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This study presents a case study of the treatment of serious mental illness in one state, 
Texas, and its largest city and county, Houston, and Harris County. It also examines 
critical factors leading to the federal government’s involvement in the treatment of severe 
mental illness from the 1960s through the early 1980s. This new role for the federal 
government inaugurated a massive deinstitutionalization movement fueled by new 
federal funding streams and federal court decisions that dramatically altered the treatment 
of severe mental illness in the United States. Across the country, states released patients 
from their psychiatric hospitals often to highly inappropriate facilities or the streets. The 
new federally funded community mental health centers focused on treating new, less ill 
patients from the community rather than treating those exiting the state hospitals. The 
number of state hospital beds dropped from a high of 550,000 in 1955 to less than 40,000 
today. The result has been the criminalization of mental illness resulting in the 
imprisonment of over 350,000 severely mentally ill citizens, and the recognition that the 
largest mental health facility in every state is the largest county or city’s jail. While other 
studies have chronicled this history on the national level, this fast-growing state and local 
community show the fate of the mentally ill who need more services than medication and 
counseling. For those lacking appropriate treatment, their illness often causes them to 
commit crimes leading to their arrest and jail. From its history of moral treatment in 
asylums that removed the mentally ill from jails, Texas and the nation have moved to the 
immoral treatment of jailing and imprisoning the mentally ill for the illnesses they cannot 
control. The failure of Texas and the nation to fund appropriate systems for the treatment 
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of mental illness in the wealthiest nation and one of its wealthiest states points to the 
dramatic need for change in our health care system.  
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  In 1982, Susan Sheehan published the Pulitzer Prize-winning book Is There No 
Place on Earth For Me? It is the true story of a brilliant woman to whom Sheehan gave 
the pseudonym Sylvia Frumkin, and who suffered from medication-resistant 
schizophrenia. Sheehan met Frumkin at the Creedmoor Psychiatric Facility in Queens, 
New York, in 1978. For the next two years, she closely followed Frumkin’s chaotic life 
in and out of different programs at Creedmoor. The chaos encompassed not just Ms. 
Frumkin, but also her family, those who sought to help her, and other patients with whom 
she came in contact in and out of the hospital. The case is a tragedy, for it showed, nearly 
forty years ago, that for her and many of those suffering from severe mental illness 
(SMI), there was no appropriate place. When Sheehan concluded her book in December 
1981, she wrote 
I hope that by the time this book is published in April she [Sylvia Frumkin] will 
be living in that apartment and that it will please her, because I want there to be a 
decent place on earth for Sylvia Frumkin, my subject and my friend, and for the 
many thousands of other people like her.1 
 
Unfortunately for Ms. Frumkin, whose real name was Maxine Mason, that wish did not 
come true. She died in 1994 at the age of 46 at the Rockland Psychiatric Center in New 
York. Her last years proved as challenging as her earlier ones, and she never found a 
place for herself.2 
 The reality is that forty years ago, there were more resources available for Maxine 
Mason than there would be today. Allen Francis, M.D. (b. 1942), former chair of the 
                                                             
 1 Susan Sheehan, Is There No Place on Earth For Me? (New York: Vintage Books A Division of 
Random House, 1983): 334. 
 2 Susan Sheehan, “Postscript: The Last Days of Sylvia Frumkin,” The New Yorker (February 20 and 
27, 1995): 200-211. 
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department of psychiatry at the Duke University School of Medicine and the psychiatrist 
who chaired the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV (DSM-IV) 
Task Force that created the standard manual for the classification of mental disorders 
used from 1994 to 2013, presented this grim reality in 2015:  
There has probably never been a worse time and place to have a severe 
mental illness than now in the U.S. Because we have criminalized 
psychiatric disorders, 350,000 patients have inappropriately been made 
prisoners. Instead of receiving treatment, they are routinely jailed for 
minor nuisance crimes that could have been avoided if they had access 
to care. An additional 250,000 mentally ill persons are homeless because 
of our failure to provide them with anything approaching adequate 
housing.3 
 
The most recent estimate by the Treatment Advocacy Center in September of 2016 put 
the number of severely mentally ill in prison or jail at 383,000.4  
 In the 1970s and 1980s, state psychiatric hospitals still provided the bulk of the 
treatment for Ms. Frumkin and others suffering from severe mental illness. However, as 
journalist Alisa Roth states in her new book, Insane: America’s Criminal Treatment of 
Mental Illness,  
Today, the country’s largest providers of psychiatric care are not hospitals at all, 
but rather the jails in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City. Across the 
country, correctional facilities are struggling with the reality that they have 
become the nation’s de facto mental health providers, although they are 
hopelessly ill equipped for the job. They are now contending with tens of 
thousands of people with mental illness who, by some counts, make up as much 
as half their populations.”5 
 
                                                             
3 Allen Francis, “Is this the Country we want to be?” Psychiatric Times 32, No. 11 (November 
2015): 1. 
 4 “Serious Mental Illness Prevalence in Jails and Prisons,” Treatment Advocacy Center, Accessed 
August 31, 2019, https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/evidence-and-research/learn-more-
about/3695. 
 5 Alisa Roth, Insane: America’s Criminal Treatment of Mental Illness (New York: Basic Books, 
2018): 2.  
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  This immoral treatment of the mentally ill in jails and prisons in America today is 
so different from the concept of moral treatment that began in this country a little over 
two hundred years ago. In 1817, the Quaker community near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
established the first asylum in the United States based upon treating the mentally ill with 
kindness in a specially constructed facility that allowed them freedom from chains and 
locked doors. Called “moral treatment” with “moral” coming from the French term 
moral, meaning psychological or emotional, it served as the basis of care for the mentally 
ill in America for most of the 19th century. The facilities were asylums, for they were 
places where the inmates were free from arrest and being locked in jail. The asylums 
proved successful in treating several patients, but eventually, states began to build more 
and larger facilities that could no longer provide the small intimate spaces for the 
mentally ill. Though some still found their sanity, these programs by the beginning of the 
twentieth century became long-term holding facilities for those whom society could 
provide little actual treatment. 
 From moral treatment that kept its patients free from jail and offered a hope of 
restoring  their sanity, our nation has moved to immoral treatment by failing to fund the 
treatment of the severely mentally ill and by locking them away in jail and prison for 
committing crimes that their lack of appropriate treatment leads them to commit. We, as a 
society, have genuinely allowed the treatment of mental illness to go from moral 
treatment with its care and concern, to immoral treatment through the criminalization of 
mental illness. 
 How did we, as a nation, become a place where we punish people for illnesses 
they cannot control? How have we regressed from a society that cared and attempted to 
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help the mentally ill to one that locks them away in a jail or prison? This study seeks to 
find answers to those questions by documenting changes at the national, state, and local 
levels with Texas and Harris County, Texas, providing the documentation for the latter 
two. Chapter I draws from recent first-hand newspaper and journal accounts to present 
the status of the treatment of those with a severe mental illness in the United States today. 
Chapter II examines the way historians and other writers have considered the changes in 
the treatment of severe mental illness over time.  Chapters III and IV look at the changes 
nationally from the 1940s through the early 1980s when the federal government became 
directly involved in the provision of mental health treatment through the community 
mental health acts and through federal court decisions that changed the treatment of 
mental illness at all governmental levels. Chapter V documents the first hundred years of 
the history of the treatment of mental illness in Texas, primarily through institutions. 
Chapters VI and VII examine the implications of the implementation of community 
mental health programs, the effect of federal court decisions, and the change in political 
leadership at the state level in Texas. Chapters VIII and IX show how the changes at the 
national and state level influenced the treatment of severe mental illness in Harris 
County, Texas, and its largest city, Houston.  
 In conclusion, chapter X points to lessons learned from this study of Texas and 
the nation to show why we, as a society, allow our governments to ignore the severely 
mentally ill and allow the criminalization of mental illness. It also looks at the 
implications of this study as it pertains to aspects of the funding of mental illness and to 
how we as a nation should treat mental illness in the future. Though this study focuses on 
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the treatment of severe mental illness, the lack of treatment of those with less than severe 
mental illness is also a problem today. 
 My interest in this topic grew out of my life’s work as an administrator of 
agencies serving emotionally disturbed children. From my education as a social worker 
and my early days of work at a small residential children’s agency in Illinois in the mid-
1970s, deinstitutionalization was the primary focus of public policy. Jerome G. Miller, 
who headed the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services at the time, had 
gained a national reputation for closing institutions with little worry about what would 
become of those leaving them. In Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, he closed 
facilities with the idea that whatever came next had to be better than being in an 
institution. Unfortunately, the wholesale closures left many individuals in inappropriate 
settings. I spent much of my career developing community-based services for children. 
Some of these programs worked well, while others such as foster care where children can 
move continually from one home to another, often leave children unconnected to others. 
With new skills in historical research, I began to search for the origins of this mass rush 
to close institutions. I also wanted to learn what had happened to the individuals 
previously served in those facilities. I chose to examine this movement and its impact on 
those served by focusing on the severely mentally ill, who are the least prepared to live 
on their own, and the most incapable of living in communities where their needs were not 
understood.   
 Mental illness affects many individuals and families; unfortunately, it is an illness 
with such a stigma, that it often remains hidden. I hope that shedding light on the illness 
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and our failure to treat it will begin to open our eyes to the real tragedy our society 
perpetuates daily.  
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I. THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL: THOSE WE 
CHOOSE TO IGNORE 
 
 Few of us talk about mental illness. The stigma about the disease is so significant 
that unless an individual or a family is dealing with a crisis that becomes public 
knowledge, few others know about it. Nevertheless, in America, it is such a common 
illness that one of five adults (44.7 million) had a mental illness in 2016. Within that 
number, one out of 25 adults (10.4 million) in the United States suffers from a serious 
mental illness (SMI) to the point of not having the ability to perform essential functions 
in one or more areas of their lives. Thirty-one percent of children received mental health 
services in 2016,1  and twenty percent of children between the ages of 12 and 17 have 
had, or currently have a “seriously debilitating mental disorder.”2  
 With that prevalence, mental illness is something that afflicts many more of us 
than we realize, especially given that many families keep mental illness a secret from 
neighbors, co-workers, and even from other family members. My family has such secrets. 
My grandfather stabbed my grandmother and, 16 years later, his second wife, both in the 
middle of the night while they were sleeping. Both wives survived and remained married 
to him. I am not sure what treatment he received after the first incident, but after the 
second, he spent several months in a veteran’s hospital for treatment of his mental illness. 
                                                             
 1 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Key substance use and mental 
health indicators in the United States: Results from the 2016 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (HHS 
Publication No. SMA 17-5044, NSDUH Series H-52), Rockville, MD: Center for Behavioral Health Statistics 
and Quality, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (2017): 3, accessed on October 
12, 2017 https://www.samhsa.gov/data/report/key-substance-use-and-mental-health-indicators-united-
states-results-2016-national-survey. 
 2 Thomas Insel, “Posts by Former NIMH Director Thomas Insel: Mental Health Awareness Month: 





Wounded by machine-gun fire in World War I, I assume my grandfather’s illness was 
probably post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). He was able to return home to his family 
and to work after both instances. I also have a cousin who has had schizophrenia since his 
teenage years. His mother cared for him until her death, and while he continues to live by 
himself, an older brother who lives nearby checks on him daily, takes him his food, and 
makes sure that he takes his medication. My wife’s grandmother spent most of her life in 
a state psychiatric hospital during the first half of the twentieth century. We do not know 
her diagnosis; my wife never knew her grandmother, and her situation was never a topic 
of discussion within the family.  
Defining Mental Illness 
 
 While all mental illnesses have significant implications for those who suffer from 
them, those with the diagnosis of an SMI are the most affected. The Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMSHA) of the United States states that an 
adult with an SMI is a person 18 years or older who had at 
any time during the past year, a diagnosable mental, behavior, or emotional 
disorder that causes serious functional impairment that substantially interferes 
with or limits one or more major life activities. Serious mental illnesses include 
major depression, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder, and other mental disorders 
that cause serious impairment.3 
 
 Psychiatrists identify several different mental illnesses, including some that may 
or may not be as severe, depending upon the effect of the illness on the person’s ability to 
function. The most severe mental illness is schizophrenia, which affects 1.1 percent of the 
                                                             
 3 “Mental and Substance Abuse Disorders,” Substance Abuse and Mental Health Service 
Administration (SAMSHA), last modified March 8, 2016, accessed on October 20, 2016, 
http://www.samhsa.gov/disorders.  While SAMSHA only identifies by name the three listed illnesses, the 
agency recognizes that any mental illness, which causes serious functional impairment to the point that it 
interferes with life activities including serious personality disorders, are serious mental illnesses. 
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population. Its onset usually comes in the late teens or the early twenties, and it decidedly 
affects the life of the young person and his/her family. A person suffering from 
schizophrenia experiences delusions, hallucinations, such as hearing voices or seeing 
things that others do not observe and has disorganized speech and behavior, among other 
symptoms.4  
 Mood disorders are another type of mental illness. These disorders include bipolar 
disorder considered an SMI, which affects 2.6 percent of the adult population in America. 
Patients with this illness have extreme swings in mood from mania, where they 
experience a euphoric high, become hyperactive, and sleep little, to a deep depression 
where they collapse into a depressive state. The second SMI in this category is major 
clinical depression, from which 6.9 percent of the adult population in America suffers. 
Persons with clinical depression have little interest in life, their mood is depressed, they 
have no energy, have trouble sleeping, or sleep all of the time, they feel worthless, have 
trouble concentrating, and often their thoughts are of death or suicide.5 Psychiatrists also 
identify dysthymia, a depressive disorder suffered by 1.5 percent of American adults; 
while not as severe as major depression, it is a persistent, long-term state of depression 
with brief interludes of a normal mood. People with this illness “tend to be chronically 
miserable.”6 Cyclothymia is a milder form of bipolar disorder that affects between 0.4 to 
1 percent of adults in America. Persons with it have less severe mood swings from 
                                                             
 4 Nancy C. Andreasen, Brave New Brain: Conquering Mental Illness in the Era of the Genome 
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10 
 
depression to mania, but it is also a persistent illness.7 An illness that has elements of 
both schizophrenia and bipolar disorder called schizoaffective disorder is a chronic 
illness with symptoms of delusions and hallucinations as well as swings in mood from 
depression to mania. It affects 0.3 percent of the population in the United States.8  
 Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is a condition that accounts for 20 percent 
of the psychiatric hospitalizations in the United States.9 Individuals who are suffering 
from BPD struggle to regulate their emotions. For long periods, they feel intense 
emotions that make it quite difficult for them to return to normalcy. They have difficulty 
with “impulsivity, poor self-image, stormy relationships and intense emotional responses 
to stressors.” As they struggle to bring their emotions under control, their actions can 
often lead to self-harm.10 The illness is “characterized by pervasive instability in moods, 
interpersonal relationships, self-image, and behavior.” It affects 2 percent of the adults in 
the United States, with “75 percent of the cases diagnosed among women” who have 
often suffered some trauma.11 
 Another type of mental illness identified by psychiatrists are anxiety disorders 
that affect 18.1 percent of adults in the United States each year.12 With these illnesses, the 
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normal adaptive responses of anxiety and fear become abnormal, appear without 
warning, and incapacitate the individual seemingly without cause. One type is a panic 
attack, which is an intense fear reaction to a great danger that is present only in the mind 
of the individual. If these attacks occur several times, and the person spends much time 
fearing another attack, he/she may have a panic disorder.13 Some prevalent types of 
anxiety disorders are phobias, which includes social phobias, also called social anxiety 
disorder, which is “the fear of doing things in front of other people that might lead to 
humiliation or embarrassment,” and specific phobias, which are the fear of something 
specific such as an animal or specific situation.  There is usually no rational basis for 
these fears, but the person reacts with significant anxiety and fear.14 2.7 percent of adult 
Americans have a panic disorder, 6.8 percent suffer from social anxiety disorders, and 8.7 
percent have a specific phobia disorder.15  
 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is an anxiety disorder first identified among 
soldiers returning from combat. Called by other names in different wars, including shell 
shock, battle fatigue, and traumatic war neurosis, the individual has flashbacks that take 
him/her back to the event, and he/she reacts as if he/she was still experiencing the trauma.  
These flashbacks may be nightmares, or they may occur when triggered by some stimuli 
that remind them of the experience. Psychiatrists now recognize that PTSD is not just a 
war-related illness, for any significant trauma in a person’s life can cause it. Such traumas 
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can include major injury produced by accidents, rapes, physical abuse, and natural 
disasters.16 PTSD affects 3.5 percent of adults in the United States.17 
 Generalized Anxiety Disorder is a milder anxiety disorder that affects 3.6 percent 
of adult Americans.18 The individuals suffering from this illness “feel anxious and 
worried most of the time and complain of … being keyed up, on edge, restless, easily 
fatigued, irritable, or tense.”19 Another anxiety disorder is Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder (OCD), which affects 1.0 percent of the adult population in the United States.20  
Persons suffering from this illness are compelled to do repetitive acts “for no obvious 
reason or to an extreme degree.” They are obsessed with thoughts that while senseless to 
others are troubling to them, and they cannot stop thinking about them. The compulsions 
and obsessions “become a disorder when they are accompanied by intense and crippling 
anxiety if [they] are resisted or not adequately satisfied.” Persons with OCD may spend 
all day trying to get dressed just right. They may follow rituals and preoccupations that 
“seem almost delusional.” Some extremes of the illness include hoarding or an extreme 
focus on orderliness.21  
 Any mental illness needs proper diagnosis and treatment, for untreated mental 
illness can lead to symptoms that are more significant. It may also lead to death or 
impairment through self-harm or it can lead to the injury of others. One of the problems 
for the mentally ill in America today is obtaining proper diagnosis and treatment. Most 
people with a mental illness in this country will first see their primary care physician. 
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That physician is familiar with the illnesses but does not have the knowledge of a 
psychiatrist to distinguish between the varieties of illnesses, nor the same understanding 
of the powerful medications used to treat them that require constant monitoring. Such 
medications often take weeks to begin to achieve results, and the effects on the person 
may change over time. If the primary care physician chooses to refer the patient to a 
specialist, there is limited availability of the specialists to whom insurance companies 
will pay. Because insurance payments to psychiatrists tend to be quite low, the number of 
psychiatrists who will accept health insurance payments is not as significant as other 
specialties. This situation often means that referrals are to social workers, psychologists, 
or other mental health therapists who may refer to a psychiatrist only those whom they 
believe need medication. Unfortunately, many individuals may not receive the proper 
diagnosis, and often, the coordination between therapist and psychiatrist ranges from zero 
to limited. 
 The impact of an SMI extends beyond the mentally ill person to his/her family. It 
taxes the financial and emotional resources of the family members to the point that they 
cannot provide the support required, placing the individual at the mercy of the greater 
community, often with poor results. For many centuries, the community viewed the 
seriously mentally ill whom their families could not hide away as persons tormented by 
evil spirits. By seeing these persons as less-than-human, communities locked them away 
under barbaric conditions.  
The Plight of the Seriously Mentally Ill Today 
 
 The personal stories of the seriously mentally ill and their families provide the 
best picture of these illnesses that most of us fail to understand. I am grateful that in 
14 
 
2014, the national newspaper, USA Today, published a lengthy series entitled “The Cost 
of Not Caring: The Financial and Human Toll for Neglecting the Mentally Ill.” That 
series, led by their health writer for twelve years, Liz Szabo, won a national award for 
excellence in medical science reporting. Through personal interviews with individuals 
suffering from severe mental illness, their family members, persons who seek to help 
them, and advocates for the mentally ill, she and other reporters working with her 
captured their stories in their own words. Ms. Szabo has since become the senior 
correspondent at Kaiser Health News and has won several more awards for health care 
reporting. I draw from her work with USA Today and the work of other writers telling 
these stories to convey an understanding of the real nature of the problems of those 
suffering from a severe mental illness today. 
 From two congressional representatives, Ms. Szabo learned that the most 
significant problem for the mentally ill is the lack of care for persons with an SMI. 
Congressman Tim Murphy, R-Pa., who is also a child psychologist, states, “We have 
replaced the hospital bed with the jail cell, the homeless shelter and the coffin.”22 Former 
Congressman Patrick Kennedy from Rhode Island, who has long advocated for the 
mentally ill, stated that in America, “mental health is a separate but unequal system. We 
have a wasteland of people who have died and been disabled because of inadequate 
care.” Kennedy noted that our nation “routinely fails to provide the most basic services 
for patients with mental illness something the country would never tolerate for patients 
with cancer or other physical disorders.” Kennedy noted that the failure of the nation to 
                                                             
 22 Liz Szabo, “Cost of not caring: Nowhere to go—A man-made disaster,” “The Cost of Not 
Caring: The Financial and Human Toll for Neglecting the Mentally Ill,” USA Today, May 12, 2014, 




provide the hospital and community care needed by the mentally ill has led to 
“overburdened emergency rooms, crowded state and local jails, and left untreated 
patients to fend for themselves on city streets.”23  
The Criminalization of Serious Mental Illness 
 
 The mentally ill, and particularly the seriously mentally ill, make up a 
disproportionate number of those incarcerated in the criminal justice system. A study in 
2012, estimated that there were 356,268 seriously mentally ill persons incarcerated in 
prisons and jails and approximately 35,000 such patients in state psychiatric hospitals.24 
In a recent blog post from the Psychiatric Times’ Couch in Crisis Blog, Allen Francis 
M.D. stated that in 2019, the last number state psychiatric hospital beds remain at “only 
about 35,000.”25 A person with an SMI in the United is ten times more likely to be in 
prison or jail than in a state psychiatric hospital. The Urban Institute, drawing from 
several studies, stated, “Severe mental illness afflicts nearly one-quarter of the US 
correctional population including individuals in prisons, in jails, and on probation,” and 
also between 15 and 24 percent of the prison population.26 The Bureau of Justice reported 
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a total correctional population in the United States in federal and state prisons, local jails, 
and on probation or parole of 6,741,400 on December 31, 2015, with 1,526,800 
incarcerated in prisons and 728,200 in jails.27 Given those numbers, over 1.6 million 
persons in the total correctional population have a serious mental illness, and between 
229,020 and 366,432 of those in prisons have a serious mental illness. No specific 
analysis for those with an SMI in local jails is available. However, assuming a similar 
range to those in prison of between 15 and 24 percent yields 109,230 to 174,768 with an 
SMI in local jails. The jails of the larger cities and counties have become the most 
extensive mental health facilities across the nation as they provide psychotropic 
medications and psychotherapy to the incarcerated mentally ill patients.28  
 Looking beyond those with serious mental illness, a study in 2005 found more 
than half of the individuals in federal and state prisons and local jails were suffering from 
some form of mental illness. That study identified 705,600 (56 percent) in state prisons, 
78,800 (45 percent) in federal prisons, and 479,900 (64 percent) in local jails as having a 
mental health problem.29 A more recent estimate, in 2014, by Dean Aufderheide, a 
clinical and forensic psychologist stated, “50 percent of males and 75 percent of female 
inmates in state prisons, and 75 percent of females and 63 percent of male inmates in 
jails, will experience a mental health problem requiring mental health services in any 
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given year.”30 Though the jail experience contributed to the problems, the mental illness 
they suffered before incarceration likely contributed to their jailing in the first place. 
 The National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI), a grassroots organization 
created by family members of persons diagnosed with mental illness, reported the jailing 
of 2 million people with mental illness each year. Of that number, 15 percent of the men 
and 30 percent of the women have an SMI. The mentally ill are more likely to encounter 
a police officer than medical help when they suffer a crisis.31 Forty percent of persons 
suffering from a serious mental illness are arrested one or more times in their lives.32 
While some jails provide mental health services, NAMI notes that 83 percent of jail 
inmates do not receive treatment for their mental illness, which only makes their illness 
worse. The mentally ill spend more time in jails than those without mental illness and 
have a greater risk of becoming victims of abuse both in jail and outside.33  
 Jails and prisons have become the placement of last resort for the mentally ill. 
Cook County, Illinois Sheriff Tom Dart oversees one of the largest jails in the nation. He 
estimates that 30 percent of the 12,000 inmates in the Cook County Jail in Chicago have 
a serious mental illness, and he describes his estimate as “a horrifically conservative 
number.” He notes that “they end up here (the criminal justice system), because we are 
the only system that can’t say no.” Dart describes one of the inmates as a “self-mutilator” 
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with more than 100 arrests, which has cost the county over $1 million “in repeated arrest-
and detention-related costs.” The sheriff states that a second inmate “recently had to be 
fitted with a hockey mask and thick gloves resembling oven mitts to keep him from 
gouging out his remaining eye. The 43-year-old man, who has bipolar disorder and 
schizophrenia, had ripped one eye from the socket before his arrival at the jail, 
complaining that he ‘didn’t want to see evil anymore.’”34 Given the size and intensity of 
the needs of the jail population, Sheriff Dart appointed a clinical psychologist and 
correctional health expert to lead the Cook County Department of Corrections.35  
 Mark Ghaly M.D., who leads the Los Angeles County Department of Health 
Services and oversees correctional medicine at the Los Angeles County jail, points out 
that many inmates within the jail may not need long-term hospitalization, but many do 
need the intensive treatment that they can only receive in an inpatient hospital for at least 
a period of time. He also notes that many would not have become so sick if they had 
received proper treatment earlier. “It’s the embarrassment of the way we’ve done mental 
health in this country in the last two decades,” he stated.36  
 Tracey Love, a woman jailed for stabbing her abusive boyfriend in 2014, was one 
of the lucky ones whom jail helped. She credits the psychiatrist who listened to her in jail 
with properly diagnosing her condition as major depression and PTSD. Her attempted 
suicide 22 years before, in 1992, had not led to a diagnosis of mental illness. In the 
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meantime, she had lost her job, custody of her son, and now had a felony record that 
means she will likely not find permanent work.37  
 Amy Lynn Cowling was one who was not as lucky in Texas in 2010. Following 
her arrest and incarceration in the Gregg County Jail for “two outstanding misdemeanor 
warrants,” the 33-year-old mother, who had bipolar disorder and opioid addiction, died 
five days later. Since 2003, Cowling had received methadone treatments for her addiction 
and other medications for her bipolar disorder and other health problems. However, the 
jail prohibited methadone treatments and her bipolar medications, so the jail’s physician, 
who never saw her, prescribed alternative medications. A nurse described Cowling’s 
conditions to him over the phone, since he only visited once a week. The jail did not 
include methadone despite Amy’s mom telling the jailers, “if she didn’t have the 
methadone, it would be bad.” The staff at the jail would not allow her family to see her or 
to speak with her.38 The other inmates later told Texas Rangers at the postmortem: 
“Within the first couple of days, Amy became unable to eat, ‘could barely walk,’ ‘used 
the restroom on herself,’ hallucinated, and had seizures.” On her fifth day in custody, the 
jail’s staff moved her to isolation, where, according to other inmates, she “was 
‘screaming’ and ‘moaning’ the entire day.” Medical staff, but not the doctor, saw her 
twice that day, and early that evening, the nurse told the doctor by phone that she was 
“hollering and uncooperative.” The physician prescribed antipsychotic medication and 
told the jail staff to place her on suicide watch. She died that evening, and her autopsy 
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concluded that she “likely died from seizures brought on by withdrawal from her 
medication.”39 
 Perhaps one of the cruelest lack of concern for persons with an SMI is the fact 
that their untreated illness leads them to commit crimes that are punishable by death. 
Marc Bookman, in a 2013 article, “13 Men Condemned to Die despite Severe Mental 
Illness,” questions why paranoid schizophrenics are eligible for execution when 
“juveniles and intellectually disabled people” are not. Bookman identified 13 such 
individuals condemned to die, seven in Texas, and six in other states. Texas executed six 
of its seven, but in the other states, all six had their sentences commuted.40 All 13 had 
committed heinous crimes, but the state of Texas’s punishment for six of them was just as 
heinous. 
Emergency Rooms Provide Critical Evaluations for the Seriously Mentally Ill
 When the police intervene in a mental health crisis, they attempt to calm the 
person and transport him/her to a hospital for evaluation; usually, this is to the emergency 
room (ER). Mental disorders account for over 4.7 million (3.6 percent of the total) 
hospital emergency room visits each year.41 Many ERs do not have the staff to provide 
psychiatric evaluations quickly, meaning the mentally ill wait longer in an ER for help. 
On average, they wait twice as long as a patient with physical health problems does, and 
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if they need services beyond what the ER can provide, they often have to wait for days in 
the ER for an open psychiatric bed.42 Since an ER cannot release a patient who requires 
hospitalization, and if no psychiatric beds are available, Robert Pierattini, a professor of 
medicine at the Vermont College of Medicine and chair of psychiatry at Fletcher-Allen 
Healthcare, notes, “It’s common for mentally ill patients … to languish for weeks in 
emergency rooms. … If this were cancer, we’d be talking about giving patients the very 
best treatments;” however, with mental illness, “a peculiarity in the funding formula is 
deciding how we treat patients.”43 Medicare and Medicaid, the two major public funding 
streams for services for the poor and elderly, both have significant restrictions on funding 
in psychiatric hospitals. While there are no limits on care in the psychiatric ward of a 
general hospital, Medicare has a lifetime limit of 190 days of inpatient care in a 
psychiatric hospital.44 Medicaid does not allow payments to “Institutions of Mental 
Disease” (Stand-alone psychiatric hospitals) for adults between the ages of 21 and 65.45 
There are no such limits for Medicare or Medicaid with any other disease. While US laws 
require private insurance to provide parity between mental and physical health benefits, 
the two major public funding streams for serving the poor and elderly do not provide 
such parity.  By limiting access to vitally needed services at a critical time, both Medicaid 
and Medicare are placing the lives of individuals in jeopardy.   
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 One such tragic case occurred in 2013, when the 24-year-old son of Virginia State 
Senator Creigh Deeds stabbed his father 13 times and then killed himself. The onset of 
the son’s illness had occurred three years earlier, but the only diagnosis the parents 
received was that he was “somewhat bipolar,” which was treatable with medication.  In 
2013, the son stopped taking his medication in the spring, and by November of that same 
year, his condition had deteriorated to the point that he required admission to an 
emergency room for evaluation. Virginia law at the time provided for up to a six-hour 
window to find a psychiatric placement for a person with a mental condition under a 
temporary custody order. Unfortunately, the psychiatrist arrived late and, following his 
evaluation, was not able to find a placement in a psychiatric hospital in the allotted time. 
The doctor released the young man despite the pleas of his mother that her son “was in a 
very bad place,” and he “would kill Creigh and himself if he was not hospitalized.”46  
 The doctor’s actions violated the nation’s Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Labor Act (EMTALA) that requires the stabilization and treatment of anyone coming to 
an emergency room. Senator Deeds noted that letting him leave the hospital “makes 
absolutely no sense. An emergency room cannot turn away a person in cardiac arrest 
because the ER is full, a police officer does not wait to arrest a murder suspect or a bank 
robber if no jail space is identified.” Virginia law has now changed, requiring the 
maintenance of a registry of available psychiatric beds and raising the time allowed to 
find a bed from six to 12 hours, and requiring state hospitals to admit the patient if no bed 
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is available within eight hours.47 Nevertheless, the new law continues to discriminate 
between physical and mental health. There is no time limit on finding a bed for a person 
having a heart attack or the victim of a tragic accident, so why must there be one for 
finding a psychiatric bed? 
 Dr. Ray Keller, medical director of an emergency room in Burlington, Vermont, 
notes that the mentally ill are in the ER because there are no other “services to keep them 
healthy. Even when all other resources have been cut, we’re the ones who don’t say 
no.”48 Mark Pearlmutter, chief of network emergency services for Steward Health Care 
near Boston, points out that some hospitals have “private rooms in the emergency 
department” for the mentally ill, while in other ERs severely mentally ill end up “in 
hallways, surrounded by noise, trauma and bright lights 24 hours a day.” He also states 
that some of the mentally ill are “physically restrained” during their stay in the ER. 
Pearlmutter says that because many of the mentally ill have no insurance, the ERs 
diagnose and stabilize the mentally ill patients without compensation. He also notes that 
taxpayers pay part of the cost through federal “disproportionate share” payments to those 
hospitals that treat significant numbers of the indigent.49 While the ERs and hospitals do 
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provide treatment without compensation from the mentally ill patient, other patients in 
the hospitals pay more for services to make up for the hospital’s loss not provided by 
disproportionate share payments. 
 For those not on Medicaid, the uncompensated medical care for the mentally ill 
comes in part from their lack of employment and access to private insurance. While the 
total percentage of unemployment among all those with mental illness is unknown, 80 
percent of the mentally ill who receive treatment through public mental health services 
are unemployed.50 Likely, this percentage is partly a reflection of the low-income ceiling 
for Medicaid eligibility for those states, including Texas, which did not expand Medicaid 
under the Affordable Care Act. According to a report of the National Alliance on Mental 
Illness (NAMI), “approximately 60 percent of the 7.1 million people receiving public 
mental health services nationwide want to work, but less than 2 percent receive supported 
employment opportunities provided by the states.”  NAMI’s Executive Director, Mary 
Giliberti, states, “Work is a critical part of recovery.” We, as a nation, do not recognize 
the link between supported work and the recovery of individuals with mental illness.51  
 Diane Volpe points to discrimination against the mentally ill as one reason they 
are not able to work. Her sister, who was a victim of a violent crime, lost her medical 
technician job when she began to exhibit signs of bipolar disorder. “They never gave her 
the option of medical leave or short-term disability.” Disability payments and Medicaid 
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are crucial for many of the mentally ill. The fear of losing those benefits keeps many out 
of the workforce, according to Giliberti.52 In 2016, 34.7 percent of all disability payments 
from Social Security went to persons suffering from mental disorders.53  
Too Many Seriously Mentally Ill Are Homeless  
 
 Many of the severely mentally ill are too sick to think about disability or 
Medicaid. These individuals are among the 138,250 of the 553,742 persons who are part 
of the official count of the homeless taken one night in January of 2017 by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development. The count includes anyone not sleeping 
in a place designed for human habitation, including an automobile.54 The actual number 
of people who are homeless and mentally ill changes daily as people move in and out of 
homelessness. An estimate of the total homeless population over a year reaches 3.5 
million.55 Rick Jervis, who examined the issue of the seriously mentally ill who are 
homeless for USA Today, says that such individuals  
 are gripped by schizophrenia, bipolar disorder or severe depression—all 
manageable with the right medication and counseling but debilitating if left 
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untreated. In the absence of such care, their plight costs the federal government 
millions of dollars a year in housing and services and prolongs their disorder.56 
 
Deborah Zelinsky, 45, was homeless for two decades before being diagnosed with bipolar 
disorder, receiving treatment, and then finding an apartment for herself. She said, “On the 
streets, you don’t have time to get treated. You are trying to survive.”57  
 Ron Powers, in his 2017 book No One Cares about Crazy People presents his 
study of the treatment of mental illness in America as he tells the story of his two sons, 
both of whom were victims of schizophrenia, with one taking his own life and the other 
attempting to do so.  His words paint a vivid picture of life for homeless persons 
suffering from severe mental illness. 
 The sudden mass visibility and eccentric behavior of the homeless have made 
them subject to demonization on a scale and intensity not seen since the Dark 
Ages. Now the police round them up—from the adolescents just emerging, 
bewildered, into insanity, to the veterans of madness, who are helpless not just 
before mental illness but before the injustices that compound it: minority racial 
status, class disability, crabbed opportunity, inadequate medical care, and family 
instability.  The police round them up for their of crimes of survival: for robberies 
of food; for possession of the illicit drugs used for self-destructive self-
medication; for loitering, vagrancy, and street harassment; for bothering 
noninsane people with their monologues and declarations; for not having homes.  
Bereft of committed support from any quarter, they live marginal, miserable lives 
and die early deaths.58 
 
 A new emerging focus on treating the homeless mentally ill recognizes that the 
first step is getting the individuals off the street. Sam Tesemberis, a housing specialist 
with New York’s Bellevue Hospital, witnessed the constant flow of persons from the 
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hospital’s ER back to the streets. He began to realize that patients with schizophrenia 
who were given a place to live and received treatment for their illness “were able to hold 
jobs, manage their bills and cook their own meals, and he encouraged advocates to house 
first, treat later.” Tesemberis concluded, “We have misunderstood profoundly what it 
means to be mentally ill.”59 A focus in Houston, Texas, on finding housing first for the 
mentally ill yielded a dramatic decrease of 57 percent, from 1,791 to 763, in the number 
of chronic homeless on the streets. Tory Gunsolley, CEO of the Houston Housing 
Authority, said that the key was housing the mentally ill “as quickly as possible. … Every 
time you have the homeless person in front of you, that’s the time to get stuff done. Every 
time you let them go, they wind up back on the street.”60 
Suicide—Serious Mental Illnesses Are Killer Diseases 
 
 Whether on the streets, in their own homes, or in an institutional setting, for those 
battling severe mental illness, far too often, their illness becomes fatal. Thomas Insel 
M.D., the former director of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), notes that 
mental illness is associated with 90 percent of suicides in America.61 The Center for 
Disease Control (CDC) notes that normally, a single factor does not cause suicide, and 
many who commit suicide do not have a diagnosed mental illness at the time they take 
their own life. Other factors such as relationship issues, use of substances, declining 
physical health, loss of a job, or stress over a difficult work situation, and stress over 
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money, legal or housing issues are often factors in suicide. The rate of suicide in America 
increased by 28% from 1999 to 2016.62 One can speculate that the difficult economic 
times of the last decade and the ongoing sense of crisis that seems to pervade our nation 
are factors in the increase. Suicide ranks number 10 in causes of death in the nation, and 
it is the second most frequent cause of death for those between the ages of 15 and 34.63 
The average cost of a single suicide is $1,329,553, with lost productivity accounting for 
97 percent of the amount and the other 3 percent being medical cost.64 With the loss of a 
life by suicide, “At least 6 [other] people are intimately traumatized by the death.”65 Insel 
shared with Liz Szabo that, “About one in 20 people with schizophrenia kill themselves 
within the first two years after their initial psychotic break [;] the brightest, most 
accomplished young people are the most at risk; perhaps they have the greatest sense of 
loss after becoming ill.” He advocated “First Episode” programs that “change the 
trajectory of schizophrenia from one of tragic decline to one of a chronic but manageable 
condition.” These “early intervention programs halt the deterioration so often seen in 
schizophrenia, allowing young people to get their lives back on track after their first full 
break with reality.”66 
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 Tiffany Martinez, who first heard voices when she was a freshman in college, 
benefited from such a program. Her father has schizophrenia, so she was aware that this 
was one of the first signs of a psychotic break. If untreated, 70 percent of persons who 
suffer the first break with reality will have their second break within a year. Her treatment 
at age 17 enabled her to continue her education, and today she is a psychiatric nurse 
practitioner helping others who are mentally ill. Martinez notes, however, that even after 
the delusions went away, she continued to have thoughts of suicide. “I struggled with that 
for a long time. When things got hard, suicide just seemed like an option for me.”67  
 Karen Kelly, 55, had coped with depression for 15 years. She reached a point 
where she said, “I was in a very dark place and could not see the way out. I just felt like I 
was letting everybody down around me, and I was never going to get better. It’s like 
being in a tunnel that’s encased in with black and you can’t see the way you came in or 
the way out, and you’re all alone.” Her psychiatrist tried to admit her to a hospital, but 
there was none available in the entire state since the only state psychiatric hospital in 
Vermont had flooded during a tropical storm, and the state had not opened another one. 
Kelly had attempted suicide several times, so her family members began staying with her 
all the time out of fear that she would make another attempt. Finally, in desperation, 
Kelly swallowed a whole bottle of pills and then told her husband, “Now they will have 
to admit me.” The action resulted in evaluation and stabilization at the ER, and 
transportation to Massachusetts, over 200 miles away, to the nearest psychiatric 
hospital.68 
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 Yolanda Solar of San Antonio, Texas, a 73-year-old grandmother who suffers 
from severe depression, tried to take her own life with an overdose of her medication. 
She received treatment at a hospital, but at discharge, she learned that she would have to 
wait seven months to see a psychiatrist because there were so few in the community, 
especially ones who specialized in seeing the elderly. The staff at the hospital’s ER, 
however, were able to make an interim arrangement for her.69 They referred her to the 
University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio’s Transitional Care Clinic.70 
That clinic helps 1,500 persons with SMIs annually until a regular psychiatrist is 
available for them. They help the severely mentally ill “avoid winding up in the ER, 
where round-the-clock activity and confusion is ill-suited to the needs of patients who are 
already agitated, suicidal or psychotic.” This arrangement in San Antonio has also saved 
money because the hospital ER is one of the most expensive places to treat patients. The 
ER cannot legally turn anyone away without treatment, but mentally ill patients often 
remain there for “hours, days or even weeks with minimal treatment, because doctors 
deem them too disabled to discharge[,] but [they] can’t find them an inpatient bed, which 
would allow them to get more intensive care.”71 
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 Far too often, those who suffer from an SMI do not receive the treatment needed 
to prevent their suicide.  Gregg Zoroya of USA Today tells the story of one young adult.  
Diagnosed with bipolar disorder and later, schizophrenia, when he was 24, Matthew 
Milam so wanted to die that he “dug his own grave in the backyard and stood outside in a 
lightning storm, begging God to strike him down.” His symptoms grew worse after he 
discovered the body of his younger brother, who had died of a heroin overdose. 
Following each of four brief hospitalizations, one for a suicide attempt, his symptoms 
improved with medication. However, every time he left the hospital, he stopped taking 
the medications. Matthew’s parents struggled to help their son, but they were not aware 
of his entire medical situation. Because he was an adult, the doctors could not 
communicate directly with them about Matthew’s specific situation unless he authorized 
the communication. Matthew eventually took his own life. Over a lifetime, half of the 
individuals with schizophrenia attempt suicide, and one out of ten die by their hand. 
Matthew’s parents believe that he “would be alive today if there had been a way to keep 
him medicated.”72 The Federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA), which places restrictions on the release of private medical information 
concerning persons 18 and older without the individual’s consent, prevents the sharing of 
information with family members unless the individual is incapacitated and not capable 
of making the decision. Along with laws that allow the mentally ill to refuse treatment, 
this law challenges the family’s ability to prevent suicides. It suggests a need for 
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revisions in laws where the family is often so crucial for the ongoing health of a severely 
mentally ill member.   
 For many Americans, the prevailing attitude toward suicide is that if someone is 
trying to kill himself or herself, there is little that others can do to stop that person. Some 
question the willingness of the nation to focus resources on decreasing the growing rate 
of suicide. While other leading causes of death in America, such as HIV/AIDS and breast 
cancer, receive increasing resources, resulting in reductions in deaths, suicide was not a 
priority for research until recently. This lack of research changed, however, with the 
increase of suicides among returning veterans from the Middle East wars. This increase 
prompted the military and Congress to focus efforts to reduce the number of deaths 
among war veterans. There is hope that knowledge gained in working to prevent suicides 
in this subset will provide answers for its prevention in the much larger civilian cohort for 
whom mental illness is fatal.73 
Severe Mental Illness Radically Compromises the Physical Health of its 
Victims and adds to the Expense Born by Families and the Government. 
 
Direct spending for the treatment of mental disorders from all sources is more 
than for the treatment of any other medical condition in the United States, totaling more 
than $201 billion in 2013.  Over 40 percent of that total spending is for institutionalized 
patients.74 While that amount is exceptional, as Insel states, the real cost to the nation was 
“at least $467 billion” in 2012. $201 billion was the actual medical expenditures, but 
Insel’s number adds the costs of disability payments and lost income from the unearned 
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wages of the mentally ill.75 Though these are the economic costs to the nation, Insel 
shared with Liz Szabo the personal costs to the lives of the mentally ill.  
 Mental illness costs Americans under 70 more years of healthy life than any other 
illness. That is because mental illness, unlike cancer or heart disease, is not a 
disease of aging. It often develops when people are in the prime of life, arising 
during adolescence or young adulthood. Left untreated, mental illness can rob 
people of decades of life. … People with serious mental illness die up to 23 years 
sooner than other Americans, giving them a life expectancy on par with people in 
Bangladesh.76  
 
A 2008 study of persons suffering from a psychotic disorder found that their odds 
of having access to a primary care physician were 45 percent less likely than for those 
without mental disorders.77 The same study also found that the odds of those with severe 
mental illness reporting difficulty in accessing care ranged from 2.5 to 7 times greater 
than the average population. These individuals “have greater difficulties navigating the 
health care system to get their needs met.” They face “financial issues delaying care, and 
being unable to get a prescription medicine.”78 Likely, a critical factor in the result of this 
study was the lack of employment from their disability and the resulting lack of private, 
employment-based health insurance on which America’s health system relies. When they 
do have access to healthcare, because of their illness, those with schizophrenia fail to take 
their medication 50 to 60 percent of the time.79 The consequences of that failure can be 
                                                             
 75 Insel, May 25, 2015. 
 76Szabo, May 12, 2014.  
 77Daniel W. Bradford, Mimi M. Kim, Loretta E. Braxton, Christine E. Marx, Marian Butterfield, and 
Eric B. Elbogen, “Access to Medical Care Among Persons with Psychotic and Major Affective Disorders,” 
Psychiatric Services 59, no. 8, (August 2008): 850. 
 78 Ibid: 849-850. 
 79 “Program Brief: Mental Health Research Findings,” Agency for Healthcare Research and 





hospitalization, if it is available, or jail if a hospital bed is not available, and their 
behaviors lead to a chargeable offense.  
A far more significant portion of those with mental illness report not being able to 
afford care than those with only physical illness. In 2014, a survey by the Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMSHA) found that 43.6 million 
adults age 18 and older suffered from a mental illness in 2013, but only 45 percent of 
them received mental health services that year. The seriously mentally ill made up almost 
10 million of that total, but despite the severity of their illnesses, over one-third of them 
received no treatment for their SMI in 2013. When asked why they had not received care 
if they had had a “perceived need” for services that went unmet, 51.3 percent of the larger 
group and 56.1 percent of the seriously mentally ill reported that they did not receive care 
for their need because “they could not afford the cost of care.”80 In contrast, the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services noted that in 2014 in all of health care, 8.2 
percent of persons in the United States stated that they had delayed or not received 
medical care because of cost, and 5.6 percent reported not obtaining prescription drugs 
due to cost.81  The World Health Organization (WHO) states that there is a significant 
gap between the actual need for treatment of mental illness and the funds available to 
treat it. In developed nations with adequate health care systems, between 44 percent and 
70 percent of patients with mental disorders fail to receive treatment. It is worse in 
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developing countries where the gap between treatment need and available resources is 
near 90 percent.82 Insel notes that in America, the “losses are especially tragic because of 
growing evidence that early intervention can prevent the mentally ill from deteriorating, 
halting what once seemed like an inevitable decline.” He further points out: “The way we 
pay for mental health today is the most expensive way possible. We don’t provide 
support early, so we end up paying for lifetime support.”83 A National Institute on Aging 
study by the Rand Corporation and Washington University School of Medicine in Saint 
Louis in 2010 found that the “the long-term economic damages of childhood 
psychological problems are large—a lifetime cost in lost family income of approximately 
$300,000, and total lifetime economic cost for all those affected of 2.1 trillion dollars.”  
The researchers noted their numbers are a “significant understatement” because it does 
not consider the “non-economic costs” experienced by those suffering from the 
disorders.84 
The Tragic Impact on Families 
 
 While the primary victim of serious mental illness is the individual afflicted, the 
second victim is his or her family. Families provide care for approximately 40 percent of 
the most disabled, seriously mentally ill. Doris Fuller of the Treatment Advocacy Center 
told Rick Hampson of USA Today, however, that the care is usually “not forever. … In 
the end, most of them bail out. They can’t take it any longer.”85 Hampson, who examined 
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the impact of the seriously mentally ill on their families, notes that families could obtain 
care in a hospital setting for their mentally ill member “only by proving they’re 
dangerous to themselves or others. Even then, a shortage of facilities ensures that patients 
often are discharged prematurely. And families face exorbitant out-of-pocket costs for all 
but the most basic care.”86 
 Laura Pogliano considers herself “lucky” because her son, who has schizophrenia, 
is still alive. However, she has a tough life. Laura spent $220,000 in savings on Zac’s 
(her son)’s care and estimated that she spent another $80,000 from her income as well. 
When she could no longer make the payments on her home in Illinois, she lost it to 
foreclosure. Pogliano drives a 12-year-old car with 100,000 miles on it, and she owes 
$150,000. However, she is lucky because, for the last two years, Medicare disability has 
paid for Zac’s medical bills, and she is close to one of the best psychiatric hospitals in the 
nation at Johns Hopkins University. She is also lucky because Zac “is not homicidal or 
suicidal,” and when hospitalized, which has occurred 13 times in six years, he usually 
does not exercise his right to keep his mother from obtaining his medical information. 
Laura noted that her life is on hold because Zac “never stops dying. … Twice a year, 
right in front of me, he disappears into psychosis, and there is very little left of who he is. 
Then medicine resurrects him for a few months, I have much of my child back, then he 
dies again.”87 
 Before his illness began, “Zac was popular, athletic, musical, (and) charismatic – 
a bit of a ladies man.’” At 17, his illness began with a diagnosis of obsessive-compulsive 
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disorder, but his condition worsened. He became paranoid and slept with a knife, and a 
further diagnosis confirmed that he was psychotic. The company where Laura worked 
could not “accept her constant interruptions and sudden departures,” and her boss, in 
front of her co-workers, called the situation “Laura’s little problem,” and said to her in 
private, “No one gives a s---.” She quit her job, then more jobs after that, to be with her 
son, who missed more school than he attended. Laura’s mental health declined, with 
panic attacks and sleepless nights. She was isolated and realized “as his (Zac’s) world 
shrank, so did mine.” Laura missed planning for her daughter’s (Leah) wedding as well 
as being with Leah at the birth of her grandchild because of Zac’s illness. Today, Laura 
works in jobs that have a short duration and are close by, so she can be available when 
Zac needs her. She takes medication prescribed by her psychiatrist for depression.88  
 Laura hopes someday “that Zac, like many with schizophrenia, will stabilize as he 
ages, that maybe after a decade the illness will loosen its grip.” Realistically, however, 
she knows that responsibility for Zac will become the task of his sister, Leah, and her 
husband, Dan. When Dan asked Laura for her approval of his marriage to Leah, she 
remembers, “I said yes, on one condition: ‘You have to accept Zac and all the things that 
come with him. You have to treat him with compassion, always, or I will haunt you!’”89  
 Laura struggles with understanding the lack of concern and even anger that people 
express about mental illness. She says she can 
understand people’s reaction to the mentally ill—mysterious disease, 
atrocious symptoms—but what about their relatives? Why have autism 
advocates been able to mobilize public support, and not families of the 
mentally ill? … Schizophrenia is not a casserole illness … no one is 
bringing food to the door. Nor are they staging fundraisers, as they do for 
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cancer patients. … Who’s going to come to a fundraiser for my son? … To 
them, he’s a problem.90  
 
In concluding his article about Laura and Zac, Rick Hampson states, “Of all the costs 
borne by Laura Pogliano and millions like her, the one of not caring may be the cruelest 
of all.”91 
Mental Illness—the Misunderstood Disease 
 
 Why is the treatment of mental illness so different from the treatment of physical 
illnesses?  Governments spend billions on research on cancer, heart disease, and other 
illnesses that are not as common as mental illness. Private insurance pays for expensive 
heart transplants, involved chemical and radiation treatments for cancer patients, and 
lifelong dialysis or transplants for patients with kidney disease. As noted above, both 
Medicare and Medicaid have a significant limitation on the treatment of the mentally ill.  
Why do we, as a nation, tolerate these differences? Our jails and prisons have replaced 
mental institutions as the place we send the severely mentally ill after they commit a 
crime because we do not treat their illness. The seriously mentally ill live hopeless 
chaotic lives on the street or moving between family, shelters, hospital, and jail. Why are 
we willing to allow such treatment, or lack of treatment, for the sickest members of our 
society? 
 Gerald Grob has written, “For too long mental health policies have embodied an 
elusive dream of magical cures that would eliminate age-old maladies.” He also points 
out that we have accepted “without question the illusory belief that good health is always 
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attainable and purchasable. The result has been periods of prolonged disillusionment that 
have led to the abandonment of severely incapacitated persons.”92   
 Nancy Andreasen M.D. writes about our reactions to the mentally ill as the reason 
we misunderstand it and allow such discrimination. 
Mental illnesses are often ignored, misunderstood, or stigmatized. Confronting 
any serious illness makes us feel charged with emotion and fear. It makes those 
of us who have a capacity for empathy or introspection recognize that we too are 
vulnerable, and that we too could suffer the same fate, as could any of our loved 
ones. We speak the names of illnesses—“cancer” … “heart attack”—in a hushed 
and respectful voice. Mental illnesses probably produce the most intense reaction 
of all, since they are the least well understood among the many human illnesses. 
Our intuitive reaction, when confronted on the sidewalk with a mumbling and 
disheveled person suffering from a mental illness, is to look away. Even when a 
close friend has a problem that requires hospitalization, we are reluctant to visit 
her.93 
 
Andreasen also recognizes the fallacy of ignoring mental illnesses. They are “among the 
most common diseases that afflict human beings.” They are also “incredibly costly” to 
treat and care, and they place such a heavy burden on the individuals suffering from them 
and their families. These are “frightening” illnesses because “they affect the brain and its 
product the mind.”94 
 E. F. Torrey M.D., a strong advocate for those suffering from severe mental 
illness, states that several “forces impede” the nation’s understanding of the “nature of 
serious mental illness.” He argues, “Schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and severe 
depression are brain diseases just like multiple sclerosis and Alzheimer’s disease.” He 
maintains that because of the influence of Freudian concepts, many still see these 
                                                             
 92 Gerald N. Grob, The Mad Among Us:  A History of the Care of America’s Mentally Ill (New York:  
The Free Press, 1994): 311. 
 93 Nancy C. Andreasen, (2001): 4. 
 94 Ibid: 4-6. 
40 
 
illnesses as psychological and not biological illnesses.95 Torrey’s argument that these 
serious mental illnesses are diseases of the brain has validity; however, one must note 
that other factors are often involved in severe mental illnesses. Torrey also contends that 
the public fails to realize the “magnitude of the mental illness problem.” America 
dramatically reduced the use of mental institutions, moving the mentally ill to nursing 
homes, jails, and prisons, or the streets.  As a nation, we stopped questioning their fate.96 
He also maintains that Americans misunderstand “the civil rights of people with severe 
mental illness.” The public believes the mentally ill should be free to choose where they 
want to live but fails to recognize that they are not free, for their “actions are dictated by 
their delusions,” and those actions often “interfere with the rights of others in the 
community.”97 In addition, he cites the “public mistrust of psychiatry,” and the 
“economic interests” and “political interests” that work to “maintain the status quo.” He 
identifies the federal government as the facilitator of the current state of the treatment of 
mental illness within the nation with its intervention in the 1960s with community mental 
health centers, and its continued “potpourri of completely uncoordinated programs” for 
persons suffering from an SMI. Chapters III and IV will show, however, that multiple 
causes were leading to the system we have today, and not just the federal government’s 
intervention or Freudian theories. Lastly, Torrey sees the there is a lack of effective 
leadership for improving mental health from advocacy groups and political leaders.98 
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Grob, Andreasen, and Torrey, each present important aspects of why we misunderstand 
mental illnesses and treat them so differently from physical illnesses.  
 This examination of the plight of the seriously mentally ill in America presents 
the results of the existing broken system for people suffering from terrible diseases. The 
ways various funding streams, both public and private, operate and the ways multiple 
levels of governmental and private responsibility address the needs of those suffering 
from an SMI all point to the difficulty of addressing such a complex problem. Beyond 
funding and the responsibility for providing services, the role of the courts in addressing 
the rights of the mentally ill is another factor that plays a crucial role in creating the 
inadequate system of care we have today. Chapter IV provides further information and 
analysis of the role federal court decisions played in creating the system we have today. 
The Status of a State System Serving the Seriously Mentally Ill  
 
 This study will seek to understand how the current inadequate system for treating 
those with an SMI developed in our nation by examining how changes at the federal level 
changed the work of treating those with mental illness at the state and local levels of 
government.  As we look at one state, Texas, we find that there are limited solutions to 
improving the system, and especially in such a rapidly growing state. State Senator Jane 
Nelson, R-Flower Mound, Texas, points to the “significant resources” that Texas has put 
into mental health care, which grew by $192 million from the 2013 to the 2015 legislative 
sessions. She also notes that if one includes the joint state and federal Medicaid funding 
for mental health, the total increase was $483 million. That seems like many resources, 
but in Texas—the second largest state in the Union and one of the fastest-growing—that 
increase in funding saw the per-capita number of psychiatric beds decrease from “11.3 to 
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10.5 beds per 100,000” between those two legislative sessions. The number of psychiatric 
hospital beds funded by the state has remained the same for over fifteen years.99 Christine 
Mann, Press Officer with the Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS), states, 
“Almost all of our state hospitals are currently at capacity, and we are admitting patients 
as soon as other patients are discharged.”100 One issue with that capacity is that less than 
half of the state-owned hospital beds (1,100) are available of civil commitments for 
individuals suffering from an SMI and in need of hospitalization—and this for a state 
with over 28 million in population. More than half of the state-owned beds (1,200) treat 
individuals with a “forensic commitment” from the criminal courts for the restoration of 
mental competency so they can legally stand trial.101  
 Stephen Glazier MBA, a fellow of the American College of Healthcare 
Executives (FACHE), and the chief operating officer of the Harris County Psychiatric 
Center (HCPC), points to the way the state has met the needs for civil commitments in 
Harris County, the state’s largest county. In 1988, 1,525 persons with an SMI were 
admitted to state hospitals from Harris County, but in 2013, “that number had fallen to 
two.” Now HCPC, a 276-bed public psychiatric hospital, serves as “Houston’s primary 
safety net hospital for psychiatry.” It remains “functionally full. … If there is an empty 
bed, it’s only because there’s an assigned patient who hasn’t arrived yet.” He states that, 
unfortunately, “about 14 percent of their patients are ‘super-utilizers’ who are likely to be 
readmitted because they have few options for supportive care after they’ve been 
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discharged.” The system is insufficient to meet the need.  It is also inefficient with the 
constant movement of patients in and out of the system. Glazier also noted, “We 
discharge many people to a [homeless] shelter,” and “we see a lot of chronic recidivists,” 
with many patients returning within 30 days.102 The word, recidivists, comes from the 
language of criminality, which suggests that at least subconsciously, it is not just the 
severely mentally ill who are jailed and in prisons who are seen as criminals, but those 
who need more treatment than our hospitals are providing. Chapter IX identifies new 
plans and funding from the Legislature for the much-needed expansion of HCPC to 
double its size that will be available early in the next decade. It will help with the 
constant turnover in patients by allowing them to remain in treatment. The expansion will 
also make HCPC the most extensive academic hospital in the nation for the treatment of 
mental illness.  
 Dr. David Lakey, associate vice chancellor for population at the University of 
Texas Health System and a former commissioner of DSHS, stated that the Texas state 
psychiatric hospitals (SPHs), which “were built in the 19th and early 20th centuries . . . are 
decaying.”103 A recent study of DSHS hospitals found that five of the SPHs—Rusk, 
Austin, San Antonio, Terrell, and North Texas at Wichita Falls—are obsolete and need to 
be replaced. It also noted that there is “ongoing maintenance and renovation” needed at 
the other five state psychiatric hospitals as well as the Waco Center for Youth.104 Given 
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the projected growth of Texas from 26.6 million in 2014 to 33 million in 2024 and the 
existing shortfall in the number of beds in the state system, Texas will need to increase its 
total state-owned beds, contracted beds, and privately funded beds from 4,855 to 6,033 
by 2024.105 This increase will only keep the number of beds proportional to the 
population as it exists now, which is not adequate for today’s needs. The study also 
recognized the lack of state hospitals in three key areas, including two that are in rapidly 
growing urban centers.106 The costs and political capital necessary to change the system 
to meet the sickest of the seriously mentally ill’s needs will be a tremendous ongoing 
challenge.   
America’s Health Care System Needs Major Reform and Prioritization 
 
 America spent $3.5 trillion or $10,739 per person, which is 17.9 percent of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2017 on healthcare, an amount that far exceeds the 
amount spent by all other countries in the world.107  The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) is an organization of 35 nations that work together 
to “improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world.”108 It 
reported that the closest countries to the United States in per capita spending are 
Switzerland at 11.5 percent of GDP and Japan at 11.2 percent for 2015.  Switzerland 
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spent $6,934 and Japan $4,149 per capita for healthcare.109 Given the amount of money 
and the comparative rates of expenditure by other countries, it is hard to understand the 
callous lack of treatment for the victims of serious mental illness that exists in America 
today. In Texas, with its wealth of natural resources and growing economic base, it is 
difficult to comprehend the critical status of its current system. Nevertheless, today, the 
banishment of the seriously mentally ill to the jails and prisons is, in reality, a return to 
the treatment they received before the building of asylums. The pain of their untreated 
illness and the burden placed upon their families is something that we, as a nation and 
state, choose to ignore. The stigma and shame associated with the individuals and their 
families are frankly beyond that afforded any other illness in our nation. 
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II. HISTORIANS’ UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
TREATMENT OF SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS IN 
AMERICA  
 An imperative for any study of history is an understanding of how other historians 
have viewed aspects of that study. Before the 1960s, historians wrote little about the 
treatment of serious mental illness in the United States. Albert Deutsch’s (1905-1961) 
The Mentally Ill in America (1938) was the only significant history on this subject before 
that time, and it unrealistically painted a picture of a continually improving system while 
highlighting the accomplishments of key leaders.1 Within a decade, his work The Shame 
of the States (1948) would portray the treatment in a much more negative light.2 
Circumstances revealed during World War II created a far different understanding of the 
treatment of severe mental illness in America. The works Nina Ridenour in 1961, of 
Jeanne Brand in 1965, and Steven Taylor in 2009 show how the events of World War II 
became part of the that changed the treatment of mental illness in America. Chapter III 
details these World War II events. 
 Beginning in the 1960s, those changes, and others, brought a new level of interest 
in the history of mental illness.  Historians have focused on the history of moral treatment 
within the asylums, the treatment and care in the public mental hospitals, and the 
community mental health center movement. They have also examined the changes in 
federal funding that began the rapid deinstitutionalization of the nation’s mental hospitals 
in the 1960s and 70s. They have highlighted the lack of planning for the aftermath of 
deinstitutionalization and the failure of the nation to serve the severely mentally ill 
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appropriately. This history has noted the difficulty in understanding and treating a disease 
for which we often lack knowledge of its causality. Not knowing its cause, our attempts 
at treating the illness have often focused on trying to alter the environment of the 
mentally ill person. In the 19th century, we moved the mentally ill from their family to an 
asylum to give them a new environment. In the 20th century, with the emphasis of 
community mental health, we attempted to alter the environment of communities and 
individuals to prevent mental illness.  Both attempts failed to achieve the needed results.  
 Most of the history written about the treatment of mental illness in the United 
States presents it as a monolithic system of care when, in reality, it has never been that. 
Each state has had its care system, and for most of the nation’s history, those systems 
were the only providers of care for the severely mentally ill. In 1963 and 1965, the 
federal government partially funded the creation of a community mental health center 
program and provided new funding streams, including Medicaid and, later, disability 
insurance that pays for much of today’s public care system for those with an SMI in 
partnership with the states. Recent observations of that care reveal that this population is 
ill served by the system of treatment in place today.  This chapter presents an overview of 
this history, noting particularly the variations of views and understandings of the writers.  
The Era of Asylums and Large Public Hospitals for the Insane 
 
 Four early works: Philippe Pinel’s M.D. (1745-1826) A Treatise on Insanity in 
1806,3 Benjamin Rush’s M.D. (1746-1813) Medical Inquiries and Observations upon the 
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Diseases of the Mind in 1812, 4Samuel Tuke’s (1784-1857) Description of the Retreat in 
1813,5 and Jean-Étienne Dominique Esquirol’s M.D. (1772-1840) Mental Maladies: A 
Treatise on Insanity in 1838,6 were descriptions of a new method of care. All four 
presented the need to treat the insane kindly and with respect. Pinel’s work, in its 
translation to English from the original French, coined the term “moral treatment” to 
describe programs where the physician, assisted by staff and using kindness and clear 
direction, guided patients back to sanity. Pinel’s book gained acceptance across Europe as 
an innovation away from cruel, inhumane means used previously. Samuel Tuke described 
the Retreat at York that his grandfather William Tuke (1732-1822) began in the 1790s 
using kindness and direction in a family-like setting to serve mentally ill British Quakers. 
His book was a practical description of the establishment and operation of the small 
facility, from fundraising and building design to treatment concepts. Esquirol was a 
student of Pinel, and his work served as the primary text for psychiatry in France for 
more than fifty years. Benjamin Rush also wrote of treating the insane with kindness, but 
his work focused on the more traditional concepts of medicine that were prevalent at that 
time. All of these writers influenced the treatment of mental illness, and Pinel and Tuke’s 
works, with their focus on moral treatment, launched the start of the asylum movement 
both in Europe and in the United States. 
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 Two events in the 1840s profoundly influenced the treatment of the seriously 
mentally ill in America for the next 120 years. Dorothea Dix (1802-1887), a teacher, 
became a champion for the insane. She visited the jails and poorhouses that housed the 
insane, and she wrote “Memorials” to state legislatures in each of the eight states she 
visited, plus one to the United States Congress. She asked the state legislatures and 
Congress to move away from the barbaric treatment of the insane and to build new public 
asylums to house and treat them.7 Her “Memorials” were quite successful in persuading 
states to build the new structures. Her work reinforced the movement to commit the 
nation to the treatment of those with serious mental illness within institutions explicitly 
built for that purpose. 
 A second movement in the 1840s that reinforced this commitment was the 
founding of the Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the 
Insane (AMSAII), which eventually became the American Psychiatric Association 
(APA). AMSAII formed a powerful group committed to treating the insane within 
asylums. It set standards for the new facilities and the administration of the work within 
them. Amariah Brigham M.D. (1798-1849), superintendent of the Utica State Lunatic 
Asylum in New York, published the independent American Journal of Insanity until his 
death in 1849. Subsequent superintendents at Utica continued the publication, and it 
became the official voice of the association, regularly reporting its minutes, its actions, 
and frequently, articles from its members. During its first half-century, the association 
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guided the states as they looked to it for everything, from building designs for new 
asylums to staffing needs and basic organizational plans. 
 Historians’ interest in the early treatment of mental illness emerged primarily in 
the 1960s as mental institutions came under direct attack by an anti-psychiatry movement 
and by many psychiatrists who had abandoned the institutions and who now saw them as 
evil themselves. The term “institutionalization,” which developed at that time, suggested 
that just being in an institution, harmed the patients they existed to serve. One historian, 
David J. Rothman, accepted the arguments of the anti-psychiatry movement, and in The 
Discovery of the Asylum in 1971, he challenged the concept of asylums as benevolent 
institutions focused on curing or even helping the mentally ill.8 Linking mental asylums 
with other institutions of that period such as prisons and almshouses, he concluded that 
society in the first half of the nineteenth century became obsessed with losing control of 
the established order of colonial America, as changes in the economy and the arrival of 
new immigrants transformed the demographic makeup of the nation and altered its 
culture. Rothman argued that urban, middle-class reformers feared that lawbreaking, 
poverty, idleness, and illness would bring irreparable damage to the nation. For Rothman, 
the asylums for the mentally ill and the other institutions were the reformers’ way of 
bringing social control to their changing world. These institutions also provided a way to 
hide the deviant from the rest of society. Rothman sees the asylums as places of 
authoritarian control, which inevitably led to the abuse of the helpless inmates housed 
within them. Rothman’s work provided fodder to the deinstitutionalization movement 
sweeping the country in the early 1970s. However, his theoretical focus failed to 
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recognize the legitimate role the asylums played in helping even some extremely ill 
individuals recover their sanity.  
 Historian Gerald N. Grob’s (1931-2015) Mental Institutions in America (1973) 
challenged Rothman’s views.9 He argued that Rothman approached the treatment of 
mental illness from an ideological framework, not examining the real world of care for 
the patients. Grob’s study found people leaving asylums without having to return, helped 
in such a way that they could function in society. Instead of finding evidence of harsh 
treatment in the institutions, Grob found places of kindness and positive management. He 
also found that in the “moral treatment” era, before the number of patients grew so large 
around 1890, the majority of patients spent three to nine months in care before returning 
to society. In looking past the flourishing cry to close the institutions prevalent as he 
wrote, Grob found historical evidence that the asylums were not places of coercion and 
control, but practical facilities where mentally ill persons did recover when treated with 
kindness. 
 Nancy Tomes’ A Generous Confidence (1984) drew from the writings of Thomas 
Kirkbride M.D. (1809-1883) and the early records of the Pennsylvania Hospital for the 
Insane, where he served as superintendent. Tomes also challenged Rothman’s view by 
noting that asylums were the standard treatment for the mentally ill in Europe as well as 
America, and therefore not solely determined by fears of the changing society in 
America. Kirkbride was one of the earliest leaders of AMSAII, and his ideas and 
architectural plans became the standard as states planned and built new facilities. 
Kirkbride saw the institution itself as key to improving the lives of the insane. Tomes 
                                                             




concluded, “Notwithstanding the limitations apparent to a modern observer, Kirkbride’s 
approach to patient care was certainly far superior to our own in one crucial respect: The 
care of chronic insane.”10 Tomes was not suggesting a return to the asylums, but her 
focus on the humane care and treatment of those suffering from serious mental illness is a 
reminder of how far our nation had moved away from its previous concern for these 
individuals.   
 Constance M. McGovern, in Masters of Madness (1985), examined sources from 
the founding of AMSAII and gleaned information about several of its founders.11 Her 
work presents these leaders as focused on creating the ideal place for the treatment of 
mental illness and helping others to use their understandings to provide better care. Grob, 
Tomes, and McGovern all present the early asylums as positive places for the mentally ill 
for the time and place in which they existed. Their arguments and evidence suggest that 
asylums provided a vital role for society and individuals at a time when there was no 
other place for those with serious mental illness. Today, we again have no place for them. 
 The moral treatment of the mentally ill in small asylums gave way to the rapid 
growth of large institutions as the numbers of mentally ill began to proliferate in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. Edward Shorter in A History of Psychiatry (1997) 
suggests that in part, this rapid growth of mental institutions came from changes in 
families who became less willing to tolerate the insane within their homes. He also points 
out that the number of persons in the asylums rose dramatically during this time, with 
increasing patients suffering from neuro-syphilis and alcoholism. While there is ample 
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documentation of the increase in these illnesses, he also argues that schizophrenia, rather 
than being an ancient disease that psychiatry identified more clearly might be a disease of 
recent origin since there is little documentation of its existence before 1800. Adherents to 
this recency (new disease) theory see it as accounting for the significant growth of mental 
illness beginning in the late nineteenth century.12 Shorter’s work focuses on the history of 
psychiatry and how that specialty has attempted to help the mentally ill while at the same 
time dealing with the changing cultural environment in which it practices. The 
recognition of how culture and society have changed the practice of psychiatry and the 
public’s understanding of mental illness are essential concepts in presenting the history of 
the treatment of serious mental illness. His presentation of the significant growth in new 
mental institutions and their burgeoning growth in size provides evidence of the change 
in treatment venues from small intimate facilities to large custodial institutions with too 
many patients and not enough resources to provide the treatment needed.    
 One who experienced first-hand this change in mental institutions was Clifford 
Beers (1876-1943). Beers’ A Mind that Found Itself, written in 1908, tells of his own 
experience with mental illness and the harsh and abusive care he experienced in a variety 
of mental institutions.13 It caught the attention of progressive thinkers of that era who 
were open to new ideas. Beers’ work presented a realistic picture of what mental illness 
was like for the person suffering from it, and what that individual endured as he received 
treatment for his illness. Beers initially wanted to correct the abuses he had suffered 
within mental hospitals; however, Adolf Meyer M.D. (1866-1950), the most prominent 
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neuropsychiatrist of his day, persuaded him to broaden his focus to one of preventing 
mental illness. While there was no real understanding of how to prevent mental illness, 
Beers’ book led to the formation of the mental hygiene movement that advocated for 
early intervention (particularly with children), the promotion of mental health, and the 
prevention of mental illness using public health concepts.14 On the downside, Wendy 
Kline, in Building a Better Race (2001), notes that a parallel movement focused on 
eugenics. That movement led to the incarceration and sterilization of many women and 
men because they had the label of “feeble-minded”15 Instead of Beers’ work leading to a 
needed examination of the abusive treatment in overcrowded state hospitals, it launched a 
movement focused on unproven ideas on ways of preventing mental illness. Eugenics 
focused on measuring intelligence and creating standards of what was normal and 
abnormal. Though the two movements were separate, the concept of norms and the belief 
that both mental illness and mental intelligence were inherited traits, which passed from 
one generation to the next, were characteristics they had in common.   
The Progressive Era Brought Change to Psychiatry, but Few Changes to the 
Institutions 
 
 The Progressive Era, from the turn of the century and the first two decades of the 
twentieth century, brought new concepts and changes thanks to Beers’ book and his 
subsequent work of developing the mental hygiene movement. David J. Rothman, in 
Conscience and Convenience (1980), asks why the rise of the mental hygiene movement 
and the limited development of outpatient clinics and psychopathic hospitals did not lead 
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to the replacement of the mental asylums. He notes that other than changing the name of 
asylums to hospitals and adding many new patients to them as the local poorhouses and 
county homes closed as part of the reforms of the Progressive Era, none of the 
progressive concepts succeeded “in reforming the asylum, in elevating conscience over 
convenience.”16 Rothman’s commitment to the deinstitutionalization movement led him 
to overlook the reality that there was nothing to replace the mental hospitals at the turn of 
the century. Closing the institutions without well-planned programs to take their place 
was not a practical solution, yet this is precisely what happened in the 
deinstitutionalization movement of the 1960s and 70s. 
 Grob’s Mental Illness and American Society 1875-1940, published in 1983 and 
using sources from a much broader era than Rothman, continue to note that despite the 
overcrowding and increasing problems within the mental hospitals in America, they “did 
provide minimum levels of care for individuals unable to survive by themselves.”17 He 
also traces psychiatry’s movement away from the administrative role within the 
institutions and toward the mainstream of medicine with a new focus on the mental 
hygiene movement. This, he states, took place at the same time that “the nature of the 
patient population of the institutions changed drastically” from the bulk of the patients 
being acute mental cases requiring shorter-term care, to the higher number becoming 
chronic cases of older persons with “somatic disorders” and “accompanying behavioral 
symptoms.” Many of the new patients spent much of their lives in the institutions. Grob 
states that in this era, “the central issue was not access to therapy or therapeutic 
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effectiveness, but rather decent and humane care of patients whose physical and mental 
conditions precluded the possibility that they could care for themselves.”18 Grob shows 
how the changes in psychiatry during this time put in place the first elements of the 
coming change in psychiatry and its institutions before World War II. Grob’s statement 
about “minimum levels of care” for those with serious mental illness may be generous. 
My work suggests that in Texas and other states, there was no real treatment for mental 
illness, and the care was not always decent and humane. 
 Grob states that the Progressive Era saw the movement of psychiatry out of the 
institutions to service in the community. Historian Elizabeth Lunbeck in The Psychiatric 
Persuasion (1994) asserts that in the Progressive Era at the beginning of the twentieth-
century psychiatry moved from a focus on the insane to a focus on the ordinary lives of 
people.19 She found that psychiatrists of the early twentieth century, who worked in the 
community outside of the asylums and hospitals, were bringing “their specialty’s insight 
to bear on every human endeavor,” describing normal “as that which is most common” 
and evaluating person’s actions on “what ought to be.”20 She states that psychiatry, which 
in the nineteenth century was “visible only in the margins—in the asylum—had by the 
second decade of the twentieth century established itself as the center of social and 
cultural life.”21 With these changes, she suggests, the place of practice for psychiatrists 
began to move from the large state institutions to smaller hospitals, outpatient clinics, and 
private practice. She is right that psychiatry began to change in the Progressive era.  
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However, Lunbeck’s close identification with the work of Michel Foucault, a critic of 
psychiatry, is reflective of his (Foucault’s) criticism. Through her case studies, she argues 
that psychiatrists became the definers of normality, and that definition showed the bias 
distinctions of male psychiatrists over female social workers. To her, psychiatry was a 
pseudoscience that assisted people with normal living, and she no longer saw mental 
illness as a valid diagnosis. She began her work with the belief that the profession of 
psychiatry and the diagnosis of mental illness were invalid ideas that had outlived their 
time. She then found evidence to prove her thesis in a unique setting at the Boston 
Psychopathic Hospital from 1912 to 1921.   
The Community Mental Health Movement 
 
 Jack Ewalt, a psychoanalyst by training, professor of psychiatry at Harvard, and 
administrator of the Massachusetts state mental health system, and his wife, Patricia, a 
psychiatric social worker, saw the role of psychiatry much broader than that pictured by 
Lunbeck. In their 1969 article, “History of the Community Psychiatry Movement,” they 
traced the development of community psychiatry and the movement toward community 
mental health beginning from the latter part of the nineteenth century. To them, mental 
illness was real, but its treatment should be in the community away from the hospitals. 
They saw its role expanded to focus on prevention with the underlying assumption that 
there was a relationship between the environment and mental illness.22 Essentially, they 
tied each of the critical developments in psychiatry and the treatment of mental illness to 
the need to change the environment.  To them, psychiatry had moved away from the 
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institution –the asylum--that gave it birth to the broader focus on the causes of mental 
illness that existed in the community. The Ewalts concluded with a call for action: 
 If we are to make any substantial progress in promoting mental health and
 preventing mental illness and social disorder, we must involve ourselves in
 informed consent activism to change our national goals and priorities. We cannot
 afford to have health, welfare, and education programs cut to give higher priority
 to highways, wars, farm support, and missiles.23 
 
The Ewalts wrote at the height of the excitement about the community mental health 
center movement when all things seemed possible. Just six years later, Jack Ewalt would 
acknowledge that community psychiatry had its limitations. He saw that the Community 
Mental Health Centers (CMHCs) that focused their efforts on the medical treatment of 
clients with mental illness were “very successful.” Whereas those CMHCs that focused 
on trying to change the broader community by attacking “racism, poverty, and education” 
were less successful.24 
 Gerald Grob, in From Asylum to Community in 1991, points out in the 1960s, this 
focus on treatment within the community came to define psychiatry. Community 
psychiatrists and psychoanalysts believed that their work, together with movements for 
social justice, would significantly improve individuals and society. Psychiatrists, much 
more than physicians in other specialties, came “to support legislation designed to assist 
less fortunate individuals and groups.”25 Grob states, “The pervasive confidence of these 
years grew out of a conviction that medical and scientific advances, combined with new 
institutional forms and enlightened federal leadership, provided the mechanisms that 
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would overcome the existing defects of public hospitals.”26 President Harry Truman 
(1945-1952) wrote to a joint meeting of the APA and the American Psychoanalytic 
Association (APsaA)  
Never have we had a more pressing need for experts in human engineering.  The 
greatest prerequisite for peace, which is uppermost in the minds and hearts of all 
of us, must be sanity –sanity in its broadest sense, which permits clear thinking on 
the part of all citizens. We must continue to look to the experts in the field of 
psychiatry and other mental sciences for guidance in the evaluation of our mental 
health resources.27 
 
Grob states in the 1950s, “pervasive faith in the national government and a corresponding 
belief that states were backward, parsimonious, and reactionary” began to reshape the 
nation’s views about the treatment of mental illness. He notes that mental health activists 
within the APA and the AMA joined forces to work to change the treatment of mental 
illness in the nation. Working with other groups and with the personal interests of 
President John Kennedy because of his sister’s intellectual disability, Congress passed the 
Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963. Grob argues that this act “undermine[d] 
the traditional emphasis on institutional care and treatment of the severely mentally ill.”28 
The passage of this act and subsequent legislation in 1965 brought significant change to 
the treatment of severe mental illness in the United States. Grob’s understanding of the 
events and circumstances leading to this dramatic change are noted in chapters III and IV, 
which focuses on the movement to community mental health and the subsequent 
deinstitutionalization and abandonment of those with severe mental illness. 
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Interpretations of the National Politics of Community Mental Health 
 
 As historians and others have examined the politics of changing the nation’s 
treatment of mental illness, they have found differing understandings of how and why it 
occurred. Frances Fox Piven (b. 1932) and Richard A. Cloward (1926-2001) saw the 
CMHC legislation in a broader context as part of a wave of legislation aimed at providing 
resources directly to the cities in order to quell growing concern in the 1960s over the so-
called “urban crisis” in America.29 Unfortunately, there never was enough funding in 
community mental health to provide all the services needed for direct treatment, and there 
was unquestionably little money to tackle the issues seen as causing mental illness.   
 Henry A. Foley M.D., a physician and federal bureaucrat at the time of the 
passage of the CMHC Acts, argued that the leadership of Robert H. Felix, M.D. (1904-
1990), the first director of the NIMH, was critical in creating the community mental 
health movement. Felix had an excellent rapport with crucial legislative figures and 
financial sponsors who supported improving the treatment of mental illness in the nation. 
Foley stated that the mental health portion of the CMHC Act of 1963 and the subsequent 
staffing amendment in 1965 resulted from the work of a group that included the NIMH 
staff and advocates working under the leadership of Felix. Foley, who worked with the 
NIMH, noted that this “oligarchy” of advocates, government bureaucrats, and politicians 
worked together over several years to raise the nation’s awareness of the need for change 
in mental health care.30 Their central premise was that psychiatric care needed to shift 
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from institutional care to community care because the mentally ill “could be better served 
through community mental health centers and not through large state mental institutions 
isolated from community life.” 31 Foley pictured the NIMH and its community mental 
health advocates as creating the issue and need for change and supplying the solution it 
wanted, which was the law to fund the creation of community mental health centers.32  
Foley and Steven S. Sharfstein, M.D. (b. 1942), former associate director of 
behavioral health at the NIMH, noted that President Kennedy appointed an Inter-Agency 
Committee on Mental Health to advise him on how to proceed with recommendations for 
mental health.  This committee chaired officially by Secretary of Health Education and 
Welfare (HEW) Abraham Ribicoff included the Secretary of Labor, the administrator of 
Veterans Affairs, and representatives of the Council of Economic Advisors and the 
Bureau of the Budget. The NIMH worked with the committee “to develop specific 
proposals for consideration.” President Kennedy accepted the committee’s plan, and it 
formed the basis for the creation of comprehensive community mental health centers 
(CMHCs).33 Foley and Sharfstein point out that the committee and President Kennedy 
wanted the Community Mental Health Center Act in 1963 to pay for both the 
construction of the centers and the initial cost of staffing them. The President believed 
that the state and local governments would not build the centers without initial federal 
operating support because they could not afford to do so.34 Congress in 1963, however, 
was “wary of legislation that called for further federal involvement in the nation’s health 
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sector.”35 When the AMA opposed the staffing expenditures in the 1963 bill, claiming it 
would lead to socialized medicine, the President and the supporters accepted the 
construction bill. They hoped that if Republican Barry Goldwater ran for President in 
1964, his ultra-conservativism might lead to the election of a more liberal Congress that 
would pass funding for the staffing of the centers.36  
Historian Randal Woods notes that when Lyndon Johnson assumed the 
presidency upon the President’s assassination, he began immediately to work toward 
putting Kennedy’s legislative agenda in place, expanded by his views. In 1964, President 
Lyndon Johnson (1963-1969) used his political skills and relationships with Congress to 
pass the Civil Rights Bill and a tax reduction bill. Those same skills and relationships 
then played a significant part in the passage of the CMHC staffing bill in 1965, along 
with Medicare and Medicaid and several other bills called the “Great Society” legislation. 
Woods points out that in working with Congress, Johnson knew the details of over 1,000 
significant bills that Congress had considered from 1963 to 1966 and worked with 
members of Congress to pass most of his agenda.37 Historian Julius Zelizer states that the 
key to passage of the legislation went beyond Johnson’s political skill and owed much to 
the election of large Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress in 1964 with the 
defeat of Goldwater. That election enabled a liberal majority of Democrats and some 
liberal-to-moderate Republicans to overwhelm the coalition of Southern Democratic 
committee chairs and conservative Republicans to create a brief “aberration” in an 
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otherwise conservative Congresses from the end of the New Deal in the 1930s onward.38 
Kennedy’s death, Johnson’s overwhelming victory in the 1964 election, and his 
legislative skills played significant roles in the creation of community mental health 
centers in the nation. 
E. Fuller Torrey M.D. (b. 1937), a psychiatrist and critic of deinstitutionalization 
in American Psychosis in 2014, blames the failure to treat the nation’s seriously mentally 
ill on the creation of community mental health as government policy. He identifies 
President Kennedy and Robert Felix as the key individuals responsible for that action.39 
He declares that by moving care from the sole responsibility of state governments, the 
federal government made a fundamental error, and he calls for a reversal of policy and a 
return to a time when the states had responsibility for decision-making for the treatment 
of the mentally ill. To him, the problem in the nation’s mental health system is 
determining who is accountable and responsible for the services provided. The federal 
government provides funding through several different programs, but Torrey sees no 
entity as really being in charge of services to the seriously mentally ill.40 Torrey’s focus is 
on those with severe mental illness. To Torrey, the major flaw of our nation is its focus 
on the broader concept of mental health, which emphasizes prevention and treating less 
debilitating mental disorders, rather than the more specific treatment of serious mental 
illness. He points out that the organizational and funding system devoted to mental health 
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has not worked to prevent mental illness nor provide appropriate treatment for the 
mentally ill over the past half-century.41  
 Political scientist David A. Rochefort, writing in 1984, saw the CMHC Act of 
1963 as the third psychiatric revolution, with psychoanalysis in the 1910s and ’20s being 
the first and the introduction of psychotropic medications in the 1950s the second.42 In 
pointing to the CMHCs as a revolution, he identifies the “new image of the mentally ill 
that became prevalent in American society during the decades following World War II” 
as the source of the act and its passage.43 Citing surveys and the popular media portrayals 
of mental illness, he concluded that rather than seeing the passage of the CMHC Act as 
the product of elite policymakers in Washington, it actually “reflected a broad cultural 
shift in views of mental illness and the mentally ill that had occurred from the late 1940s 
to the early 1960s in America.”44 He suggested that the “passage of the CMHC Act thus 
can be seen as a case study of a policymaking process based less on proven solutions to 
well-defined problems than on widely-held social perceptions as to the nature of a 
particular social issue and some appropriate responses.”45 
Conclusion 
  
 Historians of the treatment of severe mental illness emerged in the last half of the 
twentieth century at the time the nation was experiencing both tremendous societal 
changes and changes in its understanding of the treatment of severe mental illness. As the 
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federal government led the nation from treatment in institutions to treatment in the 
communities, some historians looked back on the early institutional history through the 
anti-psychiatric and anti-institutional concepts of their own time and found only harm in 
the institutions. Other historians found that the institutions had achieved positive 
outcomes for those suffering from severe mental illness at an earlier time. They also saw 
that with the wholesale movement to the community in their own time, many sufferers of 
chronic severe mental illness did not receive appropriate care and treatment. Still, other 
historians found that instead of being a movement based upon careful planning and 
realistic ideas of the needs of these individuals, the movement to the community rested 
upon changing societal understandings based upon the perceived evils of institutions. Led 
by individuals with a commitment to community treatment and occurring at a time of 
political and societal change, the nation committed itself to a course of action that 
prevails to this day.  
 The historians noted above, and others identified in chapter IV, all see the nation 
as one large structure and fail to recognize the critical roles played by states and local 
governments in providing and funding that care. In seeing the treatment of severe mental 
illness only from a national viewpoint, historians have failed to see the unique events and 
circumstances within a state that have influenced the treatment of severe mental illness.  
Since the states bring distinctive perspectives, it is important to add such a study to this 
history. This work will focus primarily on the history of the treatment of severe mental 
illness in the state of Texas and its most populous city Houston, located in Harris County. 
It will look for information gained there that may have implications for understanding 
what happened across the nation that led to the unfortunate treatment of the severely 
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mentally ill that exists today.  I hope that it will also inform Texas and Harris County 




III. PSYCHIATRY BECOMES A SIGNIFICANT 
POLITICAL FORCE AND PUSHES THE NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT TO TAKE A MAJOR ROLE IN THE 
TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS AND TO MOVE 
AWAY FROM THE INSTITUTIONS  
 
 At the end of the nineteenth century, psychiatry began to move away from its 
historic role in the state mental asylums and hospitals. Its new growing focus became the 
office-based treatment of individuals in the community. In 1894, Neurologist S. Weir 
Mitchell, M.D. (1829-1914), challenged the psychiatrists’ historic role in an address to 
the 50th-anniversary conference of the American-Psychological Association formerly the 
Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane 
(AMSAII) and would later become the American Psychiatric Association. He was highly 
critical of the psychiatrist’s position in asylums that now primarily served only custodial 
patients. He questioned their lack of “reports of scientific study, of the psychology and 
pathology of [their] patients.” He questioned how they could make any scientific progress 
as was happening in surgery and other medical practices of the day.1 The Mental Hygiene 
movement launched by Clifford Beers in the next decade encouraged the movement of 
psychiatrists away from the institutions.2 The bulk of the patients within the hospitals had 
changed with far fewer patients suffering from short-term acute mental illness to many 
more persons needing long-term custodial care for their chronic illnesses.3 The number of 
                                                             
 1 S. Weir Mitchell, M.D. “Address before the Fiftieth Annual Meeting of the American-
Psychological Association, Held in Philadelphia, May 16th, 1894,” Journal of Nervous and Mental Illness 19 
no. 7, (July 1894): 422, 424. 
 2 Clifford Whittingham Beers, A Mind That Found Itself: An Autobiography, (New York: Longmans, 
Green, and Co., 1908). 
 3 Gerald N. Grob, Mental Illness and American Society 1875-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1983): quote on page xi-xii. 
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patients also grew exponentially in the hospitals as county, and local facilities closed, and 
those patients moved to the state hospitals. This movement away from serving the 
severely mentally ill patients in the institutions would climax a half-century later in a new 
movement led by psychiatry and the medical community to create new federally funded 
community mental health centers to replace the hospitals. Psychiatry would gain a 
significant political advantage following World War II that would allow it to lead the 
nation to make this change.  This chapter is a study of the critical steps that created this 
advantage for psychiatry and the medical community to bring about this change.  
Introduction  
 
 The circumstances leading to what ultimately became a catastrophic loss of care 
and treatment for those suffering from an SMI included the growing criticism of public 
mental hospitals that began at the close of World War II and ultimately morphed into a 
significant anti-psychiatry movement. Another critical factor was the perception that 
mental illness was a much more significant problem than previously thought and needed 
to be addressed differently. Also, the growing number of mentally ill in state hospitals 
and the increasingly high costs incurred by the states to provide for them led states to 
explore new alternatives. Moreover, new antipsychotic drugs became the first 
breakthrough in the treatment of those with an SMI since the development of “moral 
treatment” almost 130 years before.4 The marketing and excitement created by the new 
medications was the catalyst that accelerated the changes that followed. All of these 
circumstances led to significant modifications from the 1960s to 1980 at the federal 
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government level, altering the traditional leadership role by the states in the treatment of 
mental illness, and ultimately leaving no specific level of government with the 
responsibility for the treatment of those with an SMI.  
 The lack of actual research and data supporting the conceptualization of 
community mental health programs and its reliance on faith in the medical community is 
reminiscent of the claim by the early superintendents of the asylums that moral treatment 
alone could cure mental illness. In the end, both failed to meet the needs of the patients 
and the expectations of the psychiatrists and the community. 
 Chapter IV addresses the changes that took place from 1963 through the early 
1980s, in which the new federally supported community mental health center programs, 
new federal funding streams, and federal court decisions launched a movement to 
deinstitutionalize people with a mental condition in the United States. This movement 
drastically and rapidly reduced the available institutional facilities for those with an SMI 
without providing appropriate alternative care. To understand the changes in the 
treatment of the seriously mentally ill in Texas, one must understand changes at the 
national level detailed in this chapter and the next. 
Significant events during World War II Led to Changes in the Treatment of 
Mental Illness 
 
 World War II (WWII) proved to be the beginning of the turning point for the 
treatment of mental illness in America. Medical historian Jeanne L. Brand (1918-2013), 
writing in 1965, described the growing role of the federal government in mental health 
“as part of a larger, over-all commitment to community responsibility for the health and 
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welfare of its members.”5 To this point in time, the federal government had accepted no 
role in the treatment of mental illness, deeming it a state responsibility.  A century before, 
in 1854, following a major campaign led by Dorothea Dix, Congress had passed a bill 
setting aside 12,225,000 acres in federal land to fund the treatment of mental illness. The 
bill failed to become law when President Franklin Pierce vetoed it, stating, “If Congress 
have power … to make provision for the indigent insane … it has the power to provide 
for the indigent who are not insane, and thus to transfer to the federal government the 
charge of all the poor in all the States.”6 Now, ninety years later, wartime experiences 
raised the nation’s concern about mental illness. Nina Ridenour (b. 1904) found that 
psychiatrists at the beginning of World War II asked the federal government to include 
their profession in the selection process for military draftees to prevent what had 
happened in World War I, when so many soldiers succumbed to “shell shock” and 
required intensive treatment at government expense. The psychiatrists pointed out, 
“Every psychiatric casualty in World War I had cost American taxpayers $30,000. … 
[And] three out of five beds in the 79 veterans’ hospitals were occupied by patients with 
nervous and mental diseases.”7 With the psychiatrists’ help, the WWII selection process 
rejected over 1.75 million inductees for military service because of mental and emotional 
disability and discharged another 750,000 for psychiatric reasons during the war.8 The 
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military rejected more persons for mental conditions than for any other reason, and this 
suggested that mental illness was a significant problem for the nation.9  
 Though those numbers got the nation and its politicians’ notice, one recognizes 
that due to the significant influence of eugenic ideas and the theoretical bases of 
psychiatry at the time, the rejections and discharges were over-inflated. Recent studies 
have shown that psychiatry’s attempt to identify and reject mentally ill or intellectually 
disabled10 persons from the military during WWII neither reduced the numbers of 
“psychological casualties” from the war nor successfully identified those “who would 
have made good soldiers.”11 Whether or not the work of the psychiatrists was accurate, 
the finding that millions of young men, screened for the draft or enlistment, were 
mentally unfit for duty raised the issue that mental illness was a growing concern that 
needed national attention.  
 Brand also stated that during the war, “early intensified treatment” of the soldiers 
had enabled the “discharge of seven out of every ten psychotic patients admitted to 
hospital(s).”12 Brand, in using the term “psychotic” misused the term, for the patients 
were not psychotic since “battle fatigue” is not a psychosis, but a milder form of mental 
illness. However, the success highlighted by Brand did lead to a dramatic increase in 
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interest by physicians in psychiatry and particularly in psychoanalysis, which was 
successful in treating early PTSD at the front line right at the onset of the disease. 
Psychoanalysis was not as successful in the treatment of psychoses from which most 
individuals with an SMI suffer. The success of treating these patients during the war, 
however, suggested to the public that there could be new hope for patients in 
overcrowded public mental hospitals across the nation.  
 A second wartime experience that raised the concern of the nation for the 
mentally ill came from the work of conscientious objectors (COs). In place of military 
service, over 3,000 COs worked as low-paid attendants in the nation’s mental hospitals 
during the war. While Clifford Beers, had told of his own experience in a variety of 
mental institutions in 1908,13 Brand noted, “For the first time in American history, 
intelligent, high-caliber attendants witnessed the neglect, over-crowding, often barbarism, 
in public mental hospitals throughout the country.”14 Ridenour found that the COs shared 
what they saw in the mental hospitals through a “mimeographed bulletin called The 
Attendant.” From this exchange of concerns in the newsletters, the COs created plans to 
reform the hospitals.15 They did not blame the deplorable conditions within the hospitals 
on the “negligence and indifference of incompetent superintendents, but rather to the lack 
of funds which was traceable to public apathy.” During the war, the COs began to expose 
the conditions they saw “in a context of interpreting the reasons for bad conditions and 
collaborating with public officials in bringing about improvements.”16 Portions of the 
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reports were published in Frank L. Wright, Jr.’s Out of Sight, Out of Mind (1947), with an 
introduction by Eleanor Roosevelt, the widow of President Franklin Roosevelt.17 
Wright’s selections described some of more than 2,000 conditions the COs had witnessed 
in 46 mental hospitals in 16 primarily Northeastern and Midwestern states. Steven Taylor 
(1949-2014) stated that from the COs reports, “the implication was clear … the 
conditions and treatment reported … had been found in institutions among the most 
progressive and wealthy states—not poor states in the South.”18  
 The findings of the COs within America’s psychiatric hospitals inspired a 
significant change in thinking about the public mental hospitals and their treatment of the 
mentally ill. Albert Q. Maisel published a long pictorial article in Life magazine entitled 
“Bedlam 1946: Most U.S. Mental Hospitals Are a Shame and a Disgrace” based upon the 
COs’ work. He described inhuman conditions of physical abuse, overcrowding, mediocre 
food, inadequate staffing, and a minimal number of poorly trained physicians to care for 
thousands of patients. Maisel stated, “Through public neglect and legislative penny-
pinching, state after state has allowed its institutions for the care and cure of the mentally 
sick to degenerate into little more than concentration camps on the Belsen pattern.”19 
Bergen-Belsen was a Nazi concentration camp where thousands, including Anne Frank, 
died during the Holocaust. This reference, written a year after the close of the war and 
following vivid public descriptions of the concentration camps by the media, sent a 
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powerful message to American readers. Reader’s Digest published the article without the 
pictures under the title “The Shame of Our Mental Hospitals.”20 Ridenour stated, “These 
two articles, appearing in two of the magazines with the widest circulation in the United 
States, triggered a volcano of exposés and feature articles in other magazines and the 
daily press which continued for several years.”21 The hospitals’ staffs, the communities’ 
medical leadership, and public officials co-operated in the disclosures, which brought 
even more attention to the conditions in the state psychiatric hospitals.22  
 Other writers, also drawing on the work of the COs and their research, provided 
additional information about the treatment provided in the institutions for the mentally ill. 
Albert Deutsch’s The Shame of the States (1948) described the large public hospitals 
across the country: 
 The most serious defects arise from the deadly monotony of asylum life, the 
 regimentation, the depersonalization and dehumanization of the patient, the 
 herding of people with all kinds and degrees of mental sickness on the same 
 wards, the lack of simple decencies, the complete lack of privacy in 
 overcrowded institutions, the contempt for human dignity.23 
  
Mary Jane Ward (1905-1981) published her novel, The Snake Pit, in 1946, and it became 
an Academy Award-winning movie by the same name in 1948. The book and movie 
accurately portrayed the warehousing of the mentally ill in large, crowded state 
psychiatric hospitals where conditions allowed very few to receive treatment. In the 
movie, a young psychiatrist, using elements of Freud’s psychoanalytic therapy, 
eventually cures the heroine, whose placement in the hospital came after she had a mental 
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break following a major crisis in her marriage.24 These dramatic public presentations 
marked the end of any positive regard for the asylum/hospital movement after 130 years, 
with half a million people still housed in large public hospitals across the country. 
The Creation of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) 
 
 Other concerns leading to action by Congress were the fact that psychiatric 
patients occupied more than half of the nation’s hospital beds, that there was a significant 
shortage of psychiatrists, and that research and training resources for new staff to serve 
the mentally ill “were hopelessly inadequate.” 25 Robert Felix M.D., a psychiatrist who 
headed the Division of Mental Hygiene within the United States Public Health Service, 
led an effort to make mental illness a federal—not just a state—concern. Gerald Grob, 
perhaps the most respected historian of the treatment of mental illness in America, states 
that Felix’s “goal was to alter the entrenched tradition of state responsibility for mental 
illnesses and use the prestige and resources of the national government to redirect mental 
health policies.”26  
 Concerns that mental illness was a growing factor in the United States and 
increasing concerns about the lives of patients in public psychiatric hospitals led 
Congress to take action. With President Truman’s support, on July 3, 1946, the National 
Mental Health Act passed, creating the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) 
within the Public Health Service of the United States as part of the National Institute of 
Health. The purpose of this new entity and its National Advisory Mental Health Council 
was  
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 the improvement of the mental health of the people of the United States 
through the conducting of researches, investigations, experiments, and 
demonstrations relating to the cause, diagnosis, and treatment of 
psychiatric disorders: … [T]raining personnel in matters relating to mental 
health; and developing, and assisting States in the use of, the most 
effective methods of prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of psychiatric 
disorders.27  
 
One provision of the law required the states, in order to receive funding from the NIMH, 
to select a mental health authority, which could be either the health department or another 
separate mental health authority.28 However, the states could not designate their mental 
hospitals for this role since no funding from the NIMH could go “for the care of mental 
hospital patients.”29 The states, therefore, had to create new mental health linkages to the 
NIMH that were separate from their treatment systems for the mentally ill.  
 The NIMH became one of the fastest-growing departments of the federal 
government, increasing from $4.5 million in expenditures in 1948 to over $186 million in 
1965.30 Its resources, however, did not benefit those with an SMI within the state 
hospitals. Instead, the NIMH grants for training enabled the significant growth in “the 
number of university-trained psychiatrists.” Also, the NIMH grants to the states to 
establish community-based practices dramatically increased the number of available 
employment positions for these new psychiatrists. Unfortunately, the state hospitals 
serving those with an SMI could not compete with the universities for the best residents, 
nor could they be competitive with the more generous jobs offered by private practice 
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and community-based clinics. Ernest Gruenberg and Janet Archer from Johns Hopkins 
University’s School of Hygiene and Public Health stated, “The state mental hospitals 
never recovered the loss of leadership they sustained during the war” because they could 
not compete with the resources provided by the NIMH to each of the states. The NIMH 
funding did not benefit the hospitals and the NIMH’s argument that community 
psychiatry would “‘save the states money’ … created an atmosphere of antagonism 
between state mental hospital psychiatrists and the NIMH.” 31 At a time when the states 
saw rising inpatient populations and expense, the NIMH provided nothing to help the 
state hospitals. It hurt them, by denying the state hospitals quality staff by creating new 
work with better pay and less complicated patients through the programs created by its 
grants. 
 The NIMH used the concerns from WWII of the increasing number of mentally ill 
in the nation to provide “financial and policy support for community surveys” through 
the 1950s and early 1960s that provided evidence to the American people that mental 
illness was a significant problem in the nation. Gerald L. Klerman, M.D. (1928-1992), a 
psychiatrist who headed the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration 
under President Jimmy Carter from 1977 through 1980, identified the 1950s and early 
1960s as the “‘golden era’ of social epidemiology.”32 Several extensive studies, including 
one in midtown Manhattan, a nationwide survey by the University of Michigan in 1960, 
several Canadian surveys, and the Hollingshead and Redlich study in the late 1950s, 
emphasized that the prevalence of mental illness was significant and growing. These 
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studies, however, used “general impairment scales” of mental illness instead of clinical 
diagnoses to determine mental illness. General impairment scales were more economical 
to use, and they did not rely on the traditional medical model of differential diagnosis. 
They instead placed an “emphasis on social causes of mental illness.” As such, there was 
no way to determine the “rates of treated or untreated specific psychiatric disorders.”33  
One study found, “Only 17 percent of the population was ‘probably well.’” Other 
research discovered “a firm link between environment and mental health, and at least the 
outlines of the kinds of interaction necessary for normal human development.” 34 
Researchers and public policymakers began to see mental illness as widespread and 
advocated treatment or “crisis intervention” at the earliest signs of mental illness.35 
Leonard Duhl M.D. of the NIMH called for psychiatry’s “total resources and 
responsibility’ … to be reanalyzed and reallocated so that psychiatry could realize its 
potential as the ‘humanistic aspect of a technological society.’”36 For Americans reading 
the public accounts of these studies and the NIMH’s call for action by psychiatry, there 
was a growing impression of the need for societal change to prevent the growth of mental 
illness. 
“Miracle” Antipsychotic Drugs Bring New Hope to the Treatment of SMI   
 
 The advent of new antipsychotic medications, more than any other event, offered 
new hope for the treatment of SMIs, and these new drugs would become a significant 
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driver for creating a new federally supported community mental health system. In 1954, 
John Vernon Kinross-Wright M.D. (d. 1999), a young academic psychiatrist from 
England on the faculty of the Department of Psychiatry and Neurology at Baylor 
University College of Medicine in Houston, Texas, published the first research article in 
America validating the use of Chlorpromazine (CPZ) with psychotic patients.37 He noted,  
 For decades psychiatrists have searched for a simple chemical agent with which to 
treat mental illness, one which would be effective without producing narcosis or 
coma and at the same time increase the patients’ capacity to respond to 
psychotherapy. Recently a derivative of phenothiazine which appears to fulfill 
these requirements was discovered in France and named chlorpromazine.38 
 
In a subsequent publication, Kinross-Wright described the change the new drug brought 
to one chronically ill woman. 
 [A] 48 year old paranoid schizophrenic had spent most of the past ten years in 
private and state mental institutions. She received electro-shock, insulin treatment, 
and two prefrontal lobotomies without significant benefit. On admission, she was 
bellicose, sloppy in appearance, and actively hallucinating and entertained loosely 
systematized delusion of persecution. She responded slowly to CPZ, being 
maintained on 2400 mg. daily for almost three weeks. Improvement continued for 
three months on a maintenance dose of 75 mg. daily. For the past four months she 
has been symptom free, manages her home, goes to bridge parties, dresses well, 
and amazes her husband and friends with her affectionate friendliness.39 
 
  Smith, Kline and French (SK&F), the company licensed to market CPZ in the 
United States, trademarked it under the name Thorazine. In the first year of its 
introduction, it increased SK&F’s total revenue by one-third.40 The company would grow 
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from $53 million in net sales in 1953, the year before the drug’s introduction, to $347 
million in 1970, thanks “in no small measure to Thorazine and to the research and 
development of new products that its sales ma[d]e possible.”41 
  This new drug and similar ones became “wonder drugs” to the press and nurses 
and physicians working with previously intractable patients in large public mental 
hospitals. H. Angus Bowes M.D., clinical director of psychiatry at a large mental hospital 
in Quebec, and on the faculty of McGill University in the same city, described the effect 
of the use of another new drug, Frenquel, the brand name for azacyclonolan, an ataractic 
or tranquilizing drug, at his mental hospital. 
 Within two weeks of commencing treatment a striking change had taken place. The 
patients on Frenquel had become more sociable, they were neater, cleaner, and 
tidier. … They stopped responding to their hallucinations. This was so encouraging 
that all the patients on the ward were given 40 mg. t.i.d. [three times a day] and 
within one week the ward became quiet and orderly. For the first time, patients 
would read books and magazines instead of tearing them apart. Curtains could be 
left up instead of being pulled down. [The patients] appeared much more sociable 
and interested in their environment. Some who had previously banged their heads 
against the walls and covered their heads with their overcoats stopped responding to 
their hallucinations. It was most impressive.42  
 
Gerald Grob argues, “The spectacular success of antibiotic drugs in the postwar era 
undoubtedly created a climate that was sympathetic to the introduction of Thorazine.”43 
The new drugs had their most pronounced impact in facilities where “patients were 
receiving a minimum of individual attention from nursing and medical staff.” 44 That 
indeed characterized the public hospitals in the United States in the 1950s where 
                                                             
 41 Ibid: 161. 
 42 Angus H. Bowes, “The Ataractic Drugs: The Present Position of Chlorpromazine, Frenquel, 
Pacatal, and Reserpine in the Psychiatric Hospital,” American Journal of Psychiatry 113, no. 6, (1956): 532, 
535. 
 43 Grob (1991): 148. 
 44 Hordern and Hamilton: 506. 
81 
 
“admissions were rising, budgets were falling, [and] staff was becoming ever more 
difficult to recruit.”45 In Texas, each of the state hospitals began using chlorpromazine 
and reserpine46 the first year they were available. The result was that many long-term, 
chronic patients were so improved that they could go on furlough and make visits outside 
of the hospital. There were also dramatic changes within the hospitals. These included 
“quieter wards;” less “soiling” by the patients; “less destruction of mattresses and 
clothing;” reduced injuries; more patients who were “accessible to psychotherapy;” much 
less use of restraints; less “need for electroconvulsive therapy and insulin therapy;” and 
there was much less use of barbiturates.47  
 In 1956, Bowes told the American Psychiatric Association (APA) meeting in 
Chicago, “I have attended conferences on these drugs where the atmosphere approached 
that of a revivalist meeting.”48 Kinross-Wright stated in 1956, “Reference to the 
psychiatric literature of the past year leaves one in no doubt that the chemotherapy of 
mental diseases has come of age.”49 Winfred Overholser (1892-1964), past president of 
the APA and superintendent of St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington—a  massive 
federal mental hospital—writing in 1958, highlighted the improvement of staff morale in 
psychiatric hospitals: “A hopeful attitude has come about as patients who had been 
previously troublesome were [now] noted to be cooperative and helpful, and to show 
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signs of improvement.” He also emphasized that the impact of the new medications 
extended beyond the hospital.  
 These drugs have again made the mental hospital a medical institution in the 
minds of the public. Physicians in general practice are more co-operative and 
more willing to refer patients for hospital or other psychiatric treatment. … 
Legislative bodies have shown a greater interest in the problems of mental illness 
now that a positive and easily administered therapy appears to be available. … 
Families have not only become more helpful but more demanding … insistent that 
the drug be administered. … It seems not too much to say too that the community 
is at last developing an attitude of far greater tolerance toward the discharged 
mental patient, a greater readiness to accept him back into the community.50 
 
In 1955, Harold E. Himwich (1894-1975), director of research at Thudicum Psychiatric 
Research Laboratory in Galesburg, Illinois from 1951 to 1975, stated in his presidential 
address to the Society for Biological Psychiatry, “We are living in a moment of 
excitement, rich in potentialities that can be realized by increased interaction between 
psychiatrists and pharmacologists. … We cannot help but feel that the advances made by 
chlorpromazine and reserpine, important as they are, represent only the initiation of a 
new era in psychiatry.”51 Time and Life magazines published several articles in 1955 and 
1956, hailing the success of the new drugs and suggesting that research would produce 
significant breakthroughs in the next ten years.52  
 The marketing of Thorazine by SK&F played a crucial role in promoting its sale 
and use and indirectly that of other new drugs as well. When the company began to 
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market Thorazine, it found that while state hospitals were interested in using it, they did 
not have the money to buy it. Deciding that its 300-person sales force across America 
could not handle the job, SK&F created a 50-person task force that became the “Hospital 
Sales Service.”53 This group worked intensively with state legislatures and with mental 
hospitals and their staff. Their lobbying efforts worked with mental health activists in all 
50 states. An example of their efforts was that: 
 In one state … through the efforts of SK&F and other interested groups, a special 
legislative session took place at one of the state mental hospitals, with the 
governor’s and the legislative leaders’ blessings. The entire session was filmed 
by the “Today” show, and, in that state, it was the breakthrough that eventually 
committed the legislature to funding an intensive-treatment program for the state 
hospital system.54 
 
State legislatures proved amenable to funding resources that could reduce the 
number of persons in state hospitals.55 In 1950, in a study for the National Governor’s 
Conference of State Hospitals, the Council of State Governments had stated, 
“Overcrowding is the most extensive problem in state hospitals.”56 Texas had approved 
an extensive rebuilding program of its institutions in 1950, but it could not keep up with 
the growing need. All states faced critical questions of how to replace old institutions and 
build new ones for what was a growing hospitalized population that reached its zenith in 
1955 with over 550,000 in state mental hospitals. The use of the new drugs allowed some 
patients to function outside of the hospital. In addition, with the new drugs, patients were 
better able to respond to therapeutic programs within the hospitals. Lengths of stay began 
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to decrease dramatically for new patients, but at the same time, there was a significant 
increase in the numbers of people committed to treatment in state hospitals.  
 Despite the excitement about the new drugs and the hope that they would 
decrease the population of the hospitals, William Gronfein, a professor of sociology who 
has studied the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill in America, argued that the drugs 
alone did not lead to the deinstitutionalization movement in the United States. He noted 
that while some states saw a decrease in the census of state hospitals, others, including 
Texas, saw a rise in the population of mental hospitals after 1955, as an increasing 
number of new patients replaced those discharged. He cites “the short supply of 
alternative facilities in the community for state hospital patients” as the reason for the 
failure to discharge more individuals.57 He believed that the new drugs did lead “to the 
emergence of a new philosophy regarding what was possible and desirable in the 
provision of mental health care for the seriously mentally ill.” He asserted, however, 
To the extent that drugs “led” to a policy of deinstitutionalization, they did so 
because they converged with the interests and needs of several different groups, 
including fiscal conservatives determined to save money and civil libertarian 
lawyers intent on attacking what they viewed as a repressive institution.58  
 
While the advent of the new drugs did not directly lead to deinstitutionalization, it served 
as a medical breakthrough that held the most promise for the mentally ill. Other 
influences played a role in deinstitutionalization, as well. 
Community Mental Health Programs Developed in Several States in 
Response to Funding from the NIMH 
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 The NIMH grants to the states for “establishing and maintaining adequate public 
health services, including grants for demonstrations and for the training of personnel”  59 
required the states to submit plans for how they would use the funding. Every state 
developed a plan, and many states encouraged the development of community mental 
health outpatient clinics with the support of the NIMH. By 1951, funding from the NIMH 
had created 342 such clinics around the nation.60   
 The mental health authority in most states encouraged the development of 
community mental health clinics, relying mainly upon local community resources.  In 
Texas, the Health Department, the designated mental health authority for the state, 
worked with the NIMH in 1956 to begin tracking existing psychiatric outpatient clinics 
and to encourage the development of new clinics in the state. These clinics operated 
under a variety of auspices.61 In 1956, there were 15 such clinics, and the number grew to 
36 by 1964. Funding for the clinics grew from $288,650 in 1956 to $640,813 in 1964.  
These funds came primarily from local funds, including local taxes, state-federal funds, 
and community chest funds.62 Patient fees based upon the family’s ability to pay provided 
only limited funding.63  
 Some states passed legislation to create state-supported community mental health 
systems that went beyond offering psychiatric clinics. The first state to do so was New 
York, which passed its Community Mental Health Services Act in 1954 that created the 
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New York Mental Health Commission (NYMHC). The act also offered the opportunity 
to local cities or counties to receive funding from the state to provide services to those 
who could not afford to pay for them. The state would fund 50 percent of the cost of 
psychiatric outpatient services, psychiatric inpatient services in a general hospital, 
psychiatric rehabilitation services, and consultant and educational services up to a total of 
$1.00 per capita for each county or city that voluntarily established services under the 
guidelines of the state.64 In 1956, the state provided over $4 million to local entities in a 
50-50 match of their approved expenditures, and in 1959 that number had grown to 
almost $11 million.65  
 New York’s state hospitals established some community services in their areas, 
but the effort was limited because they received no additional staff or funding to do so. 
The NYMHC had recognized that the hospital locations were too distant from the 
significant areas of the population to center the state’s community work on them.66 This 
essentially deprived the state hospitals of the new growth area for mental health and 
meant there was limited coordination of services between hospitals and community 
centers. One of the problems encountered with the new division of responsibilities in 
New York was “the lack of integration between community programs and state 
hospitals.”67 This would prove to be a critical issue in future federal community mental 
health center legislation, for those laws required no coordination of services between the 
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hospitals and future community mental health centers when passed in the 1960s and 70s. 
Chapters VI and VII identifies some of the problems in Texas of integrating state 
hospitals with community mental health centers. 
 Some other states followed New York’s lead. Indiana and Connecticut passed 
authorizing legislation in 1955. California, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Vermont in 1957, 
and Wisconsin and Maine passed similar legislation in 1959. The organizational 
structures, the amount of state funding for local services, and the specific services 
reimbursed varied between the states, but all mostly followed New York’s model.68 
When the new Short-Doyle Act of 1957 created the community mental health center 
program in California, a significant shortage of trained staff resulted, which only grew as 
more counties opened facilities. California also found the centers “overwhelmed by 
demands for assistance from all quarters.” Referrals flooded every clinic.69   
The new programs showed a demand and need for services for the mentally ill in 
the community. Of particular note was that the new services included short-term (up to 
90 days in some cases) psychiatric inpatient care in community hospitals for voluntary 
patients. As they left the local hospitals, these patients could receive aftercare through 
local outpatient centers. California, however, did not allow funding to the centers for 
those committed by a court to the state hospitals.70 Care for those individuals remained 
with the state hospitals. This prohibition ensured that the new system would develop 
separately from the existing state mental health system. 
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Open Hospital Care in Great Britain Encouraged Mental Hospitals in the 
States to Explore Community-Based Care 
 
 Another innovation that brought about change came from work in Great Britain. 
In 1953, New York’s Ernest M. Gruenberg (1915-1991), executive director of the state’s 
Mental Health Commission, became aware of the development of some open hospitals in 
Great Britain, which, while serving the same level of patients as the New York state 
institutions, had moved away from locked wards and opened their doors to the 
community. Most of their patients “were actually living outside of the hospital grounds.” 
Patients had responded so positively to the new treatment that there was no longer a need 
for restraints, and patients were doing much better than they previously had in the 
hospitals.71 In 1954, Gruenberg arranged for consultants from Great Britain to share their 
work with staff from the New York state hospitals, and in 1955, he and others from the 
United States visited the British hospitals to see for themselves. They saw that the basis 
of the new way of treating patients was “increased respect for the patients.” The British 
hospitals worked to protect “the patient’s self-respect and sense of personal responsibility 
for his or her own behavior.” To accomplish this, the hospitals had developed 
relationships with service providers in local communities to assist the patients. When that 
was not possible, “the hospital staff itself set up outpatient clinics in general hospitals 
and, in some instances, general hospital psychiatric observation and treatment wards.”72 
The direct support by the hospitals within the community and the ability to bring patients 
back as needed in a crisis were critical to the success of the programs in Great Britain. 
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 The organization and funding of health care in Great Britain was and is quite 
different from the United States. Hospitals and community centers are all part of the 
public National Health Service, and in 1959, Britain did away with the distinction 
between psychiatric and general hospitals. Because of the funding and organizational 
difference, what was possible in Great Britain was not possible in New York or anywhere 
in America. The state hospitals across America, however, did begin to see their patients 
differently. In 1979 Gruenberg and Archer noted, 
By the early 1960s, many state hospitals in the United States were operating as 
open hospitals, and some were providing comprehensive services to most of their 
patients in the community. This movement toward state-hospital-based-
community care for the seriously mentally ill had little connection with the rapidly 
proliferating community-based mental health services, which rarely served people 
with severe mental disorders who often needed inpatient care.73 
 
 The Texas hospital system had opened ten community psychiatric clinics by 1964 
to serve discharged patients primarily in the larger cities away from the hospitals.74 They 
did not open a center in Houston because the State Psychiatric Institute for Research and 
Training (HSPI) located in Houston met that need. Many of the public psychiatric 
hospitals in America, built in the previous century in communities with the most 
influential political lobbying efforts, were too often far from the places that were 
appropriate for community centers. The prohibitions established by federal funding 
barred any new federal funds from going to state hospitals for the care of patients, thus 
requiring the states to build and maintain two different systems of care to serve two 
different populations of the mentally ill. Both systems had too many patients and far too 
few staff to serve those with SMIs or even less debilitating mental illnesses.  
                                                             
 73 Gruenberg and Archer: 492-493. 
 74 A Nine-Year Report on Mental Health Clinics 1956-1964 and some Trends in Community Mental 
Health in Texas: 11. 
90 
 
 While the first federal legislation creating and funding community mental health 
centers did not become laws until the mid-1960s, states were already providing 
community mental health under two different models. First, some states created systems 
separate from their state hospitals, and second, state hospitals created community mental 
health centers to serve patients leaving their hospitals. Because of the bias of the NIMH 
against state hospitals, the federal legislation, drafted with significant influence from the 
NIMH, choose to support the creation of separate systems rather than one that supported 
patients leaving the state hospitals.  In essence, their choice would serve an entirely new, 
less ill population than those served in the state hospitals. 
The Antipsychiatry Movement 
 
 Another critical factor in the growing storm that changed the treatment of mental 
illness in the United States was the disparagement of psychiatry. In the 1950s and 60s, 
following the significant onslaught of criticism of mental hospitals, a growing anti-
psychiatry movement challenged psychiatry, the existence of mental hospitals, and 
previously accepted assumptions about mental illness. Michel Foucault (1926-1984), a 
French philosopher and social critic, questioned the historical concept of moral treatment 
for the mentally ill that advocated treating them with compassion, calling it a “religious 
and moral milieu … imposed from without; in such a way that madness was controlled, 
not cured.”75 In his work Madness and Civilization in 1961, he challenged the lack of 
scientific medical understanding of mental illness and saw the medical leadership within 
mental health as a “personality,” “whose powers borrowed from science only their 
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disguise, or at most their justification.”76 Thomas Szasz (1920-2012), a psychiatrist and 
psychoanalyst, in his work The Myth of Mental Illness (initially published in 1960), said 
that mental illness was a myth, for psychiatrists dealt “with personal, social, and ethical 
problems in living” and not with “mental illnesses and their treatments.”77 In The 
Manufacture of Madness (1970), Szasz compared “the belief in witchcraft and the 
persecution of witches with the belief in mental illness and the persecution of mental 
patients.”78 As a Libertarian, Szasz favored personal responsibility and not locking 
people up if they were not criminals. Szasz became a supporter of the Scientologists’ 
anti-psychiatry organization Citizens Commission on Human Rights (CCHR),79 which in 
Texas and across the nation still lobbies politicians, physicians, and the public against the 
support of psychiatry and the treatment of mental illness. Thomas Scheff (b. 1929), a 
sociologist, saw significant harm coming from the label of mental illness itself. In Being 
Mentally Ill (1966), Scheff argued against the validity of the medical model to serve the 
mentally ill, noting that there is no rigorous knowledge, cause, cure, or even symptoms of 
the illness.80 Another sociologist Erving Goffman (1922-1982), with a grant from the 
NIMH, observed patients and operations within the 7,000-bed St. Elizabeth Hospital in 
Washington, D.C. In his work Asylums (1961), he used the term “total institution” to 
describe the hospital’s power over the life of patients and compared it to other “total 
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institutions” such as prisons and concentration camps; in the asylum, there was complete 
authoritarian control with the psychiatrist in total charge.81 Goffman concluded that the 
medical model of psychiatry within the large psychiatric hospitals was not appropriate for 
the needs of patients.82  
 This challenge to psychiatry and the psychiatric hospital also had significant input 
from Texas. Ivan Belknap (1914-1984), a sociologist at the University of Texas, 
completed a three-year case study focused on the organization of both the Texas state 
psychiatric hospital system and the Austin State Hospital.83 In his book Human Problems 
of a State Mental Hospital (1956), using pseudonymous names for the hospital and the 
state to protect the institution,84 he stated that the hospital from the time it began in 1861 
had two conflicting tasks: to treat the mentally ill and to serve “as a more efficient poor 
farm.”85 He saw the large, central, and self-sufficient institution as incapable of providing 
an environment where the concepts of the treatment of mental illness would work. He 
stated: 
Most professional psychiatrists will not accept the conditions posed by the state 
hospital. … Of the eighty certified psychiatrists in the state in 1950, only three 
were employed in the state hospitals and only one of the three was in actual ward 
practice. Eighty-four percent of the specialists concerned with psychiatry in the 
United States are not practicing in the agency which treats eighty-five percent of 
the resident mental cases in the country.86  
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The hospital’s large population and centralized structure required the hospital 
administration to be impersonal, with no allowance for individualization.87  
The American Medical Community Joins Forces to Create the Joint 
Commission on Mental Illness and Health (JCMIH) 
 
 The attack on psychiatry brought a strong response from that specialty in 
particular and the medical community in general. There was recognition that the state 
hospitals were remnants of an old era that many believed were doing more harm than 
good for the patients they served. The new drugs, on the other hand, held much more 
promise for the future, and “they sparked intense clinical excitement and produced 
significant improvements in staff morale.”88 The new drugs brought psychiatry closer to 
the mainstream of medicine with medications that worked miracles for people who had 
endured years within institutions. As studies showed that mental illnesses were growing 
exponentially, those who practiced community psychiatry saw the need and opportunity 
to focus on prevention where people lived rather than bringing them into an institution.89 
Psychiatry had a political voice, thanks to Robert Felix and the NIMH. The time was ripe 
for change, and psychiatry and other physicians were ready to lead it.  
 Joining with Felix in the 1950s, the American Medical Association (AMA) added 
a Council on Mental Health that worked in partnership with the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) and others to form a national study group on mental illness. Working 
with a $5,000 grant from the Field Foundation of Illinois in 1954, and in 1955, a 
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sustaining grant of $10,000 from SK&F (the marketers of Thorazine in the United 
States), the two entities and their political supporters successfully lobbied Congress to 
pass the Mental Health Study Act of 1955.90 The law authorized the formation of a non-
governmental entity and provided some funding to develop “an objective, thorough, and 
nationwide analysis and reevaluation of the human and economic problems of mental 
illness.”91 That entity became the Joint Committee on Mental Illness and Health 
(JCMIH), and it was composed of members from the APA, the AMA’s Council on 
Mental Health, and representatives from several other organizations influential in the 
treatment of mental illness. Most of the membership of the JCMIH were from the 
Northeast and Midwest, with very little representation from other parts of the country. 
Texas had limited representation on the Commission. However, the director, Jack R. 
Ewalt M.D., had served on the faculty at the University of Texas Medical Branch in 
Galveston, Texas, and directed the Psychopathic Hospital there in the 1940s. He moved 
from Texas to Massachusetts in the early 1950s, and in 1955, he was a professor of 
psychiatry at Harvard University and served as Commissioner of Mental Health for that 
state. Others from Texas included the consultant for scientific studies Fillmore H. 
Sanford Ph.D., a professor of psychology at the University of Texas, and Bernice Moore, 
Ph.D., the associate director of the Hogg Foundation from Austin, Texas who served on 
the Advisory Committee on the Role of Religion in Mental Health.92 The Commission 
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worked over the next seven years, funding several studies on the status of mental health 
in America, and it was instrumental in leading to the passage of the Community Mental 
Health Centers Act in 1963. Its work ended in 1961 with the publication of a final report, 
Action for Mental Health: Final Report of the Joint Committee on Mental Illness and 
Health (AMH).  
 That report called for the federal government to take on increased responsibility 
for mental health in the nation, including significant new funding. It called for a doubling 
of expenditures for services to the mentally ill in the next five years and a tripling of 
outlays in the next ten years. Stating that the states “[had] defaulted on adequate care for 
the mentally ill,” it called for “revolutionary changes” in the tax structure. “Only the 
federal government has the financial resources” to raise the care of the mentally ill to 
even “the minimum standard of adequacy,” it stated.93 AMH advocated for an increase in 
recruitment and training of personnel and for an expansion of services beyond the SMI to 
“mentally troubled people,” which meant “the emotionally disturbed. …, those under 
psychological stress that they cannot tolerate.”94  
 Although advocating for an expansion of services to the “mentally troubled,” 
AMH recognized that the focus of the nation’s mental health program should be on those 
with an SMI. It stated, 
Major mental illness is the core problem and unfinished business of the mental 
health movement, and … the intensive treatment of patients with critical and 
prolonged mental breakdowns should have first call on fully trained members of 
the mental health professions.95 
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It also called for the expansion of mental health resources beyond the state mental 
hospitals.  It recommended the creation of new community mental health centers for each 
50,000 of the population (catchment areas) to serve children and adults to reduce the need 
for hospitalization from significant mental illness. It also suggested that general hospitals 
add psychiatric units to provide care for the same population. AMH called for a reduction 
in the size of state mental hospitals to no more than 1,000 beds, so they could become 
intensive treatment centers to serve those needing longer-term intensive treatment in a 
hospital setting. It suggested a moratorium on building any hospitals larger than 1,000 
beds and the gradual conversion of existing hospitals of larger size “into centers for the 
long-term and combined care of chronic diseases, including mental illness.” AMH noted 
that the goal of treatment was that a person with a significant mental illness would 
eventually be able to sustain “himself in the community in a normal manner.” To do so, 
AMH called for the development of aftercare, intermediate care, and rehabilitation 
services to become a standard part of the services for the mentally ill.96  
Kennedy’s Inter-Agency Task Force on Mental Health Refocuses the AMH 
Recommendations 
 
 President John F. Kennedy (president 1961-1963) came into office shortly after 
the publication of AMH. His sister Rosemary Kennedy’s (1918-2005) intellectual 
disability and his sister Eunice Kennedy Shriver’s (1921-2009) advocacy on behalf of her 
sister and the intellectual disability community was fortuitous for expanded federal 
support for the mentally ill. AMH and the other JCMIH publications had received mixed 
reviews. One reviewer, Elaine Cumming Ph.D., a sociologist with the New York 
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Department of Mental Hygiene, in a book review article that examined AMH and other 
JCMIH publications, highlighted the incongruities of the recommendations of the reports 
to the reasons provided for them.  The most challenging criticism was that 
The Joint Commission [had] attempted both to pinpoint an evil and  to set forth a 
blueprint for the future.  The evil they found was the large hospital, and the 
blueprint they produced was a range of community services. But in both of these 
things they have been unfortunate, for the real evil [was] surely the stubborn, 
complex manpower problem, and the blueprint in essence suggests diverting still 
more manpower to the community services not always able, nor always willing, to 
tackle the core problem. … It has failed to attack what is, by its own confession, 
the main problem facing psychiatry today, treatment of the acutely mentally ill. 97  
 
In addition to the criticisms of AMH, it did not contain a specific legislative agenda or the 
financial information on which to make decisions about future recommendations. 
Kennedy appointed the Inter-Agency Task Force on Mental Health with representatives 
from several federal departments to consider the AMH proposals and varying task force 
reports, including a report from the NIMH, to determine what role the federal 
government should assume.  
 Officially, the Secretary of the Department of Health Education and Welfare 
(HEW), Abraham Ribicoff (1910-1998), chaired the task force, which included 
representatives of the Secretary of Labor, the administrator of Veterans Affairs, and 
representatives from the Bureau of the Budget and the Council of Economic Advisors. 
The representatives appointed to work on this project had an interest in and knowledge of 
the critical issues, and most saw expanding non-institutional resources as necessary. 
While others likely met with the group, there were five key individuals.  They were 
Boisfeuillet Jones (1913-2001), a special assistant to the assistant secretary for health and 
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medical affairs in the HEW who “was a medical administrator of renown” on loan from 
Emory University, who served as chair. Jones had served on Eisenhower’s National 
Advisory Health Council and had recently chaired a group that produced the report, 
Federal Support of Medical Research, for the Senate Appropriations Committee. The 
representative from the Department of Labor was Daniel Moynihan (1927-2003), the 
future New York Senator, who, in his previous work in New York State, had seen the 
decrease in residents at state hospitals and “thought there was a need for treatment 
programs in the community.” Robert Manley came from the Veterans Administration 
(VA), Robert Atwell from the Bureau of the Budget, and Rashi Fein (1926-2014) from 
the Council of Economic Advisors.98  
 The VA was the largest provider of mental health treatment in the nation, and 
Atwell and Fein had significant knowledge of the mental health programs of the nation 
and the economic and financial issues involved. Fein had written The Economics of 
Mental Illness for the JCMIH, in which he supported the nation’s need for increased 
spending on mental illness and health. Atwell served as the budget examiner for the 
National Institute for Health (NIH), of which the NIMH was a part. He had detailed 
knowledge of the overall agency’s programs and budgets. He saw the various JCMIH 
publications, including AMH, as “totally discrediting the system of state mental hospitals. 
He believed there was a need for more support for the institutions, but he thought, “It was 
even more crucial to develop new non-institutional services.”99 Robert Felix M.D., the 
director of the NIMH, and Stanley Yolles, M.D. (1919-2001), his deputy, also met 
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regularly with the group, and Jones asked the NIMH to “develop specific proposals for 
consideration.” Felix told his staff “that assisting the president’s interagency committee 
was the most important job the institute faced.”100  
 The NIMH, at Felix’s direction, rejected the views of the AMH statement that the 
most significant need for mental health in the nation was to treat those with SMI. 101 The 
NIMH’s position was that “the proper focus for any mental health program should be 
upon the improvement of the mental health of the people of the country through a 
continuum of services, not just the treatment and rehabilitative aspects” of treating the 
mentally ill.102 In essence, the NIMH saw the mental health of the total population and 
not the treatment of mental illness of individuals as the critical need of the nation.  The 
NIMH wanted the focus to be on prevention and the creation of treatment resources in the 
community. The NIMH mostly left the state hospitals out of their plans. It assumed that 
those with an SMI would be treated appropriately within the community with the new 
medications. Its lack of consideration of the existing system and planning for appropriate 
transitions would prove to be a significant error that sanctioned the rapid 
deinstitutionalization movement. With no planning or standards created for movement 
from hospital to community, this lack of concern allowed the discharge of thousands of 
mentally ill persons to highly inappropriate living situations, often with little or no care 
for their mental illness.  
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 Without regard to the real need of those with an SMI, the task force’s plan called 
for the creation of comprehensive community mental health centers. The plan presented 
these centers as local rather than state-based and providing a full range of diagnostic and 
treatment services. The new centers were seen not necessarily as one entity, for they 
could be several organizations in a local community that worked together to provide a 
range of services. The plan called for federal funds to go directly to the local centers, 
bypassing the states, which members of the task force viewed as obstructions in remaking 
the treatment of mental health in the nation.103 The President’s task force specifically 
recommended, “That federal grants assist in the construction of such centers and that a 
decreasing federal subsidy cover initial operating costs.” It established a goal of 500 such 
centers by 1970 and another 1,500 by 1980. The task force also called for state planning 
grants for support to improve state inpatient hospital care, for voluntary health insurance 
plans to provide more coverage for psychiatric care, for increased federal aid for training 
of the needed workforce, and expanded research.104 The recommendations from this task 
force became President Kennedy’s new plan for mental health. 
Kennedy’s Bold New Plan and the Beginning of the Deinstitutionalization 
Movement 
 
 In President Kennedy’s “bold new” plan calling for a law to support the building 
of community mental health centers, he stated, 
I propose a national mental health program to assist in the inauguration of a 
wholly new emphasis and approach to care for the mentally ill. This approach 
relies primarily upon the new knowledge and new drugs acquired and developed 
in recent years which make it possible for most of the mentally ill to be 
successfully and quickly treated in their own communities and returned to a useful 
place in society. 
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 These breakthroughs have rendered obsolete the traditional methods of 
treatment which imposed upon the mentally ill a social quarantine, a prolonged or 
permanent confinement in huge, unhappy mental hospitals where they were out of 
sight and out of mind.105 
 
Kennedy went on to state, “If we launch a broad new mental health program now, it will 
be possible within a decade or two to reduce the number of patients now under custodial 
care by 50 [percent] or more.”106  
 The NIMH and other advocates wanting to replace the hospitals with community-
based treatment for mental illness had a major political victory when President Kennedy 
agreed to combine the treatment of mental illness with his interest in the intellectual 
disabled. The information he received from advisors and other advocates; however, 
argued that the obsolescence of the hospitals was a reality because of the new medicines 
and new knowledge.  While it was true that new medicines and new knowledge held 
promise for the future, the reality was that the total movement to the community was an 
untested and unproven model of care. The wholesale abandonment of the hospitals with 
no plan to coordinate the movement of patients to the community was fraught with 
potential danger for the mentally ill. With the President’s buy-in and support, Congress 
and ultimately, the public accepted the new direction.  This first bill only provided 
funding for partial support of the construction of the new centers. It was not until 1965 
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when President Johnson used Kennedy’s support for the bill and his legacy to pass the 
second bill that funded the cost of staffing the new centers on a decreasing annual basis.   
Kennedy’s new legislation called for the federal government to fund 
comprehensive community centers to serve the intellectually disabled and the mentally 
ill.107 The federal funds and the ongoing federal role was to “‘stimulate’ State, local and 
private action” to implement the new policy.108 He also called for the appropriation of 
$10 million for state hospitals for demonstration projects and training that became the 
Hospital Improvement Plan and provided limited funding to state hospitals to help 
patients move out of the hospitals.109 
The AMA Council on Mental Health endorsed Kennedy’s plan. Hamilton C. Ford 
M.D. (1908-1990) of the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston and chair of 
the AMA’s Council on Mental Health stated the following:  
Institutional Care may have seemed the only solution at one time, but we know 
now that it can be more of a detriment than a help. There has been a revolution in 
the treatment of the mentally ill in the past decade and this in turn has 
revolutionized our way of looking at mental illness. In the language of this missile 
age, it’s time to start phasing out many of our centralized mental hospitals, just as 
these hospitals phased out the ancient concept of insane asylums not so many 
years ago.110 
 
However, the AMA’s Council on Legislative Activities opposed that portion of 
the bill that provided funds to pay a share of the initial staffing costs of the centers 
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because of their strong opposition to government funding of medical care and their 
longtime fear of “socialized medicine.”111 The final bill in 1963 did not contain the 
staffing provision. Without staffing support, the grants would primarily appeal only to 
hospitals that could use existing staff in new facilities. Its reach was therefore quite 
limited; nevertheless, Kennedy’s speech and the actions of Congress in 1963 launched 
the national deinstitutionalization of mental hospitals in the United States.  
Conclusion 
 
 World War II, with its exposure of conditions within state psychiatric hospitals 
and with its elevation of psychiatry in importance due to its role in the treatment of 
soldiers on the battlefield, ultimately changed the treatment of the seriously mentally ill 
in the United States.  The creation of the NIMH and the growing role of the federal 
government in the treatment of mental illness in the 1940s launched a relentless 
movement for change. The discovery of new antipsychotic medications provided a 
catalyst for the change, the NIMH’s support for community mental health programs in 
the states in opposition to the institutions, and the rise of a strong antipsychiatry 
sentiment pushed psychiatry and the medical community to lead the way for the change.  
A supportive President, the NIMH’s focus on mental health and the prevention of mental 
illness versus the treatment of mental illness would lead to a rapid restructuring of the 
way the nation viewed the severely mentally ill and its responsibility for their treatment.  
These efforts would lead to the creation of new federally and locally funded community 
mental health centers across the nation.
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IV. DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND THE ULTIMATE 
ABANDONMENT OF THE SEVERELY MENTALLY ILL 




 The 1963 and 1965 legislation passed by Congress with the advocacy of the 
NIMH and the medical community created an entirely new community mental health 
center program that did not focus on serving the SMI they hoped would exit the state 
hospitals. Instead, following the lead of the NIMH, the new legislation created an 
ultimately inadequate public system to treat mentally ill persons in the community with 
outpatient services and limited inpatient services in general hospitals. The new funding 
streams of Medicare, Medicaid, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) led the states 
eagerly to move many of those with an SMI to other venues without ensuring that the 
care was appropriate for them. Federal court decisions made during the Civil Rights 
movement, and at a time of much public criticism of public mental hospitals, 
dramatically changed requirements for the commitment process the states had long used 
for those with an SMI. Also, the court decisions required significant new safeguards for 
the hospitalized mentally ill. While many of these had a positive effect on the care of 
individual patients, they led to even fewer placements in the state hospitals, leaving 
insufficient resources for those suffering from an SMI who needed a daily structured 
environment. These changes led to the rapid, dramatic reduction in the number of 
severely mentally ill served in state hospitals, and to the abandonment of those patients 
by the nation.  
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 The federal government’s leadership role in the treatment of severe mental illness 
was short-lived. By the 1980s, with a new, more conservative President and Congress, 
the direct funding of community mental health centers ended, and the federal courts’ 
interest in finding new federal rights for the mentally ill waned. The medical specialty of 
psychiatry went through significant changes as it moved from its psychoanalytic focus on 
long-term treatment to one that focused on diagnosis with a checklist of behaviors and 
treatment through the prescription of medication while delegating shorter-term 
psychotherapy to others. Funding for treatment and care changed as well as Managed 
Behavioral Healthcare Organizations (MBHOs) now oversee much of the treatment of 
mental illness in the United States. Their focus is on limited treatment and care that is 
much less than those with a severe mental illness need. The reality is that today, with 
inadequate or no treatment, those with severe mental illness are jailed and imprisoned for 
behaviors they cannot control. Our nation has criminalized mental illness. 
The Short Life of Community Mental Health Centers (CMHCs) Directly 
Funded by the Federal Government  
 
Congress passed the Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health 
Centers Construction Act on October 31, 1963. It authorized the federal expenditure of 
$150 million over three years as matching funds for the construction of community 
mental health centers (CMHCs) and facilities for the intellectually disabled. Each state 
had to submit an approved plan for the operations of the new centers in that state.1 A 
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subsequent law, passed in 1965, provided limited short-term funding for the initial 
staffing costs of the centers, which decreased over time and required significant increases 
in matching funds from the funded entities throughout each grant.2 Congress extended the 
length of new awards to eight years in 1970, and the percentage of federal funding 
increased for centers located in impoverished areas.3 In 1975, a subsequent amendment to 
the Act provided additional funding but increased the required services from five to 
twelve.4 In 1977 and 1978, Congress passed laws extending funding for one and two 
years, respectively.5 In all of these instances, federal community health funding to the 
CMHCs decreased over time, requiring increased local or state funding to sustain the 
centers.  
Following a lengthy study by President Jimmy Carter’s Commission on Mental 
Health, the Mental Health Systems Act passed in 1980, which would have made 
significant increases in funding for community mental health and state mental health 
systems. However, appropriations to fund the act never passed.6 Instead, President 
Ronald Reagan and the new Congress elected in 1980 passed the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act in 1981 that cut funding for community mental health by 20 to 25 
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percent and sent it directly to the states as block grants.7 This action effectively ended the 
direct federal role in community mental health, with approximately 650 community 
mental health centers in operation, far short of the 2,000 initially forecast for the year 
1980.8 The states were required to use the block grants to support community mental 
health centers, so they now assumed responsibility for the centers’ continued funding, 
direction, and oversight. 
Direct federal funding for CMHCs built only 768 centers, instead of the planned 
2,400 by 1989.9 The funding was marginal compared to the resources spent by the states’ 
on their hospitals. That early funding began facing cutbacks immediately after passage, 
with only 40 percent of the amount of funding authorized for the first two years 
appropriated.10 One study found that “The total federal expenditure for community 
mental health centers [from 1964-1968] average[d] out to thirty cents per capita per 
year—or slightly less than five percent of the annual per capita expenditure by the states 
for state mental hospitals alone ($6.64 in 1966).11 The design of the federal CMHC 
funding was mainly to prime the pump. The national planners assumed that other funds 
from states, localities, and private sources would continue the programs. Congress never 
appropriated enough federal matching funds to launch the program as planned, and 
funding from the states, localities, and private sources never materialized at the level to 
sustain the services needed by those with an SMI. The states accepted the federal funding 
                                                             
 7 Public Law 97-35, August 13, 1981. 
 8 Gerald N. Grob and Howard H. Goldman, The Dilemma of Federal Mental Health Policy: Radical 
Reform or Incremental Change? (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2006): 63. 
 9 Grob: (1991) 251. 
 10 Ibid: 250. 
 11 Raymond M. Glasscote, James N. Sussex, Elaine Cumming, and Lauren H. Smith, The 
Community Mental Health Center: An Interim Appraisal (Washington DC: Joint Information Service of the 
American Psychiatric Association and the National Association for Mental Health, 1969): 6. 
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for CMHCs because initially, it cost them little since the matching funds came from the 
local communities through the organizations applying for funds. The local community 
organizations applied for funding, assuming that both federal and state funding would 
continue to support the programs they created. Three organizations in Houston and others 
in Texas, primarily hospitals, applied for and received federal funding to build and staff 
community mental health center programs in the late 1960s. 
Aside from Lack of Appropriate Funding, Why did CMHCs Fail? 
 
While lack of appropriate funding for CMHCs was a critical reason for their lack 
of achieving the goals of the program, Gerald Grob points to serious shortcomings of the 
community mental health legislation and its implementation. He notes that the leadership 
at the NIMH did not seek “comments, criticism, nor alternative views” in the writing of 
the regulations for the CMHC Acts of 1963 and 1965, and they specifically provided a 
minimal role for state governments in the new centers. The rules created by the 
leadership of the NIMH detailed no specific ways in which the traditional state hospitals, 
as they discharged patients, would work with the new centers. In both the limited role for 
state government and the lack of any linkage to the state hospitals, Grob argues that the 
NIMH wanted a “decentralized system that enhanced the role of communities.”  He 
questioned how the new mental health system, as called for in the act, could “provide 
comprehensive services and continuity of care … in isolation from a state system that still 
retained responsibility for most of the nation’s severely and chronically mentally ill 
population.” The perception by the NIMH was that the state hospital systems were an 
entrenched institutional system that would oppose attempts to change. They saw 
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bypassing the states and working directly with communities as a more promising means 
of transforming mental health.12 
 Shortly after the passage of the first CMHC Act in 1963, Raymond M. Glasscote 
et al. (1964) noted that the community mental health center program was an untested 
model. While individual elements of what the new law required fit the medical and social 
thinking of those who pushed for the movement of the treatment of mental illness to the 
community, no single model existed as to how the centers should operate.13 In 1969, 
Glasscote and another group of researchers issued an interim appraisal of the community 
mental health center movement. They looked in depth at eight centers of the 50 
operational in 1967. Their examination revealed that most were experiencing problems 
just in getting started. Looking at all eight sites visited in the study, they stated that 
thousands of persons in state hospitals could function in the community if they had the 
proper support, including housing, job training, and activity centers. The new 
antipsychotic medications that emerged in the 1950s would enable many mentally ill 
patients to function outside of the state hospitals with such supports. Glasscote et al. 
(1969) pointed out, however, that federal regulations recognized these types of services 
as optional—not essential—services for community mental health clinics. However, 
                                                             
 12 Grob, (1991): 245-246.   
13 Raymond M. Glasscote, David S. Sanders, H. M. Forstenzer, and A. R. Foley, The Community 
Mental Health Center: An Analysis of Existing Models (Washington D.C.: Joint Information Service of the 
American Psychiatric Association and the National Association for Mental Health, 1964): xv.  No single 
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including Texas, had created outpatient centers to serve as aftercare facilities for state hospitals, and in a 
limited way to provide community resources to prevent hospitalization. 
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these were services exactly necessary to “accomplish the original goal of transferring the 
care of the mentally ill from the state hospital to the community.”14 
Robert H. Connery’s edited work, The Politics of Mental Health, written in 1968, 
examined the readiness of six large communities in the United States, including Houston, 
Texas, for community mental health and assessed the pitfalls and problems that the move 
to community-based mental health services would likely face. The work provided an 
understanding that while most spoke positively about the movement, the communities 
would face many problems in putting the federal legislation into place.15 Writing of the 
issues in Houston, a political scientist from the University of Texas, Clifford McCleskey 
found issues that would require a constitutional amendment to allow public funding of 
the CMHCs. He also identified the fragmentation of services between agencies, and the 
lack of workforce to staff new facilities as potentially critical shortcomings the 
community would face in launching the new centers.16 
Looking back on the CMHCs in later decades, others point to the problems that 
those with an SMI faced as the CMHCs came into existence. Steven Segal, a professor of 
social welfare at the University of California at Berkeley, suggested as early as 1979 that 
the problems of inadequate services for persons with an SMI came in part from invalid 
assumptions made in the planning for community mental health care. The planners, he 
argued, assumed that families would provide the supplemental support that previously 
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institutionalized mentally ill persons would need as they moved into care in the 
community. He noted that little planning and effort went into this critical point, let alone 
a retrospective study to determine the validity of these assumptions.17  
In 1990, Uri Aviram, also a professor of social work, described the crisis that 
arose in community mental health centers around the care for the seriously mentally ill 
population. He noted that while part of the problem was financial and organizational, 
there were broader issues. One of those wider issues was the public’s concern about 
having those with an SMI living in their communities.  The public’s fears led them to 
push for greater social control rather than the endorsement of public policies that placed 
persons with an SMI into the regular community.18 One acronym that grew out of the era 
and is still present today is “nimby”—not in my back yard.  People favored policies and 
programs that fostered those with an SMI living in communities as long as it was not 
their community.  
In a further examination, Aviram, also in 1990, showed that rather than seeing the 
seriously mentally ill population as presenting structural and organizational problems for 
which it should have planned, the mental health community chose to see them merely as 
persons needing medical care. The institutionalized patients had received 24-hour care, 
including food, a place to live, and a supportive system of care, however inadequate. In 
choosing to see the deinstitutionalized individual with an SMI as only needing medical 
support and served by the medical marketplace, the CMHCs and the states that 
discharged the patients failed to develop the necessary organizational structures in the 
                                                             
17Steven P. Segal, “Community Care and Deinstitutionalization: A Review,” Social Work 24, No. 6 
(November 1979): 521-527. 
18 Uri Aviram “Community Care of the Severely Mentally Ill: Is Social Control a ‘Necessary Evil’ in 
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community, including liaison and transitional living services, to provide adequately for 
them. Often these individuals had no families, and, when they did, the return of those 
with an SMI to the community placed increased burdens on their families and led to an 
increase in homelessness among the seriously mentally ill because their families were 
unsuccessful in providing for them.19 H. Richard Lamb and Leona L. Bachrach suggested 
that the problems of this population grew more acute as a new generation of persons 
came into care who were not as passive as those who first left the institutions. This group 
presented unique challenges, including denial that they were ill, refusal to take 
medications, and an unwillingness to see themselves as part of the mental health system, 
which to them was “tantamount to admitting failure and some basic defect.”20  
Saul Feldman, the NIMH associate responsible for the CMHC program in the first 
decade of its existence, writing on the 40th anniversary of the passage of the CMHC Act 
of 1963, acknowledged that the community mental health center movement failed to 
create the system of care necessary for those exiting the psychiatric hospitals. However, 
he declared the community mental health center approach was “an attempt to build a 
network, an unprecedented system of care in a way that had never before been tried. … 
[It] was no small task but it was a time of adventure, of a ‘bold new approach,’ of great 
aspirations.”21 
David and Sheila Rothman’s The Willowbrook Wars (1984) found a historian and 
his social worker wife, both with strong anti-institutional views, giving a firsthand 
                                                             
19 Uri Aviram, “Community Care of the Seriously Mentally Ill: Continuing Problems and Current 
Issues,” Community Mental Health Journal 26, No. 1 (February 1990): 69. 
20 H. Richard Lamb and Leona L. Bachrach, “Some Perspectives on Deinstitutionalization,” 
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account of the closing of the Willowbrook State School.  This school on Staten Island in 
New York City, was one with which they were closely involved. While the facility cared 
for children who were developmentally disabled and not persons with an SMI, their work 
provided a lesson in the extraordinary legal and practical challenges faced in closing an 
institution with 5,400 residents and moving the residents into the community. They 
chronicled the difficult task of creating group homes for children that most people did not 
want in their neighborhoods.22 
The laws creating and funding CMHCs did not cause deinstitutionalization. Grob 
points out that Medicaid and Medicare led to a rapid decrease in the “number of aged 
chronic patients” in the mental hospitals. Also, the new therapies, medications, and the 
improved circumstances within the hospitals with the decreasing population of chronic 
patients led to more rapid discharges and shorter lengths of stay.23 The passage of the 
CMHC laws, however, signaled to the nation that the federal government was moving 
from institutional care of the mentally ill to a community-based system of care. 
Unfortunately, funding did not move from the hospitals to the community, as new federal 
court decisions would require tremendous improvements in the existing hospitals. These 
improvements used up available funding. They would lead ultimately to the states 
reducing the number of hospital beds available to those with severe mental illness, and 
sending more of those individuals to CMHCs that were not funded appropriately to 
provide for them. 
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 23 Grob (1991): 240. 
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Federal Funding of Medicare, Medicaid, and Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) Incentivized States to Save Money by Deinstitutionalizing  
 
 While the Community Mental Health Center Acts signaled the beginning of the 
deinstitutionalization movement in the United States, three other federal funding streams 
provided the resources and incentives for the states to remove many of the mentally ill 
from their state hospitals. Medicare and Medicaid passed as part of Johnson’s Great 
Society in 1965. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) passed in 1972. It began in 1974 as 
part of President Nixon’s effort to centralize and standardize the different state payment 
systems to support the aged and the disabled. Medicare, funded by a charge on social 
security funds drawn over the working career of individuals, provides hospital and health 
insurance for those 65 and older. Medicaid, funded jointly by the federal and state 
governments, but administered by the states, provides health insurance on a means-tested 
basis for qualifying individuals who cannot afford medical care. Today, it is the funding 
mechanism for most of the public mental health care in the nation. The federal to state 
payment rate varies with each state reimbursed based upon the per capita income of the 
state. The federal government requires a lower matching rate from less wealthy states. 
The states determine what federally approved services they will provide, the eligibility 
rules, and they set the payment rates that providers will receive for the services provided. 
SSI, also a means-tested program, funded by federal general tax revenue, provides 
limited income support for the aged and disabled who cannot work. Medicare provides 
only limited care (190 lifetime days) in an inpatient psychiatric hospital, but it will pay 
for 100 days of skilled-nursing care for each occurrence of mental or physical illness. 
Medicaid does not cover care in an inpatient psychiatric hospital for adults 22 through 64, 
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but it does fund care in a nursing home for anyone meeting the eligibility criteria. SSI 
provides limited support for the blind, disabled, or aged poor.24 
Federal Medicaid funding for CMHCs only began after 1981, and only in those 
states that had added Medicaid plans that included several optional services such as case 
management services, rehabilitation services, and clinic options that provided funding for 
community-based services.25 States could fund their portion of these optional services by 
increasing state appropriations or by transferring funding from existing “fully funded 
state or local programs” to the newly approved optional programs that were then funded 
jointly by the federal and state governments.26 The Texas Legislature, before 1986, had 
not approved any of the eight Medicaid options that could support outpatient mental 
health services, and it was the “only state of the ten largest that did not participate in any 
of these [eight] Medicaid plan amendments” at that time.27 However, by 1990, the Texas 
Legislature had approved the acceptance of Medicaid plan amendments for the services 
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of psychologists supervised by a physician, drugs, targeted case management, and 
rehabilitation.28 Texas has had limited expansion in the number of services since 1990.29 
 Medicare and Medicaid led to a significant expansion in the growth of nursing 
homes.  These federal acts provided nursing home operators with low-interest loans to get 
them started in the business. They subsidized the cost of care that “sharply stimulated 
demand for nursing home services.” The number of nursing homes in the United States 
increased from 16,701 in 1963 to 22,558 in 1971. The number of nursing home beds, 
however, more than doubled over the same period from 568,560 to 1,234,405.  Overall, 
the nation’s expenditures for nursing home care increased from $500 million in 1960 to 
$7.5 billion in 1974.30 The United States Senate Subcommittee on Long-Term Care 
concluded in 1976, “Cost Savings … is undoubtedly the primary reason for [the] removal 
of thousands of patients from State hospitals into nursing homes and other facilities.” The 
subcommittee noted that states averaged spending $12,000 a year from state budgets to 
care for each person in a state hospital bed.31 If states discharged a patient and enrolled 
them into Medicaid, the state at most spent only half of the cost of a nursing home bed.  
From 1969 to 1974, the total number of inpatients in state hospitals dropped from 
427,799 to 237,691. In Texas, the total number of inpatients dropped from 14,253 in 
1969 to 8,588 in 1974.32 A study focused on Texas found that from 1968 to 1978, the 
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number of state hospital inpatients decreased from 15,035 to 5,260.  Though the process 
started shortly after 1965, from 1971 to 1977, over 5,000 patients went directly from the 
state hospitals to nursing homes.33 A study in 1980 showed that those moved to “the 
nursing homes were receiving significantly fewer services that those [who remained] in 
the state hospitals.”34 
 The U. S. Senate Subcommittee on Long Term Care also noted another way states 
could save money. “If the State release[d] the patients unconditionally and maintain[ed] 
the fiction that they [were] simply indigent elderly, the federal government [would] pay 
100 percent of the cost through the new Supplementary Security Income (SSI) 
program.”35 SSI provided $157 a month to a blind, disabled, or elderly poor individuals. 
The payment would reduce by a third if the person lived with a relative, thus dis-
incentivizing that arrangement. This payment gave rise instead to the “for-profit board 
home industry” that provided no medical services. States discharged thousands of 
patients from their hospitals, signed them up for SSI, and placed them in boarding homes 
that typically “offer[ed] nothing more than board and room” and charge[d] the amount of 
the SSI payment.36 “Good food, good care, recreation and habilitative services [were] 
virtually nonexistent in many boarding homes. …Unlicensed and unregulated old hotels 
and boarding homes … [became] the depositories of so many mentally impaired aged.”37 
In the nation from 1969 to 1974, the total number of inpatients over age 65 in state 
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mental hospitals dropped from 135,322 to 59,685. In the Texas public psychiatric 
hospitals, the number of inpatients over age 65 decreased from 5,464 to 1,447 between 
1969 and 1974.38  The Subcommittee concluded, “Many factors come together to force 
the mentally impaired out of State hospitals into nursing homes, boarding homes, old 
hotels—and sometimes into the streets.  The desire to save State dollars [was] clearly the 
most important reason.”39  The Subcommittee’s lumping licensed and medically staffed 
nursing homes in with unregulated boarding homes, old hotels that offered single room 
occupancy, and the street, fails to recognize that the nursing homes at least provided 
some medical treatment. The others provided only a place to live and food, with virtually 
no oversight or care.  They, of course, were better than the streets, which offered perhaps 
a sense of “freedom,” but nothing in the way of housing, support, care, or treatment. 
How Federal Court Decisions in the 1960s and 1970s Dramatically Changed 
the Treatment of those with an SMI 
 
 Paralleling in time and purpose, the federal courts joined the 
deinstitutionalization movement with several decisions that significantly reduced and 
changed placement alternatives for those with an SMI. Historically, the various states’ 
commitment laws had given broad discretion to mental health professionals to make 
decisions concerning the commitment and discharge of individuals in public psychiatric 
hospitals. However, as the antipsychiatry movement began to question whether a mental 
disorder was a medical illness, that wholesale discretion to the professionals came into 
question.40 The civil rights movement also led to calls for change as “advocates for the 
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mentally ill viewed institutionalized care not as an asylum to protect the mentally ill, but 
as an intrusion on the liberty and autonomy of the mentally ill.”41 Commitment of the 
mentally ill became an emotionally charged issue, with many seeing it as putting people 
away who were not sick but merely different from others.    
In 1967, California became the first state to change significantly the laws 
governing legal commitment for mental illness with the passage of the Lanterman-Petris-
Short Act. The act set specific requirements for legal notice, representation, lengths of 
time for evaluation and treatment, and it explicitly stated that the mentally ill individual 
did not lose legal rights because of his/her illness. The law allowed a person’s loss of 
liberty temporarily only if he or she posed a danger to someone else or to himself or 
herself. It mandated treatment in the community with institutional care only for 
evaluation and intensive treatment with specific time limits on the treatment and required 
ongoing judicial review.42  
In 1972, the federal district court of Eastern Wisconsin found in Lessard v. 
Schmidt, that the state had violated federal law when it took away the freedom of Alberta 
Lessard whom two police officers had taken into custody and filed an order for her 
emergency detention. She received no notice of hearings and had no access to counsel as 
the doctors filed additional emergency detention orders and determined that she had 
schizophrenia and recommended “permanent commitment.” Ms. Lessard, through her 
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efforts, was able to obtain legal counsel from Milwaukee Legal Services. She filed suit on 
behalf of herself and other adults detained without the benefit of a hearing to determine 
the “necessity of detention.” Her legal counsel argued that the state’s ability to hold her 
for a maximum of 145 days without a public hearing, its failure to provide adequate and 
timely notice, and its failure to provide the mandatory notification of the right to a trial by 
a jury violated her legal rights. The court found that the civil commitment procedures of 
Wisconsin were “constitutionally defective.” It ordered new systems put in place, 
guaranteeing the legal rights of the individuals. It also required the review of all cases of 
those committed under the old process within 90 days using the new procedures. 
Moreover, it ordered that those improperly committed, based on the new procedures, be 
released, and it required the state to aid the reentry of those individuals into society.43  
Both of these actions restricted the power of the states to commit persons 
involuntarily to a mental hospital. Following California’s lead, “the majority of states 
legislatively reformed commitment laws.” After Lessard, many other court cases “found 
state commitment laws unconstitutional and applied stringent substantive and procedural 
due process protections to the involuntary commitment process.”44 Changes in the 1950s 
with new medications and more open hospital settings had allowed the release of chronic 
patients over time and the earlier release of new patients, thus increasing those exiting the 
hospitals. These actions on changing the commitment laws led to closing the entrance to 
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the hospitals as states dramatically changed the criteria for the admission of new patients 
into their state hospitals. California and other states’ legislative actions and subsequent 
federal court decisions led to “the rapid phase-down of state institutions.”45 It is essential 
to recognize that the new commitment laws did rectify a system that had ignored the legal 
rights of individuals and institutionalized persons who did not require that level of care. 
However, with the new procedures, the states gained the ability to deny services to the 
mentally ill that they could not do before. They no longer had to provide services to 
persons unless they were a specific danger to themselves or others. This change, 
however, left out those suffering from an SMI who were not dangerous, but whose illness 
prevented them from receiving the care they needed to sustain themselves. The 
impoverished among these individuals and those without families to support them 
suffered the most. 
The states went along readily to decrease hospital admissions as the promoters of 
civil liberties pushed for changes in the commitment laws. Fiscal conservatives also 
supported the new laws as they had seen the admission rates of state hospitals increase by 
52 percent from 1955 to 1972, and they foresaw “the looming inevitability of large-scale 
capital construction costs for new institutions to house the growing number of 
inpatients.”46 For the states 
 the cost of overhauling buildings and providing programs for institutions which 
had been underfinanced for 50 years would be immense. At a time when state 
budgets were tightly squeezed and increased taxation was politically unpalatable, 
                                                             
 45 Joseph P. Morrissey, “Deinstitutionalizing the Mentally Ill: Process, Outcomes, and New 
Directions” in Deviance and Mental Illness, ed. Walter R. Gove (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982): 
153, 157. 
 46 Stephen M. Rose, “Deciphering Deinstitutionalization: Complexities in Policy and Program 
Analysis,” Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society 57, no. 4 (Autumn 1979): 435. 
122 
 
the millions of dollars necessary for improved psychiatric services to the 
chronically mentally ill and retarded were simply unavailable.47 
 
 The Lessard ruling set the federal standard for the commitment of an individual 
by a state to a mental hospital. The new standard became “‘imminent danger to one self 
or others’ based upon some ‘recent overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm to 
one’s self or others.’”48 It also required “that the state must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt all facts necessary to show that an individual is mentally ill and dangerous.”49 In 
1979, the Supreme Court of the United States altered the last criteria in Addington v. 
Texas. The Texas State Appeals Court had ruled that the standard in civil commitment 
proceedings should be “beyond a reasonable doubt” as set in Lessard and invalidated the 
ruling by the district court that the determination should be based upon “clear, 
unequivocal and convincing evidence.” The Texas Supreme Court ruled that neither 
standard was appropriate for a civil commitment case, calling instead for one typically 
used in civil matters of “the preponderance of the evidence.” The U.S. Supreme Court, 
however, noted, “The uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis … may impose a burden the 
state cannot meet, and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to needed medical 
treatment.” They changed the standard to “clear and convincing” evidence.50 This 
standard kept the burden of proof higher than required in civil cases, but lower than that 
required in criminal cases.   
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 The federal courts identified other civil rights that further curtailed the availability 
of resources for those with an SMI. Lake v. Cameron in 1966, Covington v. Harris in 
1969, and Welsch v. Likins in 1974 established the right for placement of committed 
individuals to the least restrictive alternative.51 Rouse v. Cameron in 1966 found that a 
publicly committed patient had a right to treatment “appropriate to their individual 
needs.” The ruling, technically based upon a District of Columbia law, did not establish a 
federal constitutional precedent. A federal district court in Alabama in Wyatt v. Stickney 
in 1972, however, did create the precedent stating that anyone committed involuntarily to 
a state institution had a constitutional right to treatment.52 The court found that patients in 
two Alabama state hospitals were not receiving the minimum care needed and gave the 
state six months to correct the problems. When the state did not make the corrections to 
the judge’s satisfaction, he sought expert testimony from several national groups.53 From 
that testimony and precedents established in other court decisions, a set of standards “to 
achieve a humane psychological and physical environment” was created. These standards 
became the criteria by which other states, including Texas, had to improve the treatment 
conditions within their state hospitals.54 Rather than allocating significant new funding to 
provide the treatment specified in court rulings, many states, including Texas, chose to 
promote the discharge of patients into the community. 
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 Another right upheld by the courts was the right to refuse treatment in many 
instances. In Rennie v. Klein (1983), John Rennie, an inpatient in a state psychiatric 
hospital in New Jersey, had varying diagnoses of paranoid schizophrenia and manic-
depression. As his illness progressed, “he became increasingly abusive and assaultive.”  
As he became homicidal and his condition deteriorated, he received an injectable 
psychotropic drug, and “his condition improved markedly.” Rennie, however, sued in  
Federal district court to keep the hospital from administering any psychotropic drugs to 
him except in an emergency.  After a lengthy trial in which the judge overruled the 
medical decisions of the psychiatrists and a procedure developed by the state to ensure 
the medical review by other psychiatrists when involuntary patients refused to take 
medications, the appeals court ordered the district court to accept the state’s new policies.  
Essentially the decision ruled that involuntarily committed persons had a right to refuse 
specific treatments, but that “professional judgment” by medical providers could override 
the refusal if the circumstances presented a danger for the individual or others. It noted, 
however, that the decision to override was valid only as long as it was not a “substantial 
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards.”55  
 Citing the “drastic reduction” in “the number of civilly committed patients” in 
state hospitals, Alan A. Stone M.D. (b. 1929), an emeritus professor of law and 
psychiatry at Harvard and former president of the APA, challenged the use of criminal 
court procedures and requirements in the civil courts. He argued that the decision in the 
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courts are not over innocence or guilt, but over illness and the medical needs of patients.  
Writing specifically about the right to treatment, but with a statement that covers the 
impact of changing commitment laws and mandating the least restrictive placement, he 
noted in 1977,  
 These lawsuits have hastened the precipitous discharge of thousands of patients 
from hospitals across the country. This process of rapid deinstitutionalization has 
occurred without provision of adequate aftercare or alternative treatment facilities. 
   The inescapable problem is that legally the right to treatment exists only 
when the state assumes responsibility for confining the patient. Thus the state can 
control the escalating costs of providing the right of treatment by rejecting the 
responsibility of confining patients.56 
 
Deinstitutionalization’s Impact on Those Suffering from an SMI 
 
Murray Levine (b. 1928), professor of psychology at the State University of New 
York–Buffalo, stated, “The theory behind the Kennedy legislation was that resources 
would follow the patients to provide community-based services. Instead, some states 
discharged patients to local communities in the hopes that necessity would become the 
mother of invention and local resources would be found.”57 The new local community 
centers did not provide services for patients with an SMI leaving the hospital because 
they had no incentive to do so. “Their charge was to provide community-based services, 
and in the absence of particular benefits to be derived from the treatment of the more 
difficult and expensive-to-care-for chronic patient,” they saw nothing to be gained by 
serving them.58 The CMHCs mostly served a new population of the non-hospitalized 
mentally ill, individuals suffering from milder forms of mental illness that do not involve 
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a loss of touch with reality nor involved an organic disease. A study by the NIMH in 
1974 found that only 29,300 of the 780,400 admissions to CMHC care that year came as 
referrals from public hospitals.59 A survey in 1972 found that CMHCs ranked “the goal 
of decreasing state mental hospital utilization … next to last” among their priorities.60  
The state hospital census fell by 65 percent from a high of 559,000 in 1955 to 193,000 in 
1975.61 In examining the fate of patients leaving state hospitals in 1979, Stephen M. 
Rose, Ph.D., a professor of social work, noted 
the apparent failure of deinstitutionalization policies to provide even minimally 
adequate aftercare and community support services anywhere in the nation. … 
Evidence indicates that the new policy has brought … gross inadequacies in 
community resources for aftercare and rehabilitation; large-scale scandal, 
exploitation, and abuse in the new industry of operating community facilities; 
increased drug and alcohol dependency among released patients; and an apparent 
social and psychological decay among patients released into nursing homes, adult 
homes, or “welfare hotels.”62 
 
In reality, many of those discharged had nowhere to go. Rose quotes C.J. Hynes’ New 
York Deputy General’s Report from 1977: “The discharge of mental patients from 
psychiatric hospitals without insuring the delivery of aftercare services makes 
deinstitutionalization a procedure for patient abandonment, rather than a progressive 
program of patient care.”63  
The Federal Government Stepped Aside 
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 Federal court decisions brought dramatic change to the treatment of those with an 
SMI from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s. By the 1980s, Barbara R. Grumet, law 
professor and dean at Russell Sage College, notes that the U.S. Supreme Court had 
“effectively closed the federal courts as a forum for advancing the rights of the mentally 
disabled.” Since that time, the federal courts have deferred to the state courts’ decisions 
related to mental disability based upon state laws.64 Each state determines its mental 
health policies, and the federal courts no longer serve as the mechanism for weighing the 
rights of and services provided to those with an SMI. Just as the Reagan presidency and 
the election of a more conservative Congress in 1981 altered federal community mental 
health funding, the federal courts have deferred to the state courts. They are no longer 
finding new rights and issues related to the mentally ill. Despite a fast-growing 
population, the numbers of public beds for the mentally ill have continued to decline or 
remain static across the nation, including Texas, where the number of available beds has 
remained constant since 1990 substantially maintaining the deinstitutionalization focus 
from the 1960s and 1970s. 
 American historian John Ehrman, who writes about the conservative movement in 
America, states that the age of Reagan replaced the era of Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) 
after what Ehrman believed were the failures of government in the late 1960s and 1970s. 
Reagan’s conservative proposals of turning to the private sector and cutting taxes caught 
the attention of the middle class and professionals.65 Sean Wilentz, professor of history at 
Princeton University, agrees with Ehrman that in the 1980s, with the decline of the 
                                                             
 64 Barbara R. Grumet, “The Changing Role of the Federal and State Courts in Safeguarding the 
Rights of the Mentally Disabled,” Publius 15, no. 3 (Summer 1985): 67, 77-78. 




Democrats and liberalism, the nation turned to the conservatism espoused by Ronald 
Reagan who, like FDR before him, put his name on a new political direction that would 
extend far beyond his presidency.66 His new direction reduced federal expenditures, 
particularly in what his conservative base saw as liberal social service programs. 
 Political scientist Mark A. Smith of the University of Washington notes that since 
the mid-1970s, Reagan and the Republicans have succeeded in changing the political 
discourse in the nation from the “Great Society” to the “Economic Society.” The 
attention of the Economic Society is on becoming more fiscally responsible, cutting 
taxes, and reducing the nation’s deficit while maintaining policies that favor business. 
They have also coined the inherently negative term “entitlements” to refer to any 
federally funded means-tested program, even including Social Security, for which the 
individual has been paying his or her whole working life. Rather than working to improve 
the circumstances of those left out in the growing economy, the Democrats have accepted 
the Republican’s premise. Instead of arguing for the nation to provide more funding and 
policies to improve health care and expand the resources for other needs, they have 
accepted the premise of the shrinking pie by cutting taxes and fiscal restraint.67  
 This conservative movement by the federal government has focused on limiting 
and challenging the federal funding of Medicare, Medicaid, and (SSI) instead of 
increasing the resources needed for publicly funded mental health care in the nation.   
Gerald N. Grob and Howard H. Goldman, M.D., the latter, a professor of psychiatry at 
the University of Maryland, identify this change as going from “radical reform” to 
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“incremental change.” Federal mental health policy improvements have only occurred 
“within the realities of an essentially conservative political process” since the era of 
radical reform.68 One must note that the era of radical reform was a time of drastic 
change in the treatment of mental illness. Reform implies an improvement in a system. 
However, in reality, there was never enough funding to improve public psychiatric 
hospitals nor to create the programs needed by the mentally ill in the community. The 
system worsened radically with deinstitutionalization, leaving hundreds of thousands of 
individuals without adequate services. 
Changes in Psychiatry Affected the Treatment of Those with Serious Mental 
Illness 
 
 While legislation in the 1960s prompted significant changes in the location of 
treatment, change also came in the understanding of diagnosis and treatment of mental 
illness itself. Historian Lawrence J. Friedman chronicled the leadership role that William 
Menninger, M.D. (1899-1966) played in making psychoanalysis a significant means of 
treatment in the United States during and following World War II.  He also played a key 
role in the development of the first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association based, to a significant extent, on 
psychoanalytic thinking.69 From its adoption in 1952 and revision in 1968, DSM-I and 
DSM-II used psychoanalytic terminology as the basis for the diagnosis of mental illness. 
While not all psychiatrists or mental illness treatment professionals were psychoanalysts, 
the DSM’s language and psychoanalytic views served as the standard means of 
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understanding that formed an increased emphasis on community psychiatry and away 
from institutional care.  
 Even during its popularity, questions about the effectiveness of psychoanalysis 
began with a review of several studies by Hans Eysenck (1916-1997) in 1952. He 
compared the recovery rates of individuals with neuroses (not severe mental illnesses), 
who did not receive psychoanalysis or any psychotherapy, with those who did. His work 
revealed that “roughly two-thirds of a group of neurotic patients [would] recover or 
improve to a marked extent within about two years of the onset of their illness, whether 
they [were] treated using psychotherapy or not.”70 Even though questions arose about its 
effectiveness, psychoanalysis’ dominance of psychiatry continued as the basis of the 
diagnoses in the DSM system until a key study published in 1973.  
 D. L. Rosenhan (1929-2012), a psychologist and a lawyer, experimented by 
having eight individuals with no history of mental illness attempt to gain acceptance to 
different psychiatric hospitals, claiming they had heard voices but displaying no other 
symptoms. All gained admission with a diagnosis of either schizophrenia or manic 
depression.71 The report of this study, though from a seemingly small basis, appeared in 
Science, a publication that gave it considerable influence. It became the latest of a 
growing number of criticisms of psychiatry from the antipsychiatry movement. Shortly 
                                                             
 70Hans Eysenck, “The Effectiveness of Psychotherapy: An Evaluation,” Journal of Consulting 
Psychology 16, no. 5, (October 1952): 322. It is important to note that the study was with neurotic 
patients and not psychotic patients suffering from severe mental illness.  Sigmund Freud, the founder of 
psychoanalysis, never used nor advocated the use of that treatment with patients with an SMI. 




after it appeared, the Board of Directors of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) 
met and decided to revise DSM II, then only in existence for five years.72  
 Historian Hannah Decker chronicles the political struggle within the APA led by 
Robert Spitzer M.D. (1932-2015) to move away from the dominance of psychoanalytic 
theory in the development of DSM III, the third edition of the diagnostic manual. The 
new manual, which based diagnosis on behavioral observation instead of theory, returned 
the diagnosis of mental illness to the thinking of Emil Kraepelin, M.D. (1856-1926). 
Kraepelin’s pioneering work in the diagnosis of dementia praecox (schizophrenia) and 
manic-depressive psychosis (bipolar disorder) a century before had placed it more clearly 
within the empirical medical community versus the theoretical psychological sphere.73 In 
the years since the publication of the DSM-III, two new editions continue the focus away 
from that of psychoanalytic theory to specific behaviors and symptoms. This 
understanding provides a clearer framework for diagnosis and treatment strategies but no 
better understanding of the etiology of mental illness.  
 Nancy C. Andreasen’s, M.D. (b. 1938) The Broken Brain (1984) and Brave New 
Brain (2001) show the dramatic change that has occurred in psychiatry in the last few 
decades.74 Andreasen was a member of the DSM-III Task Force of the APA, and she 
championed the anti-psychoanalytic approach. She is an empirical psychiatrist with a 
specialization in schizophrenia. She notes that today, psychiatrists primarily diagnose 
mental illness and prescribe medications that influence the brain’s functioning to bring 
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relief of the symptoms and to allow the mentally ill to live healthier lives. Psychiatry is 
also engaged in ongoing research to find new answers and solutions regarding mental 
illness based upon studies of genetics and biology and their potential role in treating 
mental illnesses. The treatment of mental illness today relies on medication and, at times, 
short-term or long-term psychotherapy, including cognitive-behavioral therapy, which 
helps individuals better understand their illness and develop coping strategies for dealing 
with it.  
 While Andreasen was a significant player in the creation of the DSM-III, she 
admits that the group’s actions had unintended consequences. The work was not a 
“comprehensive description” of a specific illness. Still, it has become the primary training 
and diagnostic tool for all mental health clinicians leading to many of them not being 
aware of “other potentially important or interesting signs and symptoms that are not 
included in the DSM.” She sees the DSM has having a “dehumanizing impact on the 
practice of psychiatry,” where it has become a “checklist.” It “discourages clinicians from 
getting to know the patient as a person because of its dryly empirical approach.”75 Most 
psychiatrists no longer provide psychotherapy to their patients. Instead, individuals 
receive it from social workers, psychologists, or other therapists trained to provide the 
therapy. Significant problems can arise for individuals when there is a lack of 
coordination between the psychiatrist prescribing medications and the therapist providing 
the treatment.  One of the significant shortcomings of today’s treatment for persons with 
an SMI is that they may need far more than medications and short-term psychotherapy, 
which is often all that is available to them. 
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Funding Changes Dramatically Affect the Treatment of those with an SMI 
 
 A critical component in the treatment of severe mental illness is funding. David 
Mechanic (b. 1936), a sociologist and director of the Institute for Health, Health Care 
Policy, and Aging Research at Rutgers University, points out that the treatment of mental 
illness is quite different from physical illness in the United States. Since the 1980s, 
private insurance companies most often contract with Managed Behavioral Healthcare 
Organizations (MBHOs) to provide treatment of mental illness for those in their plans. 
Through “carving out” mental health from other health care, the MBHOs receive a fixed 
sum for every person in the plan and assemble a controlled and limited network of 
providers to deliver services. For the purchasing entity, usually the employers through 
their contracted insurance provider, the MBHOs provide a means of controlling costs—
but at a potential cost to the mentally ill by limiting available service providers and 
closely monitoring, managing, and limiting the services provided. This system does not 
ensure the adequacy of the treatment, particularly for those suffering from severe mental 
illness.76  
 Adequate treatment of severe mental illness requires extensive and ongoing 
services, and MBHOs have little incentive (or resources) to provide that kind of treatment 
because doing so cuts into profit margins. The MBHOs claim that mental illness requires 
a much higher degree of specialization of providers. They dramatically reduce the 
number of providers available to individuals and closely monitor the provision of care. 
These systems also incentivize high-volume practices. In these, there is corner-cutting, 
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such as not having full-time psychiatrists or psychologists on staff, but instead brought in 
once a week or once a month to sign off on the work of lower-paid allied health 
professionals (still maintaining state compliance standards).  Their purpose is to reduce 
costs, not improve services. Several states use MBHOs to manage their Medicaid 
population with SMIs. Often in this arrangement, the contract calls for the MBHO to 
manage the care, but the financial risk may be shared with the state, meaning that if the 
cost reaches a certain point, the patient may move to the state system or the state may pay 
more for the services needed. In a system driven by controlling the state and MBHO 
expenditures, the focus is not on the optimal care of the severely mentally ill person.77  
 In Texas, MBHOs manage virtually all of the private insurance markets, and 
managed care organizations (MCOs) oversee almost all of Medicaid funded resources for 
both physical and mental health. On the back of all private insurance cards, one finds a 
separate number to call for behavioral healthcare, which is another name for mental 
healthcare with the addition of substance abuse treatment. That number is to the MBHO 
managing that carved out portion of care. Those in the public system receive services in 
several different ways. Local mental health authorities (LMHAs), which are the state-
funded and locally-led community mental health centers, are the state’s primary service 
delivery system for those with SMI. They receive funding from the state and provide 
services with funding from Medicaid via contracts with MCOs. Medicaid is the largest 
funder of mental health care in the state through MCO contracts and Federally Qualified 
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Health Care providers. Publically funded hospital districts in the larger communities also 
provide services for the uninsured. 78    
 David Mechanic, in The Truth about Health Care (2006), focuses on the failure of 
the nation to serve the severely mentally ill effectively. He argues that we lost sight of the 
most seriously impaired “when psychodynamic therapies dominated and interest and 
resources were directed commonly to those who were less sick and, in the view of 
therapists, more attractive and compatible clients.”79 To Mechanic, “the criminalization 
of the mentally ill represents perhaps the greatest scandal of our health care system, and a 
situation that should embarrass all thoughtful citizens.”80 As a nation, our failure to treat 
the mentally ill properly did not deinstitutionalize the mentally ill; it substituted prisons 
and jails for state hospitals. It also gave each of those housed therein a criminal record 
and provided a woefully inappropriate environment to treat their illness. Mechanic states 
that he fears that as the scope of mental health continues to expand, “we will neglect even 
more of those who should be our primary charge.”81 His statement betrays the ultimate 
truth that our nation treats mental illness differently from other diseases. We never 
suggest limiting the treatment of cancer, heart disease, or any other major physical illness 
because we provide care to a growing number of less severe illnesses. Yet as diagnoses 
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for mental illnesses have expanded at lesser levels, we have dramatically reduced 
services for the SMI.   
 Richard G. Frank, professor of health economics at Harvard Medical School, and 
Sherry A. Glied, professor of Health Policy and Management at Columbia University (b. 
1961), in Better but Not Well (2006) point to changes in mental health care policy as the 
most critical factor in providing services to the mentally ill. They note that the nation has 
changed “from a centralized planned activity run by the states to a pluralistic, market-
oriented system of care.” This transformation has meant moving from “bureaucratic 
failures and tight budgets” for services to the severely mentally ill to one in which more 
funds are spent on mental illness. However, it has created a “decentralized system of care 
that suffers from market failure and allows some people with significant impairments to 
fall through the cracks.”82 Essentially, funds and treatment are more readily available for 
the less seriously ill, while those with a chronic, severe mental illness do not receive the 
level of services they need. Adequately funded resources for the SMI have never been 
plentiful in our nation. State hospitals depended upon the whims of the political systems 
in each of the states. Today, as states have abandoned their previous commitment to 
caring for the SMI, they rely upon a healthcare marketplace not designed to serve 
individuals who have severe mental impairments. These individuals’ illness leads them to 
stop taking their medications, to live in unsafe and unhealthy situations, and to lack the 
ability to access health care as others do. 
Those with an SMI Have Few Places to Turn for Help 
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 With state hospital beds reduced from 550,000 in 1955 to 37,478 beds in 2016,83  
and perhaps less today, to serve a national population base that has virtually doubled 
from 166 million to 323 million over the same period, there are few resources available to 
provide for those who need institutional care. Funding from private insurance or 
Medicaid essentially provides only a few days of care in a psychiatric hospital or a 
general hospital psychiatric ward. Such care cannot deliver the extensive services that 
many of those with an SMI need. While the number of CMHCs in the nation has grown 
to 2,538 today, their funding comes from a variety of sources, including Medicaid, 
Medicare, private insurance, and state and local public funding.84 They primarily provide 
medication and therapy, but offer little housing and additional support needed by those 
with an SMI. In Harris County, Texas, several different groups provide community 
mental health services to those with an SMI in the county. The county CMHC, with 
several locations, serves 16,000 individuals annually. Harris Health, the public hospital 
district, offers mental health services through its specialty clinics. Twelve federally 
qualified health centers and three managed care networks bring the total served to 
approximately 65,000 (about 75%) of those in poverty who have severe needs. While 
these agencies serve 75 percent of the legally mandated individuals in the county, a 
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recent study found the services provided were woefully inadequate for their needs.85 
Today, individuals suffering from an SMI are far more likely to find themselves in prison 
or jail, for that is the only place they can be “committed” for long-term removal from 
society or receive any care. Their crime is doing something against the law that is beyond 
their power to control. Though they may receive mental health treatment while 
incarcerated, the primary focus is punishment for their crime of being humans unable to 
control their illness. Many who manage to avoid jail or prison find themselves homeless 
or living in poverty conditions and unable to access and use the fragmented mental health 
system. 
 The nation has moved a long way from the concept of the asylum that provided 
the mentally ill a sanctuary from incarceration in jail. The perfect storm that led to federal 
intervention in the nation’s mental health left a broken, uncoordinated system where the 
federal, state, and local entities utilize limited resources to provide mostly outpatient 
treatment to those who have the understanding and assistance to access it. For those who 
do not, they often can receive it only while incarcerated. 
Conclusion 
 
 For a relatively brief time, America focused on the treatment of mental illness in a 
way it had not done since the mid-1800s when Dorothea Dix challenged state legislatures 
and the federal government to build asylums for the mentally ill. The political power of 
the NIMH under the leadership of Robert Felix, who was committed to a public health 
approach to mental health, fueled this new movement. The euphoria created by “wonder 
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drugs” that made a dramatic improvement in state hospitals fed the nation’s excitement 
for change. Those concerned about increasing numbers of the mentally ill and the costs 
for each state approved of the change. Its champion was a new President who knew about 
mental disability from his own family, but who was assassinated in 1963 shortly after 
signing the new law. The federal courts in the Civil Rights era, found new rights for the 
mentally ill, providing better care for some while dramatically altering the existing 
system and taking away many resources needed by those with an SMI. The vehicle for 
change, community mental health centers, were never funded as planned and did not 
became centers of caring for those leaving state hospitals. Ultimately, Medicare, 
Medicaid, and SSI provided the states the incentive to move people out of their hospitals 
to facilities not adequate for their needs. In reality, there was no planned coordination for 
the change. The concept of deinstitutionalization became the movement that consumed 
the nation with little regard for those previously housed in the mental institutions, and 
who often had nowhere to go. 
 The national interest in mental health waned with the changing political tide in 
Washington in the 1980s. Today the only real catalyst for concern for the mentally ill 
comes in response to the growing public shootings in schools and other venues. America 
is a nation awash with guns with no apparent ability even to discuss the ramifications of 
too many guns. It has become more politically correct to blame the mentally ill person 
who, lacking treatment, finds readily available weapons and at times, uses them to tragic 
effect. Will concerns for public safety refocus the nation on improving care for the 
mentally ill? Or will its response be one that blames the mentally ill person for whom no 
appropriate treatment is provided and leads to even greater use of jail and prisons for 
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them? The needs of the severely mentally ill and, indeed, those with any mental illness—
are great in this nation, and it will take a national effort to change the situation. One 
hopes that the solution is grounded in a real understanding of the problem and with the 
resources to meet the critical needs of hurting individuals.  
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V. AS CHEAP AS POSSIBLE: THE ASYLUMS AND 
HOSPITALS FOR THE MENTALLY ILL IN TEXAS, 1860 
TO 1950  
 
 This chapter focuses on the early history of the treatment of severe mental illness 
in Texas to 1950. In Texas, as in other states, those who had mental illness received 
treatment in facilities built specifically for that purpose. While the treatment of physical 
illness was most often in the patient’s home or the office of the physician, the asylum was 
the critical component for the moral treatment of mental illness in the eighteenth century. 
Except for general hospitals in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston that primarily served 
indigent patients or selected patients who did not have access to a home, the facilities for 
the mentally ill predate virtually all hospitals in the United States. In Texas, the first 
general hospitals did not open until the 1880s, and by that time, there were 2 asylums for 
the mentally ill open in Texas, and third opened in 1892. 
 While it did appropriate the funds to build the first asylum in Texas in 1856, from 
the beginning, the Texas Legislature was parsimonious in providing funds and facilities 
to serve the mentally ill. Its citizens and the Legislature recognized the need to provide 
for these individuals. However, its history will show that excellence in the provision of 
that care was never the goal in Texas. The first asylum opened within a month of the start 
of the Civil War. Despite the war and the difficult days of the Reconstruction that 
followed, this small facility of sixty patients, with 11 leadership changes in its first 15 
years, survived and helped several to regain their sanity. As the population of the state 
grew, however, the Legislature refused to build or expand facilities fast enough to keep 
up with the need, leaving many to languish in county jails while waiting for an opening. 
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Eventually, the state created one board to oversee all of its eleemosynary (charitable) 
institutions, but that board’s primary mission focused on saving money, not on quality 
care. By the mid-twentieth century, Texas earned the label “the worst mental hospitals in 
the United States.”1  
 Today, the Legislature continues to appropriate far fewer resources than are 
needed, so Texas still fails to meet the needs of the mentally ill, who are now in jail as 
criminals.2 Texas allocates 1.2 percent of its state expenditures to mental illness, which 
places it 40th in the ranking of states with Maine the highest at 5.6 percent and Arkansas 
the lowest at 0.7 percent.3 In 2014, the last formal study of mental health expenditures per 
capita by state, including the District of Columbia, Texas ranked 48th out of 51 with only 
Arkansas, Florida, and Idaho, lower. At that time, Texas spent $45.23 per capita, while 
Maine was the highest at $362.75 per capita expenditures for mental health.4 
Texas Uses Federal Funds to Build Its First Asylum  
 
 Texas Historian Rupert Richardson observed, “The people [of Texas] learned to 
look to outside sources rather than to taxation as the means of supporting their 
                                                             
 1 James S. Mahon to Robert Sutherland, Copy of a mail-out from Mahon, the state chair of the 
Texas Junior Chamber of Commerce Committee on Mental Health, received Sutherland, Executive 
Director of the Hogg Foundation on March 16, 1951, Box MAI 9/U27, Hogg Foundation for Mental Health 
Papers, Briscoe Center University of Texas, Austin, Texas. 
 2 Edgar Walters, “State Spending More on Mental Health Care, but Waitlist Grows,” The Texas 
Tribune, May 1, 2016, accessed October 12, 2017, https://www.texastribune.org/2016/05/01/despite-
state-spending-dearth-pysch-hospital-beds/. 
 3 “Funds for Treating Individuals with Mental Illness: Is Your State Naughty or Nice?” Mental 
Illness Policy.Org, accessed September 11, 2019, https://mentalillnesspolicy.org/national-studies/funds-
for-mental-illness-is-your-state-generous-or-stingy-press-release.html. 
 4 “SMHA Expenditures per Individual Served, FY 2014,” Funding and Characteristics of Single 
State Agencies for Substance Abuse Services and State Mental Health Agencies, 2015 (Rockville, MD: 




government.”5 When Texas entered the United States, it had much land but was deeply in 
debt from its Republic days. The federal government allowed Texas to retain its public 
lands and gave the state $5 million to settle its debts. It also provided the state proceeds 
from federal bonds in excess of $23,000,000 over ten years. This funding allowed Texas 
to pay off its debts and have $4 million in reserve. Texas used the extra money to 
circumvent raising taxes by using federal funds to avoid requiring the counties to pay 
taxes for several years.6 At the urging of Gov. Elisha M. Pease (1812-1883), a 
“Connecticut-born Unionist,”7 in 1856, the Legislature passed a bill to construct the 
state’s first asylum for the mentally ill, using proceeds from the federal bonds and setting 
aside 100,000 acres of land to sell to help fund future costs.8 The city of Austin paid 90 
percent of the land cost for the asylum facility located two miles north of it.9 
                                                             
 5 Quoted in T. R. Fehrenbach, Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans (1968; repr., New 
York: Open Road Integrated Media, 2014): 346. 
 6 Fehrenbach: 345-346. Texas used the funding to pay off debts to its citizens, leaving debts to 
out of state bondholders unpaid. Thanks to the Missouri Compromise in 1850, Texas received $10 million 
from the Federal Government in payment for land that would eventually become Colorado and New 
Mexico. In 1855, it received $7,750,000 from the federal government to settle all outstanding debts and 
payments for frontier protection.  
 7 Randolph B. Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History of the Lone Star State (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003): 236. 
 8 Gammel’s Laws of Texas (GLT), Volume IV, 478-479, 494. During construction, two subsequent 
legislatures approved an additional $65,000 for land, furnishings, and other structures on the property. 
1123, 1441.  GLT available through the University of North Texas, Portal to Texas History, 
https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth5872/. 
 9 BTSH&SS Report September 1, 1950 through August 31, 1951, Texas State Library and Archives 




Figure 1 Governor Elisha M. Pease10 
Governor Pease appointed J.C. Perry M.D. to the position of superintendent with 
the annual salary of $2,000 (equivalent to $57,725.71 in 2018) to begin planning for the 
new facility.11  Perry’s brief term in office ended with the election of the next governor in 
1858, who appointed a new superintendent. During Pease’s term, Perry visited other 
states’ asylums to learn the plans for buildings and gather suggestions for operations.12 
                                                             
 10 From Wikipedia article on Governor Pease, accessed July 19, 2019 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elisha_M._Pease. 
 11 In comparison to other physicians in this era of no medical licensure, “superintendents of 
insane asylums were among the highest-paid physicians in the field of medicine. … [They] almost always 
earned at least two thousand.” “Insanity is Lucrative,” Indians, Insanity, and American History Blog: 
Asylums and Insanity Treatments 1800-1935, August 23, 2015, accessed September 13, 2019, 
cantonasylumforinsaneindians.com/history_blog/tag/salary-for-asylum-superintendent/.  One of the 
more highly paid Superintendents was John P. Gray M.D., superintendent of the Utica State Insane 
Asylum in New York, was paid more than $7,000, including perquisites. J. Edward Turner, The History of 
the Inebriate Asylum in the World (New York: Self Published, 1888): 173-174.  Published on Line by Google 





 12 Perry recommended that the state follow the plan of Dr. Thomas Kirkbride, superintendent of 
the Pennsylvania Hospital for the Insane in Philadelphia, a plan popular in the U.S. in the mid-century.  In 
addition to providing “natural ventilation … spacious corridors, lofty ceilings, and large windows and 
transoms,” it allowed for “indefinite extensions,” which the law required, Superintendent’s Report Austin, 
November 27, 1857: 4-5. 
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Perry also examined the Texas census data from 1850 and surveyed the counties for the 
number of individuals who would qualify for admission. He recognized that the data were 
incomplete, but he concluded that upon completion of the asylum, “not one-fourth of 
those requiring prompt assistance could be served.”13 The Legislature did not vote to 
expand the original scope of the facility as he hoped.  
Management and Funding Systems Created 
 
 The Legislature created a management structure for the new asylum that consisted 
of a non-compensated, five-member board of managers appointed by the governor that 
“shall have general direction and control of the property and business of the Asylum.” 
The board would work with the governor-appointed superintendent, who was required to 
“be a married man and a skillful physician, experienced in the treatment of the Insane.” 
The superintendent was supposed to serve a four-year term, subject to removal from 
office by the governor for “incompetency, refusal to fulfill his duties, or misconduct.” 
However, it became the practice for each governor, elected to a two-year term at that 
time, to appoint or reappoint the superintendent, so it became a political office, which 
was damaging to the ongoing treatment and care of the patients.14   
 Patients’ entry into the asylum came via three venues. First, a trial by jury in the 
individual’s home county would determine whether he/she was an “idiot, or lunatic, or 
non compos mentis [not of sound mind].” If the jury found an individual mentally ill, the 
                                                             
 13 Ibid: 13.  
 14 GLT, Volume IV, 987. Governors made 11 appointments to the position of superintendent 
between May 27, 1857 and February 10, 1874. These were, in order: J.C. Perry, 1857 to 1858; C.G. 
Keenan, 1858 to 1860; Beriah Graham, 1860 to March 1861; C.G. Keenan, March 1861 to November 1861; 
J.M. Steiner, November 1861 to 1865; Beriah Graham,1865 to 1866; W.P. Beall, 1866 to 1867; Beriah 
Graham, 1867 to 1870; J.A. Corley,1870 to 1871; G.F. Weisselberg,1871 to 1874; and David R. Wallace, 
1874 to 1879. 
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court ordered him/her to jail to await placement in the asylum. If a friend or relative 
agreed to be responsible for the individual and provided a bond, the mentally ill person 
could avoid jail.15 In the years to come, this law would place large numbers of the 
mentally ill in jails awaiting an opening at this or later asylums in the state. However, it 
would also provide an impetus for the expansion and building of new asylums to move 
the mentally ill out of the jails. Second, when a court found a person charged or convicted 
of a crime to be insane, the law required that court to send the person to the asylum, and 
only the court sending him or her there could remove the individual.16 Counties were 
required to pay $2 a week for the care of individuals they sent to the asylum.17 A third 
means of admittance was at the request of a guardian, family member, or friend who 
would pay for the individual’s care. Such referrals required a physician’s certification 
that a person was insane and a letter from the chief justice of the county of origin 
vouching for the credentials of the physician. These private referrals required the 
payment of $5 a week for six months of care in advance at placement.18 The Legislature 
authorized counties to levy a tax to pay the cost incurred for the care of indigents, and it 
required families or the estates of individuals to reimburse the counties for the costs 
incurred by the county when resources were available.19 The Legislature mandated 
preference for individuals ordered by a court over private referrals, and it required that 
those ill for less than a year obtain admittance over “chronic” ones.20  
                                                             
 15 Ibid: 988- 989. 
 16 Ibid: 989. 
 17 Ibid: 990. 
 18 Ibid: 990. 
 19 Ibid: 991. 
 20 Ibid: 990. Superintendents had the right to discharge chronic patients to make room for more 
recently ill ones, but this was something most of the superintendents found hard to do. They often had no 
place to send them, and one suspects they found it easier to serve the patients they knew rather than 
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The Asylum Opens in a Time of Governmental Change and the Start of War 
 
 The Texas State Lunatic Asylum (TSLA) opened in March 1861 as the Civil War 
began amidst a tremendous governmental change in Texas and the nation. A fire at the 
main contractor’s mills had destroyed a significant portion of the building materials set 
aside for the facility, delaying the 1860-planned opening to 1861.21 TSLA opened at the 
same time as the governor was changing in mid-March 1861.22 Texas had seceded from 
the Union in February and joined the Confederacy on March 2, 1861. Governor Sam 
Houston (1793-1863) favored remaining in the Union. When he refused to swear 
allegiance to the Confederacy on March 16, 1861, the Secession Convention of Texas 
declared his position vacant, and Lt. Gov. Edward Clark (1815-1880) became the 
governor. Clark held the position until the election in November of 1861. Clark appointed 
Dr. C.G. Keenan (1813-1870) to succeed the Houston-appointed superintendent at TSLA, 
Dr. Beriah Graham (1804-1879), after the asylum had opened under Graham’s 
leadership. Within a few days of its opening, TSLA had a new superintendent and, six 
months later, following the election of Gov. Francis Lubbock (1815-1905), a third 
                                                             
new, possibly more troubling ones, given the crowded conditions of the small asylum built for 60, which 
rose to 96, before expansion occurred in the mid-1870s.. 
 21 Superintendent’s Report Austin of B. Graham January 28, 1861,” Senate Journal: 8th Legislature, 
First Called Session, Legislative Reference Library of Texas: 56. Accessed September 2, 2017: 
http://www.lrl.texas.gov/scanned/Senatejournals/8/01301861_53.pdf. 
 22 Though recent publications, without citation of source, state that the asylum opened formally 
in May 1861 with 12 patients, Beriah Graham in his superintendent’s report for 1867-1868 states that it 
was organized and opened in March 1861 and that he was “superseded” after the opening, 
Superintendent’s Report Austin 1867 and 1868: 18. A document from 1904 recognizes March 11, 1861, as 
the date the asylum opened. It states, “About March 11, 1861 the institution was formally opened and 
during that month five or six patients were admitted.” Statistical Report 1904 by W. J. Clay Commissioner 
Texas Board of Insurance Commissioners, (Austin: Von Goeckmann-Jones Co. State Printers, 1904): 190. 





superintendent took over in its first year of operation. That individual was Josephus 
Murray (J.M.) Steiner M.D. (1823-1873), who was Gov. Lubbock’s physician.23 Though 
the war years were difficult for Texas, the patients at TSLA were fortunate to have 
Steiner as superintendent. His connection to the governor, his financial resources, and 
perhaps his previous problems of having killed his commanding officer while serving in 
the Army24 made him the right person to lead at that time. He served as superintendent 
for the remainder of the war, maintaining the position even after the election of Gov. 
Pendleton Murrah (1824/1826-1865) in 1863 when Lubbock decided not to run for re-
election. Steiner “supported the institution a great deal,” and he paid for “considerable 
improvements” “out of his private means.”25  
                                                             
 23 C.W. Raines, editor, Francis Richard Lubbock, Six Decades in Texas or Memoirs of Francis 
Richard Lubbock, (Austin: Ben C. Jones & Co. Printers, 1900): 373. Accessed on September 6, 2017, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=0RDc5eNjr-
cC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.  
 24 After killing his commanding officer, Steiner faced a court-martial and fled, but later 
surrendered to the authorities. The court-martial had disbanded by the time he surrendered, and he was 
discharged from the Army.  Later, a civilian court cleared him of the charges. M. L. Crimmins, “Captain 
Jack Elgin’s Last Story,” Frontier Times 16, no. 4, (December 1938): 100-103. Edd Miller, "Steiner, Josephus 
Murray," Handbook of Texas Online, accessed September 08, 2017, 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fst29. 
 25 The Texas Almanac for 1867 with Statistics, Descriptive and Biographical Sketches, Etc. The 





Figure 2 Joseph M. Steiner M.D.26 
 Thanks to Steiner, a joint Senate and House committee appointed to visit TSLA in 
1866 for the 11th Legislative Session found it to be “in a prosperous condition” with the 
financial, management, and individual records of the patients well documented “as far as 
the facts [were] known.” They did note the crowded facility and stated that unless 
enlarged, it could not serve more patients. However, due to “the financial 
embarrassments of the State,” the committee could not recommend expansion at that 
time. While the committee stated that the asylum was in a “prosperous condition,” it 
recommended that funds be set aside to improve the water closet system that was 
“exceedingly defective.” It also noted the need to repair the roof that in heavy rains 
leaked so much that “the wards are flooded” and the upper floors become “quite 
uninhabitable.”  
The Integration of the Treatment of Mental Illness in Texas 
 
                                                             
 26 “Murder at Fort Graham,” Heart of Texas Tales: True Tales of Hill County, Texas, accessed 
September 20, 2019, http://www.heartoftexastales.com/murder-at-fort-graham.html. 
150 
 
 The Legislature did endorse the building of an additional structure to house 
“insane negroes,”27 and it approved the purchase of land adjacent to the asylum grounds 
for that purpose. 28 That construction did not take place. In his 1866 report, 
Superintendent Graham did state that the admission of insane Negroes would require a 
separate facility, “in order that no compulsory association between the two races might 
exist.” He did note that if they were admitted, he would “give them the same attention 
and treatment as others receive.”29 In his report for the next year, however, he noted that 
there were 69 persons in the asylum, of which, “one female and two males [are] colored,” 
so did he accept Negroes into the existing facility.30 This statement was the last reference 
to the race of patients in the superintendent reports until Superintendent A. N. Denton, in 
1884, stated, “I deem it my duty to call your attention, and that of the Legislature, to the 
anomalous mixing of blacks and whites in one of the wards of the Asylum. This 
reprehensible, but unavoidable condition of affairs under existing circumstances, I found 
when I took charge of the institution.”31 Subsequent reports from Austin began to note 
the numbers of persons from different races in the annual reports, along with periodic 
calls against mixing the races in the same wards. In 1918, the superintendent’s report 
from Austin heralded the Legislature’s plan to convert the Rusk prison to a segregated 
facility for Negroes that would allow the removal of 587 Negroes and the conversion of 
the space for 500 more white admissions.32 As noted later, Rusk prison became a facility 
                                                             
 27 “Senate Journal: 11th Legislature, Regular Session,” Legislative Reference Library of Texas, 
September 25, 1866: 249-251. Accessed September 6, 2017, 
http://www.lrl.texas.gov/collections/journals/journalsSenate11.cfm 
 28 GLT, Volume 5: 1125.  
 29 Superintendent Report Austin for the Year 1866: 10. 
 30 Superintendent Report Austin for the Years 1867 and 1868: 12.  
 31 Superintendent Report Austin for the Year 1884: 9. 
 32 Superintendent Report for the Year 1918: 11. 
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for the mentally ill open to all races. Although undoubtedly, there were segregated wards, 
neither Austin nor any of the other asylums or hospitals ever became segregated facilities.  
Moral Treatment at TSLA 
 
 Superintendent Beriah Graham, who had opened the asylum, returned to the 
leadership position at TSLA at the close of the war, serving from 1865 to 1866. He then 
served for the third time from 1867 to 1870. Graham was the first superintendent to 
provide a listing of the forms of insanity of those under treatment at TSLA as part of his 
annual report in 1866. He identified acute and chronic mania as the most prevalent 
mental illnesses, with melancholia the second and dementia the third.33 Though the 
numbers varied in subsequent annual reports, these remained the primary forms of mental 
illness identified for the patients until the twentieth century.  
 For those who gained admission to TSLA, the first protocol was to assess their 
physical health and then to treat the physical illnesses found. Superintendent Graham 
noted, “There are very few patients admitted to the Asylum whose physical health is 
good.” Although it was a crowded facility, the staff made it as “pleasant and home-like” 
as they could. One key for treatment was “to guard against excesses of all kinds.” The 
superintendent and staff encouraged the development of regular habits. They also urged 
the patients “to take exercise in the open, or to engage in some light work or amusement.” 
The most fundamental aspect of treatment, however, was “unvarying kindness.”34 Given 
                                                             
 33 Superintendent Report Austin for the Year 1866: 15. Nancy Andreasen notes that classical 
Greeks first used the terms mania and melancholia. She states that mania corresponds to today’s 
schizophrenia and mania and melancholia to depression. Nancy C. Andreasen, The Broken Brain: The 
Biological Revolution in Psychiatry (New York: Harper & Row, 1985): 143. 
 34 Superintendent Report Austin for the Years 1867 and 1868: 14.  
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the crowded conditions, the meager pay,35 and continual turnover of leadership, one must 
question if unvarying kindness towards patients who exhibited many trying behaviors 
was reality or the public hope of a superintendent in his published report.   
Superintendents Turned People Away as the TSLA Appealed in Vain for 
Resources to Expand 
 
 Though the superintendents managed to keep the asylum’s work going, funds for 
TSLA and other Texas government operations were not plentiful following the Civil 
War. From 1866 through 1873, during Reconstruction, the Republican-led federal 
government dominated politics in Texas. Because Texas did not gain readmission to the 
union until 1870, the Legislature did not meet between 1866 and 1870. When it did meet 
from 1870 to 1873, a strong governor backed by President Grant overshadowed it. In 
1867, the federal government had divided the defeated South into five military districts.  
The military leadership appointed the governors and provided military support to them.36  
The military leader in Texas cut the annual appropriations for TSLA from $20,000 to 
$15,000 in 1869.37 Moreover, Superintendent Weisselberg noted that in 1871, the 
counties owed TSLA over $12,000 for care of their patients, and private patients owed 
$3,000.38 Decreased funds for ongoing operations caused difficulty in hiring staff, and in 
providing some of the needs of the facility and patients.39 Superintendents Graham, 
Corley, and Weisselberg, pleaded with the Legislature for more funds, not just for those 
                                                             
 35 The annual salary for a ward attendant in 1886 was $240. Assuming it was near the same dollar 
amount in 1868, it would be equivalent to $4,319.12 in 2019.  Superintendent Report Terrell (1886):20.   
 36 Campbell: 275. 
 37 Superintendent Report Austin (1870): 4.  
 38 Superintendent Report Austin October 1, 1871: 33, 36. 
 39 Superintendent Graham, in his report for 1865-1866, noted the difficulty in hiring staff “either 
black or white,” Superintendent Report Austin 1866: 7. Superintendent Corley in 1870 noted the impact of 
lower appropriations on hiring staff, clothing for patients, and furnishings and upkeep in the building. 
Superintendent Report Austin 1870: 4-5, 
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in care, but to increase their capacity to serve those they were turning away daily.40 
Weisselberg, writing in 1871, stated that due to the state’s failure to provide more room 
at TSLA, a large number of the insane were “being confined in prisons and laden with 
chains, as there are no alms houses in the State.”41 The superintendents had the difficult 
task of turning people away or trying to find room in a crowded facility because there 
was a growing number of insane in Texas.  
 Yet, moral treatment at TSLA with its small, intimate setting produced results. 
During its first 11 years of operation, 60 percent of those admitted left the facility 
recovered or improved. Weisselberg noted in 1872 that of the 428 patients treated by 
TSLA since 1861, 232 had regained their sanity, another 25 had left improved, 30 had 
left with no improvement, 45 had died, and 96 were still patients in the asylum on 
October 1, 1872.42 However, he expressed his concern about the growing number of 
incurables at TSLA. Though he could discharge chronic cases in preference for recent 
ones, he found it difficult to send them away, for there was no other place for them to go. 
With each passing year, the facility was filling with chronic cases, so there were fewer 
and fewer opportunities for new patients to receive treatment. He pleaded for more room 
to serve the 1,000 to 1,200 untreated cases existing in the state at that time. He stated, “A 
State that can expend millions of dollars for public purposes, such as railroads, etc., 
should well be able to spend sixty thousand dollars to found a home for this unfortunate 
class of humanity.”43 
                                                             
 40 Superintendent Report Austin 1869, 13. Superintendent Report Austin 1870: 3. Superintendent 
Report Austin 1871: 7. 
 41 Superintendent Report Austin, 1871: 7. 
 42 Superintendent Report Austin, 1872: 14.  
 43 Ibid: 6-7. 
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Adoption of the Texas Constitution in 1876 Leads the Way to Expansion 
 
 The adoption of the Texas Constitution of 1876, the fourth since 1865, followed 
the end of Reconstruction and federal oversight in the state. It made the state rather than 
counties responsible for all indigent mentally ill persons in Texas.44 Trials by juries in an 
individual’s home county to determine sanity and certify indigence were still the means 
of entry, but now all were state patients, and preference at all times was for indigent 
patients over, paying patients.45 Expansion of TSLA started in 1874,46 and by October 
1884, its resident population had reached 555 patients.47 The 18th Texas Legislature, in 
1883, authorized and appropriated resources to build a “Branch Asylum” in North Texas, 
which became the North Texas Hospital for the Insane in Terrell soon after opening.48  
 These and subsequent expansions were funded by the growing population and 
economy of Texas. Between 1870 and 1890, the population of Texas grew by 173% from 
818,579 to 2,235,527.49  The economic growth came about from railroad building, which 
increased from less than 500 miles in 1870 to 8,000 miles in 1890.  The state gave the 
railroads land, which they sold to new settlers in exchange for building railroads to 
                                                             
 44 The Texas Constitution of 1876, Article 16, Section 54, states, “It shall be the duty of the 
Legislature to provide for the custody and maintenance of indigent lunatics, at the expense of the State, 
under such regulations and restrictions as the Legislature may prescribe.” Accessed September 13, 2017, 
https://tarltonapps.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/texas1876/a16. HJR 3 repealed this section in 1969 
because of the obsolete language, but with the intent that the repeal made no change in the policies of 
the state. 
 45 GLT Volume 8: 976.  
 46 When D.R. Wallace and the new board took over TSLA following the ouster of Gov. Davis from 
office, they found a contract in place for construction of an additional building on the campus. They 
renegotiated the contract and began work again. Possibly the funding for this building came from savings 
from earned income. Superintendent Report Austin from 10th of February 1874 to September 30, 1874: 
11. 
 47 Superintendent Report Austin, 1884: 14. 
 48 GLT Volume 9: 315-316. 
 49 Campbell: 290. 
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connect the cities within Texas to the rest of the nation.50  The railroads fueled growing 
urbanization and industrialization in the state.  In 1870, 2,399 mills and factories 
produced $11.5 million worth of goods.  By 1890, the number of manufacturing 
enterprises had grown to 5,260, but their output increased by over 500 percent to over 
$70 million.51  This economic expansion provided resources to expand the asylums as the 
number of mentally ill also grew with the increasing population. 
 The 1883 Legislature dramatically changed the role of the board of managers of 
TSLA, the new Terrell hospital, and future such facilities. The governor, subject to the 
“advice and consent” of the Senate, would appoint individuals to vacancies as they 
occurred on each board. The board members’ terms were staggered so that vacancies 
occurred every two years; thus, most governors would appoint only part of each board.52 
The legislation required three board members to be from the local area of the facility, the 
board to meet monthly at the facility, and a committee to inspect the facility monthly and 
document their observations from the visits. The boards now had “general control and 
direction of the affairs of the Texas asylums … subject to only such rules and regulations 
as may be prescribed by the Legislature.” Each board would elect its superintendent, 
removing that office from a constant turnover as the governors changed.53   
 With their new powers in 1885, the board of managers of the North Texas 
Hospital for the Insane realized that the hospital was not large enough and began work to 
                                                             
 50 Ibid: 306. 
 51 Ibid: 309. 
 52 The governor’s term at this time was for two years, but he was eligible for reelection. 
 53 GLT Volume 9, Austin, 1898: 409-411, 629. The legislation required the superintendent to have 
three years of resident experience in the management of a mental institution. Two years later, when 
finding an individual with such qualifications proved difficult, the Legislature dropped the requirement. It 
required the individual only to be “experienced in the treatment of insanity.”  
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double its size from 400 to 800. The expansion opened in 1890.54 The Legislature 
authorized a third state asylum in 1889; it opened in San Antonio in 1892 as the 
Southwestern Insane Asylum, and its population increased rapidly.55 In 1851, the 
Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane 
(AMSAII) had set 250 as the optimal size of an asylum. Still, by 1865, half of the 
nation’s public asylums had much larger populations.56 In 1875, the total population of 
public asylums in the nation was almost 20,000, and by 1900, it was 150,000.57 Virtually 
all of the institutions had exceeded the recommendation of 250 by this point, and most 
would grow to house thousands of patients. Small, public hospitals providing intimate, 
moral treatment were no longer available. 
In 1899, Gov. Joseph D. Sayers (1841-1929) stated in remarks to the state 
Legislature, “There are at least 1,000 insane persons in the jails, upon the poor farms, and 
under private care and restraint in the State.”58 That year, the Legislature increased the 
number of asylums by approving the construction of an asylum for the “epileptic insane” 
in Abilene, which would later become the Abilene State School.59 Completed in 1904, it 
reached full capacity in only five months with transfers from the other asylums and new 
                                                             
 54 Benny Britton, Terrell State Hospital 1883-2008 (Terrell: Terrell State Hospital Volunteer 
Services Council, 2008): 5. 
 55 HB 150, 21st Legislature, 1889, Chapter 69, accessed October 4, 2017, 
http://www.lrl.texas.gov/scanned/sessionLaws/21-0/HB_156_CH_69.pdf. William R. Geise and James W. 
Markham, "San Antonio State Hospital," Handbook of Texas Online, accessed September 20, 2017, 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/sbs04. 
 56 Constance M. McGovern, Masters of Madness: Social Origins of the American Psychiatric 
Profession (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1985): 152. 
 57 Ibid. 166. 
58 Texas House of Representatives 26th Regular Session, Texas House Journal Joseph D. Sayers, 
“Message from the Governor to the Senate and House of Representatives,” (January 23, 1899): 122, 
accessed February 2, 2016, http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/Housejournals/26/01231899_12_118.pdf.  




patients.60 As the nineteenth century closed, a new addition at San Antonio opened to 
bring its capacity to approximately 600.61 At the end of 1899, Terrell had 1,041 patients 
in residence,62 and Austin had 734 patients.63 At that point, the hope was that with the 
newly expanded capacity, “all of the county jails in the state [would] be relieved of the 
insane inmates.”64  
The New Century Brings Change but Continued Overcrowding  
 
With the facilities for the mentally ill in Texas required to serve the indigent first, 
and with the requisite of an open trial by jury to gain admission to the public facilities, 
the wealthier, private-paying patients sought other possibilities for treatment. This 
opportunity created a market for small private hospitals, most often called sanitariums, to 
develop in the larger towns and cities. In most cases, physicians owned and staffed these 
hospitals. These included Dr. John Pope’s Valleloma in Marshall in 1892, Moody 
Sanitarium in San Antonio in 1903, Arlington Heights Sanitarium in Fort Worth in 1906, 
Timberlawn Sanitarium in Dallas in 1917, and Greenwood’s Sanitarium in Houston in 
1925.65 This bifurcation of care for the mentally ill continues today. The wealthy who can 
pay for private psychiatric care have access to psychiatrists and facilities that do not 
accept health insurance, on which most Americans rely. Menninger’s Clinic is such a 
                                                             
60 The New Handbook of Texas in Six Volumes, Volume 4 (Austin: The Texas State Historical 
Association, 1996): 624. 
 61 “More Asylum Room,” Dallas Morning News, October 15, 1899: 5.  
 62 Superintendents Report Terrell, 1899: 19.  
 63 Superintendents Report Austin 1899: 5. 
 64 “More Asylum Room:” 5. 




facility in Houston. They take no insurance payments for full payment of treatment, and 
they require funding per day far more than most individuals or families can afford. 
C.S. Yoakum’s report on the Care of the Feeble-minded and Insane in Texas in 
1914, at the start of World War I, reported that the population of the mental institutions in 
Texas had grown to 5,439 in four facilities. In comparing the care provided to the needs 
of the insane in Texas, Yoakum concluded that there was “insufficient care and 
incomplete treatment” for those in the asylums. Because of the overcrowded asylums, 
“large numbers that its courts have already said should be in these institutions are kept 
out.” He stated there were “471 insane persons in the county jails and on the poor farms 
of the State, or at home adjudged insane, waiting for a place to be given them in our State 
institutions.” Perhaps in an acknowledgment to the nascent mental hygiene movement, 
Yoakum also noted the state’s lack of efforts to prevent mental illness, though he did not 
identify any specific steps.66 
A study in 1915 of Texas asylums by Dr. Thomas Salmon of the National 
Committee for Mental Hygiene found the conditions within the asylums and local jails 
deplorable and recommended the creation of a central authority over the mental 
institutions.67 Salmon’s recommendation was for a central board composed of persons 
who understood the needs of the population served. He opposed state boards of control 
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https://archive.org/details/careoffeeblemind00yoak/page/n1. 
 67 Sarah C. Sitton, Life at the Texas State Lunatic Asylum 1857-1997 (College Station, TX: Texas 
A&M University Press, 1999): 36-37. 
159 
 
that focused on efficiency and exhibited no “evidences of any feeling of personal 
responsibility” for the needs of those in care.68 
The New State Board of Control: Extreme Efficiency, Extremely Poor Care  
 
 The concept of a state board of control had first emerged in Wisconsin in 1891 
when that state abolished local boards for its institutions and placed them under the new 
State Board of Control to which it gave the power to “maintain and govern” all of the 
charitable institutions. Gerald Grob states, “The intent of the legislation was to reduce the 
costs of welfare by creating a more efficient administrative structure.”69 It accomplished 
its purpose, and, by 1914, 17 more states had created state boards of control. Salmon 
stated, “Almost without exception, the only qualifications required for members of 
Boards of Control [were] those which relate to their political affiliations.”70  
 In Texas, the board of managers of the North Texas Hospital for the Insane in 
Terrell began the movement toward the creation of a state board of control in 1909. They 
recommended that Texas create a board that would manage the business of the mental 
institutions of the state “as any successful business man should.” They proposed a full-
time board of five over the four institutions instead of four part-time boards. They also 
proposed that this new board should receive a total sum to spend rather than specific 
amounts for each line item in the budget. This proposal would allow the board to spend 
resources as needed rather than being restricted to the specific directions of the 
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Legislature.71 In 1912, they expanded their recommendation for such a board to be over 
“all State charitable and eleemosynary institutions.”72  
 Ultimately, in 1919, the Legislature passed a game-changing law creating the 
State Board of Control (SBOC) for all eleemosynary institutions.73 Significantly, this 
full-time board of three had no requirement for expertise in mental illness nor any of the 
work of the institutions under its oversight. The legislation forming the SBOC abolished 
all local boards that had previously inspected the facilities, made decisions for the local 
asylums, and advocated for them to the governor and Legislature. The SBOC appointed 
superintendents of each facility who were answerable to no one except it. In addition to 
philanthropic institutions, this board also took over the responsibilities of the following 
divisions for the state: Public Printing, Purchasing, Auditing, Design, Construction and 
Maintenance, and Estimates and Appropriations.74  
 By including the state administrative divisions along with the eleemosynary 
institutions, the powerful SBOC became the budget planning, budget monitoring, and 
ultimately the auditing arm of the state. The Legislature did not agree to grant the board a 
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sum of money and allow them to spend it as needed. The legislators, rather than local 
administrators, would continue to determine the salaries of every employee and set the 
authorized number of personnel regardless of the local needs. Individual departments and 
institutions sent their budget requests for each biennium to the SBOC, which held 
hearings on the budgets and determined amounts that it recommended to the Legislature 
based upon anticipated revenues for the state, which it also determined. The SBOC’s 
proposed budget went to the Legislature, which could make changes, but now the SBOC 
was the voice for the institutions since there were no separate boards.75  
 The appropriations approved by the Legislature for each line item in the budgets 
of the institutions remained the maximum expenditures allowed. Still, the SBOC could—
and most often did—work to limit expenditures to less than the appropriations as it 
focused on fiscal management and efficiency. In effect, the SBOC served to insulate the 
Legislature from the institutions serving people. It made the hard decisions of what to cut 
before the budget went to the legislators, asking only for sums within the expected 
revenues of the state. Its stated purpose was to save the state money. Once the Legislature 
appropriated the budget, the SBOC worked to make sure, particularly in the lean years of 
the Depression, that funds would lapse back into the state treasury rather than meet the 
significant needs of the patients. In the first three SBOC Biennial Reports from 1920 to 
1926, the board highlighted the appropriations, the amount expended, and the balance not 
spent that reverted to the State Treasury for each institution. There were no biennial 
reports printed for the years 1926 to 1930. Beginning with the 1932 report and forward to 
1940 (Sixth through Tenth Biennial when the last full report was printed), the board 
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highlighted the total amount saved for all institutions. During the Depression when the 
facilities were overcrowded, salaries cut, and major repairs ignored, the board allowed 
the following amounts to lapse: 1931-32, almost $1 million; 1933-34, over $770,000; 
1935-36, over $320,000; 1937-38, over $450,000; 1939-40, over $1 million.76 The mental 
institutions had the largest budgets, and they normally had the largest lapses. The 
amounts appropriated by the Legislature and approved by the Governor were not to 
exceed amounts, so it is plausible that the Board of Control had to make sure expenses 
never exceeded the amount appropriated. However, these lapsed fund amounts were 
excessive. One assumes that perhaps the Legislators and Governor wanted to be able to 
report the amounts they had appropriated, while counting on the Board to keep the 
expenses well below the amounts to insure a surplus in revenue over expenses for the 
overall budget. 
Expansion and Name Changes but Studies Find Inadequate Treatment of the 
Mentally Ill 
 
 With new revenue from the oil production tax of $1 million in 1919,77 the 
Legislature that year expanded the number of asylums, creating a new state hospital at 
Rusk in east Texas by taking over a facility built in 1883 as a prison. Initially, the 
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planning called for it to house the “Negro Insane;” however, before it opened, that 
designation changed, and it opened to all races, becoming the East Texas Hospital for the 
Insane.78 In 1922, an institution authorized in 1917 opened as the Northwest Texas Insane 
Asylum in Wichita Falls.79  
 In 1924, The Texas State Medical Association (TSMA) passed a unanimous 
resolution calling for action to improve conditions for the mentally ill in Texas.  That 
year, prompted by the TSMA, the Rotary Club of Houston, one of the earliest Rotary 
clubs in the state and the nation, issued a report on the conditions they found in an 
examination of the care for the mentally ill in Texas. Their work pointed to the continual 
growth in the number of patients in the state facilities for the mentally ill, and the 
Legislature’s lack of funding for them. The report concluded that in Texas, “an effort is 
being made to make it as cheap as possible” to serve the mentally ill. It stated that the 
superintendents of the state asylums had to “actually beg the Legislature for the bare 
necessities.”80 Though there were no longer local boards to represent the asylums, the 
superintendents used their legislative connections to plead for what their patients needed. 
The prior year, in response to concerns about the “constant increase” in the 
number of patients needing care in the eleemosynary institutions of the state, the 
Legislature created a short-term, nine-member, non-salaried Eleemosynary Commission. 
The commission’s purpose was to examine ways to prevent “insanity, feeble mindedness, 
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delinquency, and the increase of State dependents,” along with other issues.81 To find 
means of preventing these illnesses and conditions would have been impossible with 
funding. Still, the Legislature authorized no funds for the study or even the operation of 
the commission.82 The commission, chaired by State Representative Clifton E. Beasley 
from Sulphur Springs, however, raised its funds and received services from outside the 
state to examine the treatment of mental illness in Texas.83  
The commission’s 1925 report on the mental institutions noted with faint praise 
that the patients in the hospitals were “on the whole” treated “humanely,” “kindly,” and 
“are fairly well nourished and housed.” The study stated, however, that the staff 
“struggle[d] with the impossible tasks assigned to them” and, given the “wages paid and 
conditions of service imposed,” is “about as competent” as one can expect. The report 
concluded, “Anything approximating even moderate efficiency in the problem of 
handling the insane is out of the question until radical changes are made in the present 
Texas plan.”84 The report further noted that there is “nothing being done for prevention” 
in the state, and “the four primary essentials of effective handling of the insane [are] all 
practically absent.” These primary essentials included “early recognition” of mental 
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illness, the “careful diagnosis by skilled psychiatrists and psychologists,” “prompt 
treatment … by mental and occupational therapy,” and the use of psychiatric social 
workers to develop case histories to aid in diagnosis and treatment and to follow cases to 
prevent a return to the hospital.85 It explicitly stated, “There is practically no organized 
mental therapy along modern lines attempted in any of [the] asylums; and, of the more 
than eight thousand patients, only about forty in the asylum at San Antonio receive any 
organized occupational therapy.” It did specify that some patients helped with the routine 
work of the asylum. However, this work was limited to a small number, and it did not 
provide for the individual needs of the patients.86 
The Legislature, unfortunately, failed to approve and fund any of the 
recommendations, all of which cost money. It did officially change the name of all of the 
institutions, dropping the words lunatic and asylum so that the official name of each 
facility would be the name of the city of its location, followed by the phrase “state 
hospital.” It also approved building 2 state psychopathic hospitals, one in Galveston and 
one in Dallas.87 Psychopathic hospitals, working in conjunction with medical schools, 
focused on observation, diagnosis, and brief treatment of mental illness. They differed 
from state hospitals in that they served persons who were not formally committed as the 
patients in state hospitals were, and the psychopathic hospitals did not provide long-term 
custodial care.88  Unfortunately, it did not fund the one for Galveston until 1930, and the 
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one in Dallas never received funding.89 The Galveston State Psychopathic Hospital 
opened in 1931 with a capacity of 49 patients and an affiliation with the University of 
Texas Medical Branch (UTMB), the first public medical school in Texas.90  
Under the SBOC, the number of patients in the state hospital’s care rose from 
7,248 in 1921 to 19,430 (15,000 residents and the remainder on leave from the 
institutions) in 1949. That year, a new board took over the responsibility for the 
management of the mental institutions.91 The cost per day per patient in 1921 was $.63, 
and in 1949, it was $1.41. In 2017 dollars, Texas was spending $8.62 per day per person 
in 1921 and $14.50 per day per person in 1949.92 Costs per day included the basics of 
food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and supervision before any specific mental illness 
therapy costs.   
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 Although never highly ranked, Texas was not unique among the states. While the 
Texas state hospitals for the mentally ill needed to improve facilities and to pay for 
additional staffing and improved operations, it was not the only state in such a situation.  
As Table 1 below shows the 1939 annual costs for maintenance per resident patient in 
Texas was $228.92, which ranked the state 28th. Despite increasing its expenditures by 
125.5 percent to $516.40 in 1949, the state dropped to 38th.  In 1949, Tennessee ranked 
last with expenses of $323.65 annually per patient, and Wisconsin ranked first with 
annual costs of $1,089.01.  
 The 1949 National Governor’s Conference directed the Council of State 
Governments to complete “a comprehensive, factual study” of the several states’ 
programs for the care and treatment of mental illness, which was one of the “most 
important social and financial problems confronting the states today.93 That study 
presented at the 1950 Governor’s Conference documented the dramatic rise in the 
numbers of mentally ill, the need for additional space, and the dramatic shortage of 
psychiatrists and other staff for serving the mentally ill.94 The study revealed that there 
were 462,859 patients in the state hospitals in 1949, but the actual need for public 
psychiatric beds in the nation was 725,203. At the time of the study in 1949, Texas had 
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Table 1 Annual Expenditures for Maintenance per Resident Patient in State 
Hospitals for the Mentally Ill by State Fiscal Years 1939 and 1949 
State 1939 Rank 1949 Rank % Change 
Alabama $189.92 36 $526.17 35 177.0 % 
Arizona * ..   755.81 12 * 
Arkansas  206.29 33   473.81 42 129.3 
California  265.13 20   830.05   5 213.1 
Colorado  268.37 18   767.35 10 185.9 
Connecticut  355.54   8   901.04   4 168.5 
Delaware  362.09   7   720.63 14   99.0  
Florida  258.52 21   640.52 23 147.8 
Georgia  194.83 35   383.04 46   96.6 
Idaho  127.00 46   627.81 26 394.3 
Illinois  254.90 22   768.40   9 201.4 
Indiana  * ..   505.61 39 * 
Iowa  184.27 37   556.25 31 201.9 
Kansas  296.21 34   498.89 40 141.9 
Kentucky  141.54 45   382.93 47 170.5 
Louisiana  241.96 24   464.61 43   92.0 
Maine  273.14 17   634.04 25 132.1 
Maryland  231.61 27   674.19 19 191.1 
Massachusetts  412.06   3   789.26   7   91.5 
Michigan  326.93   9   917.94   3 180.8 
Minnesota   233.09 26   521.25 37 123.6 
Mississippi  296.20 12   560.90 30   89.4 
Missouri  285.09 14   536.90 34   88.3 
Montana  177.90 38   595.29 29 234.6 
Nebraska  224.26 29   649.71 21 189.7 
Nevada  273.43 16   724.04 13 164.8 
N Hampshire  372.91   5   821.12   6 120.2 
New Jersey  772.55   6   779.23   8 109.2 
New Mexico  172.08 40   694.68 17 301.4 
New York  422.48   2   960.84   2 127.4 
No Carolina  164.73 43   689.83 18 312.8 
North Dakota  397.45   4   695.01 16   74.9 
Ohio  207.05 32   624.01 27 201.4 
Oklahoma  219.62 31   443.22 44 101.8 
Oregon  164.82 41   542.54 32 229.2 
Pennsylvania  295.80 13   643.51 22 117.5 
Rhode Island  316.67 10   755.95 11 138.7 
So Carolina  255.71 19   540.78 33 102.8 
South Dakota  249.85 23   429.51 45   71.9 
Tennessee  164.81 42   323.65 48   96.4 
Texas  228.92 28   516.4 38 125.5 
Utah  278.26 15   696.61 15 150.3 
Vermont  297.57 11   619.07 28 108.0 
Virginia  177.51 39   488.10 41 175.0 
Washington  233.46 25   659.30 20 182.4 
W Virginia  156.61 44   523.09 36 234.0 
Wisconsin  507.30   1 1089.01   1 114.7 
Wyoming  223.02 30   638.02 24 186.1 




Hospitals Were Custodial Institutions with Little Effective Treatment for 
Mental Illness 
 
 As the Eleemosynary Commission reported, the mental institutions provided 
virtually no occupational or mental therapy for the patients. With the opening of the 
Galveston Psychopathic Hospital in 1931, the SBOC highlighted its success in restoring a 
greater number of people to health by providing “intensive,” “individual treatment” to a 
small number of patients who were admitted quickly without the need for a jury trial. It 
stated that this was probably “the State’s most economical disposition” of care.97 In 1932, 
the SBOC recommended that each of the state hospitals add “a psychopathic unit or 
separate building for receiving inmates.”98 It was not until 1936, however, that expansion 
for these types of facilities received funding by the Legislature. That year, the 
construction of a new addition at Galveston began that increased its capacity from 52 to 
96.99 San Antonio State Hospital also converted several wards to psychopathic care and 
constructed a new psychopathic ward building in 1936.100 Wichita Falls State Hospital 
noted in 1936 that its “psychopathic clinical work” was limited, but a new psychopathic 
ward building was under construction.101  
 In 1938, the SBOC stated that its mental institutions were moving forward toward 
becoming treatment rather than custodial facilities. It reported that the mental hospitals 
had adopted new, modern treatments for mental illness and had added new equipment. 
They now used “insulin, metrazol, benzedrine, photodyne, and [had] expanded the use of 
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electrically-induced fever.” In addition, its report noted that its program using “malarial 
treatment for general paresis” was one of the best in the nation.102 This claim was part of 
the SBOC’s general report. Still, in examining the reports of each institution for that year, 
only the Galveston State Psychopathic Hospital stated that they were experimenting with 
Metrazol and insulin. They added, however, that insufficient time had elapsed to allow 
them to evaluate the results of their experiments.103 Austin State Hospital pointed out that 
they had “much work in paresis and Neuro-syphilis” and were sharing malarial blood 
with the other institutions.104 The SBOC also highlighted that they had added several new 
“hydro- and physio-therap[ies],” and they had expanded occupational therapy and were 
looking to increase the space available for those services.105  
The use of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), a highly effective form of treatment 
for severe depression, began in the 1940s in the state hospitals. The patients had no 
memory of the treatment (although they could awake with injuries), but it was a violent 
therapy to witness as patients “jerked violently and turned blue” while they were held 
down by four people.106 J. P. Porter, in his reporting on the hospitals, described its 
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administration in 1949, “The charge of electricity convulses the patient; the body 
becomes rigid, eyes dilate, face flushes, and sometimes there is nosebleed and frothing at 
the mouth.” Because of a lack of space at Austin State Hospital, patients waiting to 
receive the therapy watched as they stood by to receive their treatment. In some cases, 
they assisted the doctor “because of a shortage of attendants.”107 ECT is still one of the 
most effective therapies for patients suffering from significant states of depression, and 
the therapy has improved greatly from the early days described above. While patients still 
have no memory of the therapy, they no longer experience the extreme effects described 
by Porter. Today, brief electrical impulses stimulate the brain while the patient is under 
anesthesia. The primary usage of ECT today is when medications and psychotherapy 
have not produced positive results. In about 80 percent of patients, it “produce[s] 
substantial improvement.”108 
A more controversial therapy, the prefrontal lobotomy, began in the 1940s at 
Austin State Hospital and presumably the other state hospitals as well. This 
psychosurgical procedure consisted of severing the connections to and within the 
prefrontal cortex of the brain. These connections do not regenerate, so the surgery was 
not reversible.109 With the development of new antipsychotic medications in the 1950s, 
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there was less call for this surgery and the irreversibility of the procedure lessened its 
use.110  It was a part of the acceptable therapies within the Texas mental hospitals, at least 
until 1960.111   
Aside from the overcrowded facilities, the state hospitals’ key problem in 
providing treatment services was the lack of funds to hire competent staff. The 
Legislature authorized only limited funds ($1,200 a year) for the SBOC to hire a 
physician to serve as the Chief of the Eleemosynary Institutions, so instead of a full-time 
administrator to supervise all of the institutions, the SBOC settled for a part-time former 
hospital administrator who made periodic inspections.112 The SBOC in 1932 and 1934 
stated in its biennial reports, “The urgent need of the hospitals for the insane which has 
existed for a number of years is for a physician who has been specially trained in 
psychiatry and who has had several years’ actual experience in a first class psychopathic 
hospital.” The Board envisioned this person traveling from hospital to hospital to assist 
each of them.113 In 1936, the report argued that the problem went beyond the need for a 
trained psychiatrist. The report, pointing to the medical staff salary scale, highlighted that 
the salaries for physicians had never been sufficient “to retain … the best trained men.” 
Almost all young physicians left after 12 to 18 months when they found “more lucrative 
stations.” The report stated, “In recent months, one of our largest State mental hospitals 
carried only three physicians on its staff when eight physician’s salaries had been 
appropriated: doctors could not be secured for the small salaries available.”114 Not just 
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doctors received low salaries. The edition of the SBOC’s Thirteenth Biennial Report 
published in December of 1944 stated that during the depression, the Legislature had 
reduced virtually all state salaries, and “very few of them have ever been restored.”115  
 In 1937, the Legislature acknowledged that there were a “large number of insane 
persons in the jails,” for whom the state hospitals could not appropriately care, and that 
“it was not to the public interest that such unfortunate people be confined in the jails of 
Texas.” The Legislature approved new state hospitals, one each for both East and West 
Texas.116 The governor, however, vetoed the funds for the East Texas facility, because 
the Board of Control had only asked for the new West Texas hospital and money was 
very tight.117 The SBOC selected Big Spring for the new location, and it opened in 
1939.118 In 1938, the SBOC believed that its focus on increasing the capacity of the state 
hospitals would be sufficient to allow all of the insane housed in local jails to move to 
hospitals by June 1939. However, it acknowledged that it would still leave the institutions 
“over-crowded.”119 The publics’ drive to remove the mentally ill from the jails pushed the 
state to build another hospital, but that drive did not extend to a push to improve the 
quality of care within the institutions. In Texas and the rest of the nation, there was an 
assumption that the hospitals provided the treatment needed.  That belief would change 
dramatically in the next decade. 
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World War II and the Impact of Decades of Poor Funding   
 
 The SBOC’s hope of having enough space to move all of the mentally ill from the 
jails proved wrong, but they chose to empty the jails nevertheless. “Mentally ill were 
removed from jails [to hospitals] and stacked in double-deck beds.” The SBOC used 
every space in the hospitals for beds or pallets and mattresses when the beds ran out.120 In 
1943, the Texas House of Representatives received a report from a committee 
investigating the institutions under the SBOC. This report noted “food shortage[s],” 
“inefficient management,” and “cruelty beyond belief” that “authorities in direct control 
of the institutions had allowed.”121 The Hogg Foundation, in a report published in 1945, 
identified “serious personnel shortages … due to inadequate compensation,” and 
“crowded conditions and inadequate facilities”122 within the state hospitals. The 
“standards for custodial care during World War II became about as bad as they had been 
in Texas history.”123 
 The situation during the war did not improve after its close. In a series of 
newspaper articles that appeared across Texas in 1949, a young college student reporter, 
John Paul (J.P.) Porter (1924-2014), working under the auspices of the University of 
Texas Hogg Foundation for Mental Hygiene, visited each of the state hospitals. He talked 
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with staff about the care of the mentally ill following 30 years of oversight by the SBOC. 
He noted, “The state hospital system now contains 15,000 mentally ill persons with 
facilities for half that number. Halls, basements, porches and bathrooms are jammed with 
beds to catch the overflow.” Porter also noted that quarters for staff required to live on 
campus were “overcrowded and outmoded.” He quoted Hall H. Logan, chair of the 
SBOC, “If you provide slum quarters for your help, you’ll either get the type of people 
who live in slums or break the hearts of those whose zeal has kept them on the job.”124  
In Austin, Porter found that the first hospital building, constructed in 1857, still 
housed several hundred patients. Superintendent A.T. Hanretta told him that the old 
building was “unsanitary, ill-adapted, and a dangerous fire trap.” Porter also noted that 
“overcrowded” was the word that described the entire hospital. With an “official 
capacity” set 25 years earlier in 1925 at 1,700, the “capacity had increased to 2,810 with 
“practically no expansion,” and in 1949, there were more than 3,000 patients housed 
there.125 Porter also described “the world for fifty-six sick men at San Antonio State 
Hospital.” It consisted of “straw mattresses soaked in human filth; a bare cement floor 
sticky with saliva; three wooden park benches; steel barred windows and grated doors.” 
The men had epilepsy, and with frequent convulsions, they lost control of their “bodily 
functions.” “The straw [could] be destroyed when soiled, like that in a chicken coop. The 
stench resembles that of a barnyard, but low-paid attendants soon get used to the 
smell.”126  
                                                             
 124 Porter, March 20, 1949: 4. 
 125 Porter, March 22, 1949. 




At Terrell, he found a hospital built on the land given to the state that had had 
problems from its first years.127 Porter noted that there was “A constant shifting of the 
earth beneath the hospital buildings. The entire plant is plagued by cracked walls, split 
floors, tilted stairways, jammed windows, broken water mains, and jig-sawed 
pavements.”128  
In visiting the hospital at Rusk, Porter looked back to its previous life as a prison 
and stated, “After thirty years of playing tag with decency, it [had] slipped back into 
much of its former penal atmosphere.”129 At Wichita Falls, he found that “overcrowding” 
of the new hospital built in 1922 had “turned the airy wards into something little better 
than teeming cages.” Porter learned that the most significant problem for Wichita Falls 
was finding staff. Its location six miles from town made hiring attendants with low 
salaries so difficult that it actually “[had] fewer attendants per number of patients than 
any other state institution.”130 
Beyond the overcrowding, the state of the facilities, and problems of obtaining 
attendants, the biggest problem was finding qualified physicians to provide the care and 
treatment for the patients. Porter’s summary column noted that the national average 
income for a private physician in the United States in 1949 was $17,476. Still, the top 
salary for a general physician in the Texas state hospitals was $3,444. He stated that in 
Texas, “nobody expects a state doctor’s salary to be $17,000, but it obviously should be 
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more than $4,000—even with free room and board.”131 He noted that San Antonio had 
the best ratio of doctors to patients at one for every 300 patients, but that was less than 
half required to meet the standards of the American Psychiatric Association.132 At the 
time of Porter’s visit, Austin had seven doctors for the more than 3,000 patients, three of 
whom worked part-time and were over 70 years old.133 Terrell had seven doctors in 
addition to the superintendent for its 2,400 patients. Those seven had an average age of 
69, the oldest being 84, and only four of the seven worked full-time.134 At Rusk, the 
budget called for 14 doctors for its 2,750 patients and the state’s “only extensive insulin 
program.” The superintendent noted, “I couldn’t properly use that number if we had 
them. If it were possible to combine some appropriations to pay eight to ten decent 
salaries we could solve our personnel problem.”135 The superintendent at Wichita Falls 
was 78, and he had a staff of six doctors for the 2,582 patients; three of them were over 
70.136  
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Figure 3 John (J.P.) Porter 
John (J.P.) Porter following a presentation in Houston. J.P. Porter was a native 
of Mt. Pleasant, Texas, who enlisted in the Army in 1942 while a student at UT in 
Austin. He received the Purple Heart, Bronze Star, and Silver Star while in service. His 
articles on Mental Health in Texas received a nomination for the Pulitzer Prize later 
when he was a student at the Pulitzer School of Journalism at Columbia University. 
His first position after leaving UT was with the St. Louis Post Dispatch as a reporter. 
He later worked for LIFE magazine as a reporter in San Francisco. He then 
transferred to New York City in the early 1960s to become part of the startup of 
Time/Life Books. He was a writer and editor there. When he retired, he was the 
European editor of the books division of Time-Life International Ltd, London. 137 
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The Attendants, Not the Physicians, Controlled the Lives of the Patients  
 
 Given Porter’s report on the situation of physicians in the Texas state mental 
hospitals in 1949, the findings of Ivan Belknap in his examination of the mental 
institutions and his three-year observation of the Austin State Hospital in the early 1950s 
are entirely believable. Belknap stated that Texas had created “a centralized and hardly 
more humane form of the older county and city poor farms” in its less than 100 years of 
operation.138 He described the meager salaries, extensive levels of responsibilities, and 
constant turnover of physicians. His intensive study found that in Austin, each ward’s 
lead attendants, not the physicians, actually led the informal organization of the hospital. 
Their role was critical to the operations of each ward, maintaining order and control of 
potentially unruly patients. With limited staffing, the attendants used the cooperative 
patients as staff by rewarding them with better job assignments and special privileges in 
exchange for helping the attendants. These patients assisted by doing manual work on the 
ward, caring for other patients, providing surveillance and informing on other patients, 
and providing protection as the attendants needed it. Neutral patients—those who were 
not as cooperative but did not go against the system—received some privileges to keep 
them compliant, but non-cooperative patients received no privileges.139 Instead of 
assigning patients to different wards based upon illness or functioning level, every ward 
at Austin had a mixture of patients. This mix was because no attendant wanted a ward 
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where no cooperative patients were available to perform the necessary work of caring for 
the patients and maintaining the ward.140 Since the physicians had limited time, they 
depended on the attendants to tell them what was going on, and whom they should visit. 
In general, the non-cooperative patients had limited access to the doctor. Patients who 
caused excessive trouble and refused to cooperate over time received a request from the 
attendants that the physician transfer him/her to another ward. “Good” doctors, in the 
attendants’ eyes, honored their requests.141  
Creation of a New Board and an Infusion of Funds to Improve Facilities 
 
 
Figure 4 Robert Sutherland with Ima Hogg 142 
                                                             
 140 Ibid: 129-131. 
 141 Ibid: 165-171. 






Thanks to J.P. Porter’s newspaper articles, the impact of the lack of maintenance 
of the facilities during the war, and the change in the nation’s view toward the treatment 
of mental illness, there was a movement to change the miserable conditions in the state 
psychiatric hospitals.  From 1948 through 1950, working under the auspices of the Texas 
Society for Mental Hygiene, several individuals provided leadership for changing mental 
health care in Texas.  Hamilton Ford M.D., a practicing psychiatrist, professor of 
psychiatry at the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston, who was an active 
member of the Texas Society for Mental Hygiene, chaired the Texas Medical 
Association’s new standing committee on mental health. In his dual capacity, he was 
actively involved in seeking legislation to change public mental health in Texas. Joining 
him in the leadership of this effort was Robert Sutherland Ph.D., a sociologist and the 
Executive Director of the Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, an endowed organization 
affiliated with the University of Texas.143 Following a national search, Sutherland had 
come from Ohio to Texas in the early 1940s to serve as the first leader of the newly 
created foundation.144 The Foundation and its endowment were the creations of the 
children of the former Governor of Texas, Jim Hogg.145 Three others played significant 
leadership roles in the late 1940s in working to change mental health in Texas.  Percy 
Williams, an attorney and associate professor of law at the University of Texas, was 
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critical in planning legislative strategy.146 James S. Mahon, a nonprofessional, chaired the 
Committee on Mental Health as a civic project for the Texas chapter of the Junior 
Chamber of Commerce. The Junior Chamber of Commerce, a national organization of 
young men between the ages of 21 and 39, had local and state chapters in each of the 
states. The Texas state chapter adopted the cause of improving the treatment of mental 
illness in Texas as a civic project, and Mahon served as chair of the statewide effort 
working with local chapters across the state.147 Ozro T. Woods M.D, a surgeon and 
associate professor at the Southwestern Medical School in Dallas, served as chair of the 
Citizens Committee on Mental Health that formed in 1949. Governor Alan Shivers 
looked to this committee to help pass legislation and to advise him on the improvements 
needed for mental health in Texas.148   
HB 1 of the 51st Texas Legislature meeting in 1949 created a new board, the 
Board for Texas State Hospitals and Special Schools (BTSH&SS) to focus on the specific 
needs of the populations served in the state hospitals for mental health and tuberculosis 
and the special schools for the intellectually disabled from the former SBOC in 1949.149 
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In addition, the Legislature in a special session in 1950 passed a special tax on cigarettes 
to raise $35 million for new construction and renovation of facilities over seven years.150 
That $35 million repaired and replaced worn out buildings, but it did not create new 
facilities.151 The board added programs for senile patients at Kerrville in a former state 
tuberculosis sanitarium and the Mexia State Home. These joined the Confederate Home 
for Men in offering care to the geriatric population, freeing space for younger patients 
who were more recently ill.152  
Conclusion 
 
 In looking at the first 100 years of the Texas programs to serve the mentally ill, it 
is clear the state never adequately funded care. It used federal funds to begin, depended 
upon the generosity of the superintendent during the Civil War, and delayed expansion of 
the facilities that could empty the jail cells of the mentally ill. It built new asylums and 
expanded them. Still, they were always overcrowded and funded at levels to keep them 
going, but never with the opportunity to develop more than custodial care for the patients 
served. For 30 years, the asylums operated at the whim of each superintendent while the 
Board of Control sought to save money each year from appropriated resources. In 1949 
and 1950, when its services hit bottom, the state did fund significant capital 
improvements for its old and hard-worn structures. Its new board began to develop actual 
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mental health treatment programs, but the facilities remained overcrowded and the 
tangible resources low.  
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VI. THE MEDICAL COMMUNITY’S FOCUS ON 
CHANGING THE TEXAS PUBLIC MENTAL HEALTH 
SYSTEM LED TO FUTURE PROBLEMS  
 
 Just as the Medical Community played a crucial role on the national level in 
changing the treatment of serious mental illness beginning in the 1950s, it also advocated 
for change in Texas. Its focus on bringing the state health care system under medical 
control, ultimately allowed the Legislature to use its advocacy for that body’s purposes, 
and in the end to create a system with limited leadership capacity. 
Introduction 
 
 Texas has never supported the treatment of mental illness at the level needed. In 
1949 and 1950, the state created a new department focused only on the states’ public 
hospitals and special schools, and passed a cigarette tax to raise money to improve the 
facilities under its control. The medical profession played a significant role in pushing for 
these changes. It continued that role as it advocated for improved treatment of those with 
an SMI in Texas in the 1950s and 1960s.  However, its focus was on creating a state 
department led by a psychiatrist rather than passing a bill to secure the funding for the 
future programs it envisioned. The medical profession’s actions did create a new 
combined hospital and community mental health center department with the board led by 
a psychiatrist.  However, the Texas Legislature did not approve the strong physician 
presence on the board that the medical profession wanted, and Governor John Connally 
chose to re-nominate the two physicians from the former board (BSH&SS), but no 
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additional ones. The combination of a psychiatrist leading the agency with a non-medical 
board would lead to future leadership issues.  
 The new board, the Texas Department of Mental Health and Retardation 
(TDMHMR), had the challenge of supporting the creation of community mental health 
centers for both the mentally ill and the intellectually disabled in the communities that 
chose to create them. At the same time, the board’s biggest challenge was to lead two 
massive institutional programs of state hospitals for those with SMI and state schools for 
the intellectually disabled.  In both of these actions, the Legislature limited and directed 
the funding of TDMHMR. As Chapter VII will show, this organization and the 
Legislature would find themselves at the mercy of legal action and federal court 
directives for over a quarter of a century due to poor leadership by its board and 
executive. 
The Medical Community Leads Efforts to Improve the Treatment of Mental 
Illness in Texas, but is Used by the Legislature Budget Board to Scuttle a 
Hospital for Houston 
 
 In 1949, the Texas Medical Association (TMA) began a drive to gain control of 
the hospitals treating mental illness and tuberculosis in Texas. It saw political 
interference driving that the three-person lay Board of Control and the hospitals under its 
leadership. TMA wanted to create a merit system that would allow appointments and 
promotions of worthy physicians within the state hospitals.1 It drafted legislation to 
change to a new Board of State Hospitals and Special Schools (BSH&SS). TMA’s 
proposed legislation left no doubt that it wanted a strong leadership role on the new 
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board, for it sought a board of nine members, four of whom would be physicians.2 
Fearing loss of control if it gave political power to physicians, the Legislature did not 
accept the recommendation that required physicians to be on the board;3 however, over 
the life of the new board, at least two physicians were on the board at all times.4  
 The TMA continued its efforts to improve the treatment of mental illness in Texas 
throughout the 1950s. In 1953, the American Medical Association (AMA) added a 
committee on mental health that suggested a 13-point program to encourage state and 
county medical societies to promote mental hygiene within their communities.5 In 1954, 
the TMA’s Committee on Mental Health noted that it had met with the budget officer of 
the Legislative Budget Board (LBB) regarding training within the hospitals and ways to 
increase appropriations for improved treatment. That same year, the committee reported 
that some of its members were part of the advisory committee to the BSH&SS that met 
with that board every other month.6 Also, in 1954, the Women’s Auxiliary of the TMA 
made up of the wives of the physician members, accepted the challenge from AMA and 
began an extensive effort to educate themselves and their communities about the 
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“overcrowded and understaffed” mental hospitals of Texas.7 The BSH&SS advisory 
committee, with the encouragement of TMA’s Committee on Mental Health, created a 
public health information subcommittee to educate the public about the needs of the state 
hospitals and schools and those it served.8  
 TMA enjoyed its standing with the new board and the Legislature, but the LBB 
used that relationship to ask for help against the BSH&SS. In 1956, the BSH&SS budget 
request for the 55th Texas Legislature meeting the next spring went to the LBB first. It 
contained a request to build a large state psychiatric hospital in Houston, the state’s 
largest city. The LBB saw the request as “too much emphasis on bricks and not enough 
on treatment and restoration.” Lt. Governor Ben Ramsey (1903-1985), the chair of the 
LBB, advised the board to approach the TMA “hat in hand” and ask the association to 
sponsor an “objective study of state mental health services.” TMA agreed to do so, and 
they obtained a donation from Howard E. Butt Sr. (1895-1991) to fund the study.9 Butt 
was a South Texas grocer who founded the HEB grocery stores and whose wife was a 
member of the board of BSH&SS. Francis J. Gerty MD (1893-1994), Chair of the 
Department of Psychiatry at the University of Illinois – Chicago, was engaged to 
complete a three-month consultation. His charge was to recommend “short term, specific 
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steps that should be taken administratively and legislatively to develop an optimum 
program of modern care and treatment for the Texas mentally ill.”10  
Gerty’s 1957 report recommended that the state develop a model program in a 
region of the state large enough to serve a significant portion of the population, and 
ideally one without an existing state psychiatric hospital. The model should include all of 
the elements needed for the prevention and treatment of mental illness, including research 
and training, and should contain a small community-centered psychiatric hospital.11 The 
study recommended a 500-bed hospital for this model program in addition to the research 
and training program, instead of the larger state hospital envisioned by the BSH&SS 
leadership. Though the Legislature approved the concept of the 500-bed hospital, the 
opposition of the LBB successfully blocked the funding for it. However, twenty-five 
years later, this approval from 1957 became the vehicle, when funded by the Legislature, 
to build the Harris County Psychiatric Center (HCPC).12 
The LBB, under Lt. Governor Ben Ramsay’s leadership, did not want to build the 
hospital, and just as the legislature opened, it flew ‘key figures in the legislature to 
Michigan for a week to study … work being done at a clinic there.” While the work there 
was expensive, the LBB sought to convince the leadership of the Legislature that the 
“high daily cost of patient care could be good economy in the long run.” Despite a 
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“knock-down, drag-out battle” with BSH&SS, which pushed to build the needed hospital 
for the largest city in Texas, the visit to Michigan and the TMA sponsored study was 
successful in defeating the effort to build it.13  The Legislature approved Gerty’s plan for 
a research institute in Houston and the establishment of two outpatient clinics, one in 
Dallas and the other in San Antonio.14 The LBB’s focus was on saving money, not on 
building the quality care the legislators had seen in Michigan. Instead of spending the 
millions of dollars it would have cost to build and staff a large state hospital, and the 
continued ongoing expense, the legislature spent just over $1 million the first two years 
for operations of the new research center and outpatient clinics.15 It would face additional 
costs in the construction and operation of the research center, but not the cost of a large 
state hospital. 
TMA, having supported the action of the LBB and Gerty’s 1957 report created 
under its auspices, applauded this action. Like the AMA on the national level, TMA 
opposed new mental hospitals seeing them only as vintages of the past given the negative 
image of the hospitals since World War II and the new medications helping people to 
leave the hospitals. In the Texas State Medical Journal, the TMA Committee on Mental 
Health stated, “The Texas State Legislature has made itself, psychiatrically, the best-
informed legislative body in the United States.” In other states, the citizens are putting 
pressure on their legislatures to build more psychiatric hospitals. However, in Texas, the 
Legislature is pushing “not for more buildings, but more psychiatrists, clinical 
psychologists, social workers, and psychiatrically oriented nurses and psychiatric 
                                                             
 13 McCleskey, 145. 
 14 HB 133, 55th Legislature, Regular Session (1955), Bill Files, Texas Legislature, Archives and 
Information Services Texas State Library, 906-907. 
 15 Ibid.  
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aides.”16 For TMA, the creation of the Houston State Psychiatric Institute for Research 
and Training (HSPI) gave psychiatry and medicine a new role of in the treatment of 
mental illness that better fit their image. It opened in a temporary facility in 1958 and 
moved into its newly constructed permanent home in 1961 within the Texas Medical 
Center. In 1968, the Legislature renamed HSPI the Texas Research Institute of Mental 
Sciences (TRIMS), provided funds to lease space for a sixty-bed hospital in Houston, and 
added outpatient services.17 This small hospital and outpatient services, however, would 
not meet the needs of those suffering from an SMI in Houston. It would be another 
eighteen years before the construction of a public psychiatric hospital in Houston, and it 
would prove to be too small and not created to serve the longer-term needs of this 
overwhelmed population. 
The Medical Community Takes the Lead in Planning for Community Mental 
Health 
 
 In the fall of 1962, the United States Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) received $4.2 million to award to the states to plan for community-based 
mental health programs. AMA’s Mental Health Congress in October 1962 asked the 
TMA, the Texas Neurological Association (TNA), and the Texas Association of Mental 
Health “each to get five of their best people together on the subject of mental health 
planning … to begin making preparations for a plan for community mental health 
services in Texas.” At the same time, staff from the Division of Mental Health within the 
Texas Health Department started the grant application for funding the planning effort for 
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Texas even before Congress had given its final approval to the authorization.18 While the 
Health Department applied for the funding and would provide the staffing for the 
planning effort, in reality, mental health was not the focus of the department. The three 
advocacy groups had a better knowledge of mental health, and TMA and TNA had a 
strong bias for the medical leadership of the work. However, the planning effort was not 
without controversy within TMA; many of the physicians opposed it out of fear that 
acceptance of federal funding could lead to socialized medicine. The planning committee 
ultimately presented the grant proposal, which included the acceptance of federal funding 
to TMA, for consideration “where it was approved only after vigorous discussion.”19  The 
prominent role played by TMA ultimately made this a medical proposal, without 
significant input from other groups. 
 Three planning committees—Executive, Steering, and General—completed the 
planning task over a year, holding six multiple-day meetings from December of 1963 to 
October of 1964. The committees were long on knowledge of mental health but quite 
                                                             
 18 McCleskey, 145-146. 
 19 Ibid: 146. The TMA’s Committee on Mental Health had previously endorsed the use of the 
federal grant for planning purposes. However, at the first meeting of the planning steering committee, 
Perry Talkington, M.D. (1909-1996), chair of that committee, sent word that TMA’s committee opposed 
“accepting federal money for planning.” The planning committee determined that the funding would aid 
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operation of the program.” After significant debate, TMA accepted the planning committee’s proposal 
and its submission to the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) for funding. “Panel to Help Chart 
Mental Health Setup,” press release of the Mental Health Educational Materials, Division of Mental 
Health, Texas State Department of Health, 1.29.63, Box MAI 9/U35, Hogg Foundation for Mental Health 
Papers, Briscoe Center for American History, University of Texas, Austin. “First Meeting of the Steering 
Committee for Statewide Mental Health Planning—Austin, March 1963—Minutes,” March 15, 1963, first 
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short on individuals with experience in politics and finance. Of the 127 members, almost 
60 percent were mental health professionals, and 30 percent were physicians.20   
 
Figure 5 Leadership of the Community Mental Health Planning Committee 1964 21 
 “Several conservative political and community leaders who could have helped the 
committee a great deal” chose not to do so.22 Among those invited, but who declined to 
serve were Lt. Governor Preston Smith (1912-2003) and Speaker of the Texas House of 
Representatives Byron Tunnell (1925-2000), who by their positions were two of the most 
                                                             
 20 McCleskey: 146-147. The program for planning called for an executive committee of four. They 
were James E. Peavy, M.D. (1911-1980), Commissioner of the Texas Department of Health; C. J. Ruilmann, 
M.D. (d. 1981), Director of Mental Health and Hospitals of BSH&SS; Robert L. Sutherland, Ph.D. (1937-
1973), director of the Hogg Foundation for Mental Health; and the County Judge-Executive of Hale County 
in west Texas, Judge C. L. Abernethy (1907-1996). Beyond that group was a seventeen-member steering 
committee that included the executive committee. Lastly, there was a general committee of 110 people 
assigned to twelve task forces. “Highlights and Recommendations from the Texas Plan for Mental Health 
Services,” The Statewide Citizens Committee for Mental Health, December 1, 1964, 37-40. 
 21 Texas State Journal of Medicine 60, no. 9, (September 1964): 777. 
 22 McCleskey: 147. 
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influential leaders in the state. Others who declined were Ed Kilman (1896–1969), editor 
emeritus of the Houston Post, and Mrs. Amon Carter, widow of the publisher of the Fort 
Worth Star Telegram, who represented two key media resources in the state. Miss Ima 
Hogg (1882-1975) of Houston and benefactor of the Hogg Foundation and Ben Taub 
(1889–1982), a medical benefactor from Houston, were prominent philanthropists with 
interest in health care. Richard Kleberg (1917-1979) of the mammoth King Ranch in 
South Texas and Boone Powell (1912-1996), administrator of Baylor Hospital in Dallas, 
were active leaders in their respective areas. These individuals were all influential in their 
communities and the state, who could have offered valuable political insight to the 
committee.23 If Governor John Connally (1917-1993), had asked these individuals 
personally to participate in the planning, some of their responses would have likely been 
different; however, the form letter that the Governor reluctantly signed did not convey his 
support of the planning. That reluctance of the Governor led the planning leadership not 
to ask the governor to appoint the committee formally. The governor did not express 
opposition to the planning; however, he was not a strong supporter. He noted specifically 
that funding for new programs would need to come from the local communities and not 
the state.24  
                                                             
 23 “General Planning Committee: Preliminary Proposals for Task Force Composition, Steering 
Committee for Statewide Mental Health Planning—Friday, August 16, 1963,” Box MAI 9/U34, Hogg 
Foundation for Mental Health Papers, Briscoe Center for American History, University of Texas, Austin. 
 24  In a speech made two months before the opening planning session, the governor made clear 
his strong support for the improvement of state hospitals and the research work of the HSPI. While he 
noted the work of the mental health planners, he specifically stated that funding for it should come from 
the local communities, for the “state government [would] continue to perform only those necessary 
functions which are beyond the reach of local units of government and private resources.” “Remarks of 
Governor John Connally, Texas Assn for Mental Health, October 18, 1963—Dallas,” p. 6. Box MAI 9/U35, 
Hogg Foundation for Mental Health Papers, Briscoe Center for American History, University of Texas, 
Austin.  McCleskey: 146-147. 
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 Why did Governor Connally not support the state’s funding of community mental 
health?  In 1965, Democrats controlled both the national government and the government 
of Texas. However, while the liberal side of the Democratic Party dominated the national 
government, Texas Democratic leadership came primarily from the conservative wing. 
Texas Democrats were willing to take federal funding if the local communities wanted to 
fund new programs. However, they did not want a federal mandate forcing the 
Legislature to spend Texas’ money in a specific way. The Governor expressed firm 
support for mental health in Texas as it existed at that time, but he was not willing to 
champion new funding against other state priorities.   
The Planning Committees Fails to Plan for the Financing of New Programs 
 
 Though the planning committees had a finance task force, it did not develop any 
cost projections for the many new community-based ideas created in the plan, and it 
suggested no viable plan for financing them. The plan assumed that funding for new 
mental health services was the responsibility of private citizens and that treatment would 
continue to be the responsibility of “the private sector of medicine.” It noted that the 
private sector had not been responsible for preventive and rehabilitative services in the 
past, so it would be up to the new board to determine how to fund those.25  
 This idea of funding came from the physician’s opposition to any funding not 
controlled by the patient. They wanted no interference in the doctor-patient relationship 
that the government might impose if it paid for the service. The TMA, AMA, and other 
physicians’ groups wanted patients or their families to pay physicians directly for the 
services received. These were long-standing views of physicians in America that grew 
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more resilient as medicine changed in England, Europe, and other places where countries 
created government-funded single-payer health care systems. In those systems, a 
physician’s payment for services was not under the doctor’s direct control. Though the 
planners were planning for services that they would theoretically provide for those with 
an SMI then receiving services free from the state, they failed to identify any public 
funding stream for the thousands of those patients who had no money to pay for the 
services in the community. The physicians’ focus was not on funding but on ensuring that 
the leadership would come from the medical community. In the end, this would almost 
prevent the passage of the implementing legislation, and it did specifically decrease the 
funding available for community mental health for the first two years after it passed. 
 The formal plan of community services was not a part of the legislation needed to 
implement it. The planned legislation created a new mental health board. It charged that 
board with implementing community mental health centers in those communities creating 
them, without identifying any specific funding mechanisms and assuming that the new 
board would know how to create the centers. The plan itself was a watershed of possible 
programs to implement without any prioritization or implementation schedule. The 
planners failed to educate the Legislature about the plan, believing they had completed 
their task with the plan’s completion. The new board would have no real instruction on 
what community centers were or how to establish and work with them.26  In reality, it 
was not a real plan, but a means by which state government would implement a 
mechanism to bring federal funds into the state that could eventually lead to less need for 
                                                             
 26 Ward Burke Speech, “Texas Community Mental Health Centers: ‘Their Future,’” July 17, 1992. 
AVV.MS108.111, Daniel L. Creson, M.D., Ph.D. Papers MS 108, The John P. McGovern Historical 
Collections and Research Center (McGovern Center) at the TMC Library, Houston, TX. 
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state funding of the state hospitals in the future. Fiscal conservatives and community 
mental health advocates both saw the opportunity to gain their goals, while physicians 
saw themselves increasing their leadership role on the new board. 
A Political Deal is Cut Bringing the State Mental Hospitals, Special Schools, 
and Community Centers under One Board  
 
 James E. Peavy, M.D. (1911-1980), commissioner of the Texas Department of 
Health and chair of the Executive Committee, and co-chair Cyril J. Ruilmann, M.D. 
(1909-1981), Director of Mental Health and Hospitals for the BSH&SS, provided limited 
leadership for the planning effort, and the psychiatric-consultant staff leadership of the 
effort was only part-time.27 However, as planning neared an end in September of 1964, 
Peavy and Ruilmann reached an agreement to move the mental health aspects of the 
Health Department to a new Department of Mental Health that would include the state 
mental hospitals and the special schools for the intellectually disabled (ID). The state 
tuberculosis hospitals would transfer to the Health Department.28 The planners included 
the special schools in the new department without any input or discussion with advocates 
for that group. This action would prove to be a significant issue in the subsequent 
legislative process. 
 As its work neared completion, the planning committee sought support for the 
final product from the TMA. Because the committee’s leadership believed the Legislature 
                                                             
 27 McCleskey: 148. 
 28 Ibid: 149-150. The Governor gave his informal support for this arrangement in a written 
comment by Bill B. Cobb, who was an ex-officio member of the Steering Committee representing the 
Governor’s office. This support allowed the changes to be part of the proposals from the planning 
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would oppose a medically dominated board, they recommended that there be no 
designation of membership categories on the new board. They did recommend that the 
Legislature require the new commissioner of the department to be a psychiatrist and that 
there be a “strong professional advisory board” that “would not be limited to the medical 
profession alone.” The TMA mental health committee refused to endorse the plan 
specifically because they did want a medically dominated board. After much negotiation, 
the TMA committee endorsed a change in the planned legislation to require three of the 
new board members to be physicians, with one of those being a psychiatrist. They also 
required a separate medical committee made up of six psychiatrists, two general 
practitioners, and a pediatrician. One duty of the medical committee would be to name 
three psychiatrists from which the board could choose one to be the commissioner.29  
TMA Failed to Gain the Leadership Role and Created a Troubled Leadership 
for the Future Agency 
 
 The bills carrying TMA’s new board and committee structure in the Legislature 
met a quick demise. The leadership of the planning committee was correct in stating that 
the Legislature would oppose a medically dominated board. When presented with bills 
containing language creating such a board, both the Senate and House committees 
dropped all aspects of the medical committee and the requirement that physicians be on 
the board. As the legislation moved forward, it became apparent that there was strong 
opposition even to retaining the requirement that the commissioner of the new 
department had to be a psychiatrist. The bill encountered opposition from advocates for 
the ID who feared that psychiatric leadership would place all the emphasis on the 
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mentally ill, leaving the care and treatment of the ID a “step-child.”30 The advocates for 
the ID had strong support in the Legislature. They wanted to continue with the 
arrangement that existed within BSH&SS and called for the criteria for selection of the 
commissioner to be one with “proven administrative experience and ability.”31 Following 
extensive debate in both houses and a win by only one vote with all senators present and 
voting in the Senate, the Legislature passed House Bill 3 that included the requirement 
the commissioner be a psychiatrist.32  
 The result of the legislation was the creation in 1965 of the Texas Department of 
Mental Health and Mental Retardation (TDMHMR) with an independent board of nine 
appointed by the governor and confirmed by the Senate.33 This new board had only 
$600,000 to devote to establishing community mental health centers because the chair of 
the House Appropriations Committee, W.S. “Bill” Heatly (1912-1984), opposed the 
requirement of the commissioner being a psychiatrist, and he led the Appropriations 
committee to limit the appropriation.34 The focus by the medical community on 
psychiatric leadership and the lack of understanding and focus on funding meant an 
inauspicious beginning of the new department related to the start of community mental 
health in Texas. The new board had the challenge of hiring a commissioner who was a 
psychiatrist, creating new rules for its role and that of the commissioner, and working 
with new independent community mental health centers as sponsoring entities created 
                                                             
 30 Carl Freund, “Compromise Mental Health Plan Faces 1st Test,” Dallas Morning News, February 
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 31 “Mental Health Bill Gets Major Change,” Dallas Morning News, March 5, 1965: 4. 
 32 McCleskey: 153-154. 
 33 House Bill 3, 59th Legislature 3, Regular Session (1965), Bill Files, Texas Legislature, Archives 
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them. The ongoing relationship between the board and commissioner would prove a 
difficult one. Some board members wanted more significant efforts in creating the new 
community mental health centers. Others argued for the growing needs of the state 
hospitals and special schools. The new psychiatrist-commissioner immediately faced 
pressures from a board with conflicting ideas and a belief that it was in charge.35  
 
 
Figure 6 Governor John Connally Signing HB 3 on April 5, 1965 36 
                                                             
 35 Ward Burke Speech. 
 36 From the Special Legislative Issue of TAMH TOPICS, the newsletter of the Texas Association for 
Mental Health in Austin, Texas. Harris County Mental Health Association, 031/015, 1458-31 1965, Harris 
County Judge William M. (Bill) Elliott Papers, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX. 
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The Challenges of the New Department  
 
 Forging a new department out of the old BSH&SS was a challenge for the new 
board, which, in reality, was the old board with three new members.37 The first task of the 
board was to hire a psychiatrist-commissioner. They found that few psychiatrists with the 
skills to manage a large state organization were interested in the position paying $22,500 
annually.38 The board turned to Baylor University College of Medicine (BUCM)39 in 
Houston, with which it already had an ongoing relationship through the Houston State 
Psychiatric Institute (HSPI). They asked Shervert Frazier M.D. (1921-2015), the chair of 
psychiatry at BUCM, to become commissioner in the fall of 1965. He was a strong 
advocate for community mental health and had served on the Mental Health Planning 
Steering Committee. He was willing to serve if he could retain his role and salary from 
Baylor, and the board agreed. Unfortunately, after nine months on the job, he resigned 
when Baylor required him to return to the School of Medicine full-time.40  
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Figure 7 Shervert Frazier M.D., First Commissioner of TDMHMR 41 
 
 During his brief tenure, Frazier oversaw the completion of a survey of the 15,000 
patients housed in the state mental hospitals in the summer of 1966. That survey found 
that while 99 percent of the residents had a “diagnosable psychiatric disorder,” only 44 
percent needed to remain in the hospital if appropriate alternative resources were 
available. It also revealed that a significant number of patients had physical health 
problems in addition to their mental disorders. Sixty-two percent needed dental work, 45 
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percent had other physical diseases, and 25 percent had a tentative diagnosis of 
neurological disorders. The latter was likely from tertiary syphilis, however, the report 
did not identify it as such.42 The survey provided the knowledge of the need for 
improvements across the system within the hospitals and especially for the significant 
development of appropriate alternative resources for discharged patients. 
Who Would Lead the New Department: Board or Commissioner?  
 
 The next commissioner, Vernon John Kinross-Wright M.D. (d. 1999), also from 
HSPI and BUCM, accepted the position full-time because he was concerned about the 
patients he had seen in the state’s hospitals. He knew the job would involve bringing the 
system into the twentieth century and, at the same time, building a new community 
mental health program for which the Legislature had not appropriated the funds necessary 
for all of the communities wishing to establish one.43 In Houston, he had assumed 
responsibility for leading the HSPI while Frazier was splitting his time between being 
chair of the department at Baylor and commissioner for the TDMHMR. Kinross-Wright 
had worked with severely mentally ill patients in his research. In 1954, he had published 
the first clinical study of the treatment of psychiatric patients with chlorpromazine in the 
United States.44  
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 When Kinross-Wright moved into his new position, he argued that the hospitals 
did not have enough trained staff to even plan for the discharges of “half the patients in 
the system [that] do not belong here.” He hoped that with better staff pay and more 
money to train them, he could improve that situation. He also pointed to the need to 
centralize several functions. Each of the state hospitals had operated under separate 
policies and procedures unique to that institution in the past. He noted that this action 
would require a more substantial central administration in Austin. He also stated that he 
would “follow an open-door policy toward the public and news media.”45 This openness 
to the press led to coverage that reflected positive dynamic changes under his 
leadership.46 Within his first year, he also brought in a data processing system to help 
administer the department and to better track patients.47  
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Figure 8 Vernon John Kinross-Wright M.D., Second Commissioner of TDMHMR 48 
 Kinross-Wright initiated the “unit system” whereby the hospitals reorganized by 
placing patients from the same geographic area within the same wards. Patients in each 
ward saw the same doctors, nurses, counselors, and attendants during their entire stay. 
Caseworkers could visit patients regularly from their home area and maintain 
communication with the patients’ families. After discharge, if a patient needed to return, 
he or she would come back to the same unit with the same staff. This change was 
Kinross-Wright’s first significant one within the hospitals, and he labeled it a “gimmick 
that opened up the way for all kinds of other changes.” These additional changes included 
having both sexes in the same building, eliminating locked facilities, and creating 
governing systems that allowed patients a voice in the governance of their unit. These 
changes brought a reduction in the average length of stay in the hospitals.49  
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 49 Moss, July 24, 1969. 
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 Under Kinross-Wright, state funding of community mental health centers began. 
The 60th regular session of the Texas Legislature in 1967 and its special session in 1968 
included appropriations for state grant-in-aid funding for community mental health 
centers created under House Bill 3 that had passed in 1965.50 The board of TDMHMR 
approved the guidelines for state funding of the centers and authorized the first such 
funding for three centers in August 1967. The local community centers were encouraged 
to apply for federal funding for staffing the facilities since this would provide additional 
resources that would make the centers viable. The state had no control over the federal 
funding, but most of the centers were successful in qualifying for federal funds. As other 
centers qualified under the new rules, which required a local match to receive state 
funding, the board approved additional grants.51 When Kinross-Wright left office in 
1970, 24 community centers were receiving funding from the state.52 Though the ranking 
would not last long, a report from the National Association of State Mental Health 
[Program Directors] ranked Texas sixth in the nation in state spending for community 
mental health in 1969 and 11th overall in mental health spending. The fact that many 
states had not yet begun their state community mental health funding no doubt helped 
with these rankings.53 During his tenure as commissioner, the population of the state 
                                                             
 50 $3 million was budgeted for Contract Services and State Grants-in-Aid for the year ending 
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hospitals dropped from 15,000 to 12,990, though admissions were continuing to rise.54 
Other innovations during his leadership included the expansion of halfway houses and 
rehabilitation services and the incorporation of alcohol and drug treatment programs 
within the state hospitals.55  
 Based on the circumstances of the time, Kinross-Wright’s leadership seemingly 
built a stronger mental health system that included a focus on the institutions, community 
mental health, and aftercare services. However, his efforts encountered resistance in the 
boardroom of TDMHMR and from others not accustomed to change or others who 
wanted even more change. In January 1969, the board adopted its first formal 
administrative policies for the board and commissioner, which focused on restricting the 
commissioner’s authority to take any actions without the board’s explicit approval.56 Two 
board members, Rev. Robert Tate and Mrs. Howard Butts (1903-1993), expressed 
opposition to the purchase of computers, believing there was not enough emphasis on the 
creation of community mental health programs and the patients. They were leaders of the 
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opposition to the commissioner. Both of these members had strong convictions that 
undergirded their support for community mental health.57  
 In the spring of 1970, circumstances reached a critical point when Kinross-Wright 
attempted to fire Assistant Commissioner for Mental Health Gary Miller M.D., whom he 
saw as operating independently with Rev. Tate and Mrs. Butts. Miller appealed to those 
two board members about his dismissal and refused to leave his position, claiming that 
the board had to approve it before it was official.58 A secret meeting of the board in 
Houston to fire Kinross-Wright ended before it began when State Representative Ray 
Lemmon, a supporter of the commissioner, showed up and reminded the board that the 
open meetings law required proper notice.59 Because of the increasing hostility, at the 
next board meeting, Kinross-Wright asked for a special meeting of the board to discuss 
the situation.60 Before that meeting occurred, however, six members of the board wrote to 
Kinross-Wright, advising him that they no longer had confidence in him.61 The 
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center. Tate was the pastor of First Methodist Church in Austin, where Governor Connally was a member. 
Tate’s wife had a mental illness, and he became an active leader of the state Mental Health Association.  
He led his church to have a strong role in supporting programs for the mentally ill. Notes from an 
unrecorded phone conversation with Kathleen Jones of Austin, Texas, who was the Director of Youth 
Ministry at First Methodist under Tate’s leadership, August 30, 2016.  
 58 Kinross-Wright Interview. Gary Miller indicated that several board members were antagonistic 
toward Wright and wanted his (Kinross-Wright’s) removal. He did note that the two leaders against 
Wright were Rev. Robert S. Tate and Mrs. Howard E. Butts. Gary Miller Follow-up Phone Interview. 
Minutes of the TDMHMR Board, April 28, 1970. 
 59 “Board Kills Meeting to Study Firing,” Dallas Morning News, March 16, 1970: 22.  
 60 Minutes of the Board of TDMHMR March 21, 1970: 8. 
 61 Stewart Davis, “Only a Superman Can Run Mental Health System,” Dallas Morning News, April 
8, 1970: 18. 
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commissioner submitted his resignation at the next board meeting. He stated that he 
believed it was best to resign rather than have an open hearing before the board because 
the controversy had now involved all the staff of the department and that an open hearing 
could destroy its programs.62  
                    
Figure 9 Mary Elizabeth Holdsworth Butts and Rev. Robert S. Tate 63 
 Kinross-Wright had accomplishments, but his possible marriage and alcohol 
problems,64 his lack of experience in running a large organization, lack of political 
experience, and the massive number of changes he made in a short time all led to his 
downfall. He worked for a board in which at least five members in 1970 had family 
members in the care of the institutions of the department, which undoubtedly influenced 
their objectivity as board members. The board members were also politically connected 
individuals who were accustomed to getting their way, and as Kinross-Wright asserted 
his role, there was conflict.65 The active board gave notice that they were in charge of the 
department even though the commissioner had to be a psychiatrist. 
                                                             
 62 Minutes of the TDMHMR Board, April 28, 1970. 
 63 Mrs. Butt picture from Dallas Morning News February 2, 2017. Rev. Tate from the TDMHMR 
Report 1, no. 6 June 1969. 
 64 Gary Miller noted that Kinross-Wright had problems with his marriage, as well as, alcohol 
problems and that he was in and out of the office a lot. Gary Miller Follow-up Phone Interview.  
 65 Davis, June 3, 1970. 
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 It was not until 1987 that the Legislature dropped the requirement that the 
commissioner must be a psychiatrist. The board still hired the commissioner, and he or 
she served at its pleasure. However, the legislation spelled out the specific responsibilities 
of the commissioner. It also identified specific conflicts of interest to avoid appointing 
members to the board and in their service on the board.66 The board-controlled system 
ultimately changed in 2003 to one utilizing advisory boards with no real power over 
administration. This change gave the governor much greater control over what had been 
independent boards. 
A Peaceful Interlude Leads to Long-term Problems 
 
 Following the resignation of Kinross-Wright, the board of TDMHMR hired David 
Wade M.D. to become commissioner in 1970.  Wade was serving on Gov. Preston 
Smith’s (1912-2003) staff as Director of Comprehensive Health Planning at the time of 
his hiring. He had owned and led a private psychiatric hospital in Austin from 1947 to 
1966. Wade had also served as president of the TMA and as a lobbyist to the Legislature 
on medical issues. Governor John Connally, and then Smith, had asked him to work 
within their administrations after he sold the hospital.  
 Kinross-Wright had received favorable press coverage, and his departure had 
created a concern by Governor Smith that the problems at TDMHMR in the spring of 
1970 could cost him politically. Wade stated that Smith asked him “to straighten MHMR 
out because it would cost him the next election.” Smith met with the board of TDMHMR 
                                                             
 66 SB 257, 70th Legislature, Regular Session (1987) Bill Files, Texas Legislature, Archives and 
Information Services Texas State Library.  
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and told the board to hire Wade.67 Wade enjoyed the political support of the governor, 
had friends on the board, and had excellent political skills. He received a substantial 
increase in funding for programs from the Legislature and never “had a negative vote on 
any subject with the board.” In reality, he provided TDMHMR “a peaceful shop” after 
Kinross-Wright’s transformative days.  
 The next two leaders of the department were psychiatrists as required by law, but 
neither were strong commissioners. Kenneth D. Gaver M.D., who came from a similar 
position in Ohio on September 1, 1974, left his position on February 28, 1978, “for other 
personal pursuits.”68 His departure came after a petition drive by a former board member 
to have him removed from office because of suspected abuse at the Mexia State School in 
1977 and his failure to take action.69 In October of 1977, Gaver fired the administrator at 
Rusk State Hospital after the report of patient abuse.70 Seemingly, these two highly 
public actions led to his departure with no specific job at hand. His successor, John D. 
Kavanagh M.D., was a retired U.S. Air Force who had served as a hospital commander at 
several bases. Upon retirement from the Air Force, he worked at the San Antonio State 
Hospital from 1974 to 1978 then transferred to the Department’s Central Office as 
Deputy Commissioner. He served in that position only a short time before Commissioner 
                                                             
 67 Wade stated that Smith told the board to hire him; however, the minutes of the board meeting 
indicated that the board told the governor whom they wanted to hire, and he approved. Technically the 
decision was the boards, but it is highly likely that the governor made the selection. A rumor at the time 
suggested that the initial approach to Wade came while Kinross-Wright was still employed, though the 
board chair denied this. David Wade, M.D. Interview on October 6, 1992, AVA.MS.108.152, Daniel L. 
Creson, M.D., Ph.D. Papers MS 108, the John P. McGovern Historical Collections and Research Center 
(McGovern Center) at the TMC Library, Houston, TX. Minutes of the Board of TDMHMR August 29, 1970: 
5-6. “Dr. Wade Appointed MH-MR Commissioner,” Dallas Morning News, August 30, 1970: 12. 
 68 Minutes of the Board of TDMHMR, February 17, 1978: 3. 
 69 “Group for Retarded Citizens Says Mexia School Reforms ‘Inadequate,” Dallas Morning News, 
March 31, 1977: 14. “Group’s Audit Held for Public Release,” Dallas Morning News, April 22, 1977: 6. “U.S. 
called on to help schools for retarded,” Dallas Morning News, August 28, 1977: 37. 
 70 “Hospital Head at Rusk Fired,” Dallas Morning News, October 20, 1977: 45. 
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Gaver resigned, and the Board elevated him to the Commissioner’s position where he 
remained until 1981.71 On June 24, 1981, several individuals came to the board meeting 
to protest Kavanagh’s dismissal of the Superintendent of the Richmond State School. 
Though he had the support of the board chair, in the closed executive session at the end 
of the meeting, Kavanagh tendered his resignation effective October 1, 1981.  
 The combination of weak leadership and a board exerting its control was not the 
combination needed as the TDMHMR faced the two federal lawsuits that would require 
enormous amounts of time, energy, and money to fight and settle over the next 24 years.  




 The work of the medical community in Texas was crucial to the positive changes 
in the state hospitals in the 1950s. However, that community’s desire to provide even 
stronger leadership led it to overplay its hand in the passage of legislation to create the 
new department of TDMHMR. The result of its overreach was the development of a 
department that needed both a strong leader and an active board to deal with the 
development of the new community mental health centers, and the strengthening and 
maintaining the institutions, it oversaw. Unfortunately, the fight for who actually would 
be in charge, commissioner or board, created a situation where the department was not 
                                                             
 71 John Kavanagh Interview with Susan Gallo on November 19, 1993, AVV.MS108.040, Daniel L. 
Creson MD, Ph.D. Papers MS 108, The John P. McGovern Historical Collections and Research Center 




prepared to deal with the two federal lawsuits that would reshape the state’s work with 
the severely mentally ill and the intellectually for years to come.
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VII. TEXAS STRUGGLES TO COPE WITH FEDERAL 
COURT ACTIONS, RISE OF MANAGED CARE, 
POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE STATE, AND NEW 




 As noted in Chapter IV, federal court decisions played a significant role in 
changing the treatment of severe mental illness in the nation. Most states became 
involved in one or more cases within the federal or state courts. Arturo Perez in Major 
Litigation against the States: Policy Recommendations on Dealing with the Issues noted 
that in 1994, forty states were involved in federal courts over issues of inadequate 
funding of schools. That same year, forty-six were in federal or state courts related to 
their adult and juvenile corrections programs, and twenty-seven were in litigation 
regarding their schools for the intellectually disabled and their state mental hospitals.1 In 
Texas and other states, many of these cases were ones that had begun years earlier. Local 
legal aid societies—funded in part by the federal government—and the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) filed the cases and generally provided the legal representation in 
these cases as they did in Texas. Ultimately, the courts required the public agency 
defendants to fund both sides of the litigation if they ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.  
 The cases involving the states mental hospitals forced legislatures to fund 
significant and often expensive changes to their institutions. At the same time, the states 
were also trying to build and fund new community mental health centers. In Texas and 
                                                             
 1 David Pharis, “Politics and Costs,” in State Hospital Reform: Why Was It So Hard to Accomplish? 
ed. David B. Pharis (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1998): 204. 
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other states, the legislatures refused to fund the massive funds required to do both. This 
refusal resulted in the transfer of more individuals from the hospitals and a reduction in 
available beds. Also, there was a corresponding increase in numbers of persons served 
through community mental health centers, with limited or more often, no housing 
arrangements. In Texas, there was an ongoing battle between the federal court and the 
Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation (TDMHMR) over what the 
department had agreed to do in its mental hospitals in a case filed in 1974 and first settled 
in 1981. This battle lasted for many years. It increased funding for the hospitals and 
improved care, but at a cost to other services and the severely mentally ill.  
 The rise of Behavioral Managed Care Organizations (BMCOs) and significant 
political changes in the Legislature and executive leadership in 2002 brought a further 
reduction in funding and services provided to the mentally ill. With little funding and 
Texas’ exponential growth, services continued to decline until 2012. Two circumstances 
brought improvements. First, a federal Medicaid waiver allowed the temporary use of 
previously unmatched local and state funding to draw down more Medicaid funding to 
prepare for the expansion of Medicaid under the federal Affordable Care Act. Second, the 
Legislature’s preference to increase funding for mental health rather than address gun 
control after the horrible school shooting in Connecticut increased state funding and 
brought at least a temporary hope for improvement for the treatment of mental illness in 
Texas.  




 One case in which TDMHMR was the defendant was Lelsz v. Kavanaugh, filed in 
November 1974, regarding the state schools housing the intellectually disabled.2 The 
other case was Jenkins v. Cowley, which was later, renamed R.A.J. v. whoever was 
Commissioner at the time of the court’s rulings. This latter case, also filed in 1974, 
focused on the treatment of those with an SMI in Texas’s state psychiatric hospitals.3 
TDMHMR would deal with these two significant lawsuits for over 20 years, and they 
would drive its funding from the Legislature. The R.A.J. case would eliminate public 
services for those who were not suffering from an SMI, and it would ultimately reduce 
the number of services for those with an SMI in Texas. These two suits and one against 
the Texas Youth Council and another against the Texas Department of Corrections 
shaped Texas’ health and human services and correctional institutions and policies 
perhaps more than any other factor in the last quarter of the twentieth century.4  
                                                             
 2 In the lawsuit, the plaintiffs accused the defendants of failing “to provide less restrictive 
community alternatives for residents, thereby effectively forcing them into large institutions.” This failure 
exposed them to “diseases, neglect, excessive medication, unnecessary restraint, unsafe building, 
inadequate medical and dental care, and physical abuse from other residents and staff in violation of their 
constitutional rights.” The case became a class action one in 1981 and was settled three different times 
because of continuing issues of TDMHMR’s noncompliance with the agreement. There was extensive 
monitoring of the agreement by an expert consultant. The case finally closed in 1995, following the 
closing of the Fort Worth State School and the placement of those students into community settings. Lelsz 
v. Kavanaugh, 85-2462 (N.D. Texas), University Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse of the University of 
Michigan Law School. Accessed on April 23, 2018, 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=503&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7CLelsz%2
0v.%20Kavanaugh%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B.  
 3 Jenkins v. Cowley, United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division, 384. Suff. 441, No. CA 
3-74-394-C, September 17, 1974. Accessed April 26, 2018, 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/MH-TX-0001-0001.pdf. The case became R.A.J. v. 
whoever was Commissioner at the time the court published a decision. These new case titles included 
R.A.J. v. Miller, R.A.J. v. Jones, and R.A.J. v. Gilbert. 
 4 The other two cases were Ruiz v. Estelle in 1972 for the corrections and Morales v. Turman in 
1971 for the Texas Youth Council.  Unrecorded Interview (notes taken) with William Schnapp, by Curtis 
Mooney on January 27, 2016. Schnapp was the Mental Health Policy Advisor to Harris County Judge-
Executive. Before that, he was on the faculty of the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at 
the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston.   
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R.A.J. Forces Texas to Improve Inpatient Treatment for Mental Illness  
 
 Robert A. Jenkins was an adult patient at Terrell State Hospital, and Luis M. 
Cowley, M.D. (d. 2007), was the superintendent there. Jenkins had a dual diagnosis of 
mental illness and intellectual disability. Because he was “aggressive and dangerous,” the 
hospital staff kept him in a seclusion room, and anytime he was out of that room, the staff 
and other patients “were met with vicious attacks.”5 Jenkins, the staff, and the other 
patients were okay with what became a permanent situation of Jenkins staying in the 
seclusion room, but Jenkins’ parents, understandably, were not. They saw their son 
receiving neither attention nor treatment and, working with the North Texas Legal 
Services in Dallas, sued TDMHMR on September 17, 1974. Other patients in similar 
situations at Terrell and all the other state hospitals eventually joined the lawsuit, and it 
became a class-action lawsuit against all of the state psychiatric hospitals.6  
 Discovery did not begin in the case until 1978 when the U.S Department of 
Justice joined the suit and began to press for a settlement. The parties reached the first of 
several settlements in 1981.7 In 1977 the state Legislature had increased funding for the 
state hospitals, and “the fervor [for the case] behind the plaintiffs began to wane.”  The 
                                                             
 5 David Bell, Patsy Cheyney, Mary Dees, Susan Medlin, and Anonymous, “Reminiscences,” in 
State Hospital Reform: Why Was It So Hard to Accomplish? ed. David B. Pharis (Durham: Carolina 
Academic Press, 1998): 5.   
 6 Don Gilbert Interview by Susanne Gallo on November 15, 1993, AVA.MS.108.197, Daniel L. 
Creson, M.D., Ph.D. Papers MS 108, The John P. McGovern Historical Collections and Research Center 
(McGovern Center) at the TMC Library, Houston, TX.  The basis of the case was federal district ruling in 
1972 in Wyatt v. Stickney that any person with a mental condition committed against his/her will had a 
constitutional right to treatment.  Later in O’Conner v Donaldson the Fifth District Court of Appeals 
reaffirmed this right, but the Supreme Court in 1975 vacated that ruling and sent it back to the Court of 
Appeals but did not address the right of treatment in its decision.   
 7 Genevieve Tarlton Hearon, “May Our Tears be Turned into Dancing,” Pharis, in State Hospital 




plaintiffs offered to settle the case if the board of TDMHMR would “admit that the state 
had not done all that was needed, but was doing better.” The board “refused to admit any 
wrongdoing and continued to oppose the lawsuit.”8 After TDMHMR refused the 
settlement offer, and the Federal Justice Department entered the case, the state hospitals 
underwent reviews by the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of 
Justice. When the Civil Rights Division’s findings concurred that problems did indeed 
exist, TDMHMR was willing to settle, and in April 1981, TDMHMR agreed to make 
several improvements in the inpatient care of those with an SMI.9 Judge Harold Barefoot 
Sanders, Jr. (1925-2008) appointed a panel of three monitors to visit the state hospitals 
and ensure compliance, but unfortunately, what at first seemed like a clearly defined 
settlement agreement became anything but that.  
 In the R.A.J. settlement agreement in April 1981, TDMHMR agreed to several 
improvements. It agreed to improve patient rights safeguards, provide individualized 
treatment, ensure sufficient staffing to give each patient 30 hours of suitable 
programming, and to make building repairs. It also agreed to provide guidelines for 
psychotropic medications, create policies that allowed patients placed involuntarily to 
decline medications, and to have each hospital obtain accreditation by the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.10 Also, it agreed to create specialized 
geriatric programming, to develop plans for patients after discharge that utilized 
community programs for support, and to seek funds for the Legislature to put these new 
                                                             
 8 Don Gilbert Interview. 
 9 David Pharis, “The History of the R.A.J. Lawsuit in Texas,” in State Hospital Reform: Why Was It 
So Hard to Accomplish? ed. David B. Pharis (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1998): 65. 
 10 Accreditation of the state psychiatric hospitals by the Joint Commission did not occur until the 
1990s as each hospital exited the R.A.J. settlement process. They have remained accredited by JCHAO 
since that time. 
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program aspects in place.11 These agreements would bring significant changes to care in 
Texas’ state hospitals and would require the expenditure of substantial resources to put in 
place. However, they were broad statements lacking specificity and allowing wide 
latitude in understanding and misunderstanding of the agreement. This lack of 
specification would lead to years of conflict, subsequent court battles, and more 
agreements that also had some of the same flaws. 
 
Figure 10 Federal North Texas District Judge Harold Barefoot Sanders, Jr. 12 
 TDMHMR hired Gary Miller, M.D., the former Deputy Commissioner for Mental 
Health Services under Kinross-Wright, as commissioner in 1982. After leaving Texas in 
the wake of the Kinross-Wright firing, Miller had served as Assistant Commissioner for 
Mental Hygiene in New York State, head of Georgia’s Mental Health and Mental 
Retardation Program, and Director of Mental Health and Mental Retardation Services in 
New Hampshire. He saw himself as a reformer and believed that he could work well with 
those who had just reached the settlement agreement since both he and they focused on 
                                                             
 11 David Pharis, “The History of the R.A.J. Lawsuit in Texas”: 65. 
 12 Picture by Yoichi Okamoto. Property of the LBJ Presidential Library. Published on Wikipedia. 




“improving treatment and conditions in the state hospitals, assuring patient rights, and 
shifting resources and patient care from the state hospitals to the community.”13 
However, the parties soon found that the settlement agreement was far from specific. 
TDMHMR believed they were meeting the requirements, but the monitoring panel found 
several areas of non-compliance. Judge Sanders, the federal district court judge for both 
TDMHMR cases, generally agreed with his panel. As the disagreements persisted, 
Sanders changed the panel of three to a single court monitor who brought in expert 
consultants as needed. Over the next several years, TDMHMR and the plaintiffs came to 
several new settlement agreements.  However, the state’s concept of their implementation 
and the court monitor’s concept remained at odds.  For years, the leadership of 
TDMHMR and the court monitors fought over what constituted compliance with the 
agreements. It was not until 1991, after a change in the plaintiff attorney by Judge 
Sanders and leadership changes at TDMHMR that the two parties ultimately came to an 
understanding that the problem was the “lack of specific agreement over what constituted 
compliance,” and moved toward a final means of settling the case.14  
                                                             
 13 Gary Miller, “Reform through Litigation: A Commissioner’s Perspective,” in David B. Pharis in 
State Hospital Reform: Why Was It So Hard to Accomplish? (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1998): 99-
100. 




Figure 11 TDMHMR Commissioner Gary Miller M.D. 15 
 One significant change at TDMHMR grew out of the federal court’s 
establishment of a 1-to-5 staffing ratio in the hospitals based on its understanding of the 
state’s existing staffing requirements. In reality, TDMHMR had no specific staffing 
requirements. However, the court monitor had heard an Assistant Deputy Commissioner 
of Mental Health address the TDMHMR board about inadequate staffing. In doing so, the 
individual described a staffing schedule that equated to a 5 to 1 staff ratio during awake 
hours and 10 to 1 during sleep. TDMHMR disputed this finding stating that there was no 
formal written policy requiring this ratio, but the court ordered its application.16 This 
increase in staffing would have required a considerable investment in more personnel in 
the hospitals at the time the state was trying to build the community mental health 
system. Instead of adding staff, Commissioner Miller created a program to reduce the 
                                                             
 15 Houston Post, May 31, 1985. 
 16 Pharis, “The History of the R.A. J. Lawsuit in Texas”: 78. Don Gilbert, “The Positive Impact of 
R.A.J.,” in State Hospital Reform: Why was it so Hard to Accomplish? ed. David B. Pharis (Durham: Carolina 
Academic Press, 1998): 126. 
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number of inpatients. He developed the “3550 program” whereby TDMHMR determined 
a “baseline utilization rate” for each of the community mental health authorities 
(CMHAs) in the state.17 For each day the number of patients from an authority reduced to 
below its previous baseline, that CMHA received $35.50 per patient. The state calculated 
the payments each quarter and based the reduction on the previous quarter’s population. 
These payments provided the CMHA’s $38 million additional funding for community 
mental health centers from 1984 through 1988 when the program ended.18 This funding 
was an incentive for the authorities to accept individuals from the state hospitals and to 
create programs to keep them out of the hospitals. Miller also pushed for the community 
centers to create a case management program whereby there was a tracking system for 
patients in the community and a person responsible for working with individuals 
identified as needing additional services.19  
 The “3550 program” led to a significant reduction in the state hospital census, but 
it also led to concern by the court monitor regarding the quality of placements for 
individuals in the community, which were most often in nursing homes or boarding 
homes. Three different studies revealed that approximately 20 percent of those 
discharged did not seek aftercare services, and “the court concluded that many clients 
discharged from the hospitals were receiving services which were minimally adequate” 
and did not meet the court order that required “adequately staffed facilities sufficient to 
                                                             
 17 House bill 3 created the local community mental health centers as authorities with 
responsibility for a given area. The term CMHA refers to the Texas CMHCs. 
 18 Pharis, “The History of the R.A.J. Lawsuit in Texas”: 70-71.  The 3550 plan used a baseline of 
the state hospital daily census per 100,000 population from catchment areas to determine the starting 
point for 1984. For each reduction, the center received $35.50 per reduced day, which was the amount it 
cost the hospital for each patient in residence. Gary Miller, M.D., Video Interview by Susanne Gallo, 
October 6, 1992, AVV.MS108.070, Daniel L. Creson, M.D., Ph.D. Papers MS 108, The John P. McGovern 
Historical Collections and Research Center (McGovern Center) at the TMC Library, Houston, TX 
 19 Gary Miller, M.D., Video Interview by Susanne Gallo, October 6, 1992. 
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provide appropriate treatment.” The state had failed to provide adequate funding to the 
CMHCs, the nursing homes, and the boarding homes to make sure enough resources 
were available to provide for the needs of those leaving the state hospitals and had failed 
to coordinate the services to ensure the patients received the proper care in the 
community.20  
 Though TDMHMR initially agreed that “adequate discharge plans” should be 
included in the settlement agreement, it later questioned the legitimacy of the court’s 
involvement in the aftercare issue since there were “no constitutional requirements to 
provide community services.” The U.S. Justice Department accepted the state’s view 
presumably since the original case questioned the constitutional violation of patient’s 
rights within the state hospitals. While the plaintiffs continued to argue that appropriate 
discharge planning should be part of the agreement, “the legal issues were never 
thoroughly explored through court hearings.”21 The final settlement plan failed to provide 
for agreement on what constituted appropriate discharge planning. 
 Though there was progress between 1984 and 1991, the court monitors submitted 
eleven monitoring reports to the court of problems with the “provision of individualized 
treatment” by TDMHMR.  The department “usually attempted to deny or discredit the 
findings in these reports.” To the department, the goals and requirements of the 
settlement agreement kept changing.22 David Pharis (1941-2008), the court monitor 
                                                             
 20 David Pharis, “The Excursion into the Community,” in David B. Pharis, State Hospital Reform: 
Why Was It So Hard to Accomplish?  (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1998):162-165. Howard H. 
Goldman and Anne Mathews Younes, “Evaluating Compliance with Aftercare Standards,” in David B. 
Pharis, State Hospital Reform: Why Was It So Hard to Accomplish?  (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 
1998): 181-191. 
 21 Pharis, “Excursion into the Community”: 178-179. 
 22 Pharis, ”The History of the R.A.J. Lawsuit in Texas”: 73. 
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appointed by Judge Sanders, served in that role throughout the case. He argued that the 
main issues were over politics and costs. The state agency and other state officials pushed 
back against federal interference in what they saw as the state’s prerogative. Also, the 
legislators, the state agency, and other state officials were concerned about the costs, 
which were virtually out of their control as they responded to the mandates of a single 
federal judge. The budget was the Legislature’s sole prerogative, yet with R.A.J. and 
other federal cases, they were losing at least a portion of their role to a federal judge.23 
 TDMHMR Commissioner Miller struggled with R.A.J. until he left the 
department in 1988. His replacement was the first non-physician to hold the 
commissioner position, Dennis R. Jones, MSW, MBA. Jones came from Indiana, where 
he was serving as Commissioner of Mental Health.24 Instead of continuing to battle the 
court, Jones, similar to Miller when he arrived, saw the goals of the court as his goals, 
and he focused on resolving the case. The plaintiffs’ lead attorney at the time, Randy 
Chapman, stated, “Having a person heading the agency that is not allied with psychiatry 
was one of Jones’ important strengths.” When Jones took the job, he visited each of the 
agency’s facilities and surprised the direct care staff and patients by “literally staying 
overnight in one of the beds.” Jones “had a better understanding of how to implement 
institutional change beyond issuing edicts.”25  
                                                             
 23 Pharis, “Politics and Costs”: 193-198.. 
 24 He had previously served as the director of a community mental health center and was the first 
Executive Director of the Indiana Council of Community Mental Health Centers, Inc.  Joseph D. Stephens, 
“Brief History of Community Mental Health Centers in Indiana,” accessed September 8, 2018, 
http://www.iccmhc.org/sites/default/files/History%20of%20Community%20Mental%20Health%20in%20I
ndiana.pdf. 
 25 Randy Chapman Legal Services Attorney Plaintiff Interview by Suzanne Gallo on  January 4, 
1994, AVA.MS108.213, Daniel L. Creson, M.D., Ph.D. Papers MS 108, The John P. McGovern Historical 
Collections and Research Center (McGovern Center) at the TMC Library, Houston, TX. 
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 In 1990, Judge Sanders, in frustration at the impasse of the case, appointed Ed 
Cloutman, a Dallas attorney, to replace Chapman as the plaintiffs’ lead attorney.26 
Cloutman had a “reputation of being very tough, but also very reasonable.” That 
“reasonableness” helped the parties move beyond the impasse that had existed for several 
years.27 A second change was the addition of Don Gilbert to the TDMHMR central office 
staff at the time when the critical issue was to resolve R.A.J. because the Legislature had 
lost patience with the case and wanted relief from having to deal with it each session.28 
Because the court monitor had worked with Gilbert when he was superintendent of 
Terrell State Hospital and acting superintendent at Vernon State Hospital, the court 
monitor did not view him as a member of the “Central Office,” which as acting Deputy 
Commissioner for Mental Health, he was. Instead, the court monitor saw him as a person 
whose work he had seen firsthand, and he accepted his competency.29  
 Gilbert presented the idea that the department should develop a continuous quality 
improvement (CQI) process. With this, the court monitors, consultants, and TDMHMR 
would first agree on a level of standards for the hospital to achieve in each area of 
concern raised by the lawsuit. The department would then put in place a CQI process that 
would work toward each hospital reaching those standards and sustaining them. The 
timing and situations would vary for each hospital but ultimately result in reaching the 
final settlement of the agreement. The hospitals would create their own CQI monitoring 
                                                             
 26 Ed Cloutman ESQ Interview, November 30, 1993 by Suzanne Gallo, AVA. MS108.199, Daniel L. 
Creson, M.D., Ph.D. Papers MS 108, The John P. McGovern Historical Collections and Research Center 
(McGovern Center) at the TMC Library, Houston, TX. 
 27 Don Gilbert, “The Positive Impact of R.A.J.,” in David B. Pharis in State Hospital Reform: Why 
Was It So Hard to Accomplish?  (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1998): 131. 
 28 Don Gilbert Interview. 
 29 Don Gilbert, 1998: 131. 
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teams that would guide their work, and the monitor and the consultants would have teams 
doing the same thing to verify the results. The final agreement reached in 1992 accepted 
standards gleaned from visits to several nationally known hospitals as the end goal of the 
program. Over the next five years, each hospital was able to gain release from the lawsuit 
as it achieved the standards.30 The case formally closed in 1996.31 
 
Figure 12 Don Gilbert, Deputy Commissioner for Mental Health 32 
 
The R.A.J. Lawsuit Provides More Funding for TDMHMR 
 
 One significant result of the R.A.J. lawsuit was a dramatic increase in mental 
health funding by the Legislature from 1977 through 1993, with appropriations increasing 
from just over $100 million in 1977 to $475 million 16 years later in 1993.33 Those 
increased appropriations and the court monitoring over the years led to “real 
                                                             
 30 Don Gilbert Interview. Don Gilbert, 1998: 131-140. 
 31 R.A.J. v. Gilbert, Case 3:74-CV-00394-H, United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Texas Dallas Division, Document 3.  Filed 07/08/96. Accessed May 1, 2018,   
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/MH-TX-0001-0003.pdf. 
 32 Photo by Brian Blalock, University Photographer, Sam Houston State University, 
https://www.shsu.edu/campaign/don.html. Gilbert would later serve as Commissioner of TDMHMR and 
the Texas Health and Human Services Commission. 
 33 Don Gilbert, 1998: 123. 
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improvement in the quality of care … [as] evidenced throughout the state hospitals in 
Texas.”34 As measured in funding increase alone and improvement in care for 
hospitalized patients, the lawsuit brought significant results. Dennis Garza, the Assistant 
Attorney General for the State Defense from 1988 to 1991, stated in 1993 when both 
R.A.J. and Lelsz cases were ongoing, “the entire formula for the department funding 
[was] driven” by the two lawsuits. He noted that Texas was behind in education, welfare, 
and anything in the human services, but TDMHMR “actually got better funding and more 
attention from the Legislature than other services.” Garza stated, however, that he 
expected that when the lawsuit ended, the increased funding for mental health would 
likely end as well.35 Commissioner Dennis Jones noted in 1993 that while both lawsuits 
did bring new funding for TDMHMR, the state remained “48th in the nation in per capita 
spending for mental health.” “At best,” he stated, the department is “able to serve one-
half of the priority population, the most severely disabled.” To him, the job of 
commissioner came down to “setting priorities, and putting one’s energy in the vital few 
versus the significant many.” He noted that with the “strong anti-tax sentiment in the 
public that it [would] be hard for the state to raise the level of funding” for mental 
health.36 
 Indeed, if one looks only at the years of the lawsuits, the growth in funding for 
mental health was phenomenal; however, when examined in constant dollars and 
                                                             
 34 Ibid: 124. 
 35 Dennis Garza ESQ Interview by Suzanne Gallo on November 29, 1993, AVA.MS108.207, Daniel 
L. Creson, M.D., Ph.D. Papers MS 108, The John P. McGovern Historical Collections and Research Center 
(McGovern Center) at the TMC Library, Houston, TX.   
 36 Dennis R. Jones interview by Suzanne Gallo on December 6, 1993, AVA.MS108-182, Daniel L. 
Creson, M.D., Ph.D. Papers MS 108, The John P. McGovern Historical Collections and Research Center 
(McGovern Center) at the TMC Library, Houston, TX. 
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dramatic population growth, one sees that it was not that remarkable. Table 2 below 
presents the total appropriations by the Legislature for mental health at five-year intervals 
from the beginning of TDMHMR in 1966 through 2018, in constant 2018 dollars to 
control for inflation. It also shows the results of dividing those appropriations by the 
state’s population for the year, to obtain the per capita spending for each selected year. 
As shown, the highest per capita spending came in the first year of the lawsuit before any 
monitoring had begun and six years before the parties reached the first settlement. That 
year’s per capita spending of $49.74 per member of the population is the highest of any 
succeeding year. The funding remained in the low $40s until near the end of the lawsuit 
in 1995, when it reached $47.64. Since then, with the rapidly increasing population, the 
state’s highest level of appropriation per capita surpassed 1995 only in 2015 after a 27.1 







                                                             
 37 According to Democratic State Representative Garnett Coleman of Houston, who is a strong 
advocate for the mentally ill, that jump in funding occurred because of the school shootings at the Sandy 
Hook primary school in Connecticut. The Legislature argued that mental illness rather than gun availability 
caused the mass shootings.  By increasing funding for mental illness, they could claim that they had done 
something to solve the problem. State Representative Garnett Coleman interview with Curtis Mooney on 
February 25, 2016. Interview available at the John P. McGovern Historical Collections and Research Center 
(McGovern Center) at the TMC Library, Houston, TX. 
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Table 2 Texas Legislature Appropriations for Mental Health for Selected Years Divided by the 
Texas Population for that Year to yield Per Capita Spending in 2018 Dollars 38 












for MH in 
2018 Dollars 
1966     30,603,148    237,245,612     --  10,490,000    $22.61 
1970     57,959,012    378,999,668     59.7 %  11,200,000    $33.84 
1975   131,633,779    625,257,914     64.9 %  12,570,000    $49.74 
1980   193,979,744    623,476,694       -.2 %  14,230,000    $43.81 
1985   280,785,495    657,363,375      5.4 %  16,270,000    $40.40 
1990   379,580,153    742,074,684     12.8 %  17,060,000    $43.48 
1995   548,532,808    903,316,646     21.7 %  18.960,000    $47.64 
2000   613,765,708    899,037,299      -.47 %  20,940,000    $42.93 
2005   755,262,254    978,403,951      8.8 %  22,780,000    $42.95 
2010   906,462,574 1,034,803,493      5.7 %  25,260,000    $40.97 
2015 1,252,942,044 1,315,436,538     27.1 %  27,450,000    $47.92 
2018 1,326,278,364 1,326,298,364         .8 %  28,704,330    $46.21 
 
The Lawsuit Improves Quality but Dramatically Reduces Quantity of 
Services in a Fast-growing State 
 
 By allocating resources in the state budget to respond to the court’s directives 
instead of increasing the total resources available, the Legislature and TDMHMR 
eliminated public services for those who were not suffering from an SMI, and 
dramatically reduced the services available for those with an SMI in Texas. The number 
of state psychiatric hospital beds in Texas decreased from 15,284 in 1966 to an average 
patient population of 5,599 for the year 1978. It remained near that level until the state 
responded to the lawsuit’s requirement to set a staff-to-patient ratio of 1 to 5 by creating 
                                                             
 38 Actual appropriations for each fiscal year come from Article II of the Legislature Appropriations 
bill for the year ending on August 31 of the listed year. Accessed May 4, 2018, 
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/legis/approBills.cfm. The appropriations include program expenditures, capital 
or construction appropriations, and central office overhead. In instances where more than one program 
shares an expense, such as Mental Health and Mental Retardation, that number is divided in half to 
capture only the mental health appropriation. Estimations were made at other times when the funding 
between the two departments was not clearly divided. The appropriation in 2018 dollars was calculated 
using the inflation calculator accessed on May 4, 2018, 
https://www.dollartimes.com/calculators/inflation.htm. The Texas population for selected years was 
accessed on May 4, 2018, using http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/texas-population/. 
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the “3550 program” to incentivize the community centers to take more state hospital 
patients in 1985. By 1995, the average patient population had dropped to 2,738, and by 
the year 2000, it reached 2,456. The Legislature has appropriated funding for an average 
daily inpatient population of only 2,237 to 2,477 since that time.39 While the number of 
available public beds for the SMI declined by 85 percent from 1966 to 2018, the 
population of the state grew by 173 percent. TDMHMR’s annual report in 1995 noted 
that of the state’s total population of 18.6 million, an estimated 2.7 million persons had a 
mental illness, but because of the lack of funding they could provide services to only a 
“small subset” of that number, which was those “most severely impaired.” TDMHMR 
labeled the subset the priority population, and by its estimate, 500,000 persons were the 
most severely impaired, making them eligible to receive services. In reality, the state 
admitted that 2.2 million people in Texas with a mental illness were not able to receive 
any services from the state. Of the 500,000-priority population, TDMHMR could only 
provide services to 131,002 of them, with 13,084 receiving inpatient treatment and 
117,542 receiving treatment through the community mental health centers supported by 
the state. They estimated that another 192,000 persons of the priority population 
“received services from private sources, primarily general medical sources.” The 
remaining “175,000 severely impaired persons with mental illness did not receive needed 
services.”40 These individuals and their families had to suffer the ravages of an SMI 
without any help. Many of them would live on the streets, as their family could not 
                                                             
 39 Alex D. Pokorny and Shervert H. Frazier, “Texas Surveys its Mental Population,” Hospital and 
Community Psychiatry 19 no. 3, (March 1968): 88. “More Than Meets the Eye—A report from the Texas 
Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation: 1978, 10. “Setting the Stage for Change: FY 1995 
Annual Report,” Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation: 54. Actual State 
Appropriation bills from FY 2000 through 2018, https://lrl.texas.gov/legis/approBills.cfm. 
 40 “Setting the Stage for Change”: 17, 50. 
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provide the support needed nor tolerate the behaviors brought on by the illness. Others 
would find themselves arrested and placed in jail as they committed crimes caused by 
their illness and the lack of treatment. 
 The year before the 1995 report, Randy Chapman, the Legal Services Plaintiff 
Attorney until 1990 in the R.A.J. case, noted, “In Texas, we fund things on a shoestring,” 
and getting into a state hospital has become much more difficult. Voluntary admissions to 
a state hospital are rare, for “you have to do something violent to get mental health care 
in Texas. If you threaten the governor, you are going to be seen.” Chapman went on to 
state that admitted patients stayed on average three weeks with follow-up in the 
community, where there was not enough funding to provide adequate care.41 Today the 
state’s population has grown by over 10 million since 1994, but the number of state 
Legislature budgeted psychiatric hospital beds has dropped from was 3,210 in 1994 to 
2,400.42  In contrast to 1994, today, more than half of the state’s psychiatric beds exist to 
restore the competency of mentally ill patients to stand trial.43 Today there are less than 
1,200 public state hospital beds available in Texas for patients who have not committed a 
crime in a state with a total population of 28.7 million citizens. A report in 2005 stated 
that Texas had a total of 223,195 persons in prison and jails in the state. Studies at that 
time revealed that approximately 16 percent of prisoners were seriously mentally ill, 
                                                             
 41 Randy Chapman Interview. 
 42 SB 5, 73rd Regular Session, Bill Files, 1993: II-56SB 1, 85th Regular Session, Bill Files, (2017): II-46.  
. Texas Legislature, Archives and Information Services Texas State Library. 
 43 “The Growing Crisis in Inpatient Psychiatric Care:  Forensic Crowd-out and Other Access 
Barriers.” Texas Council of Community Centers, December 2016: 1. Accessed May 16, 2018. 
https://txcouncil.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Inpatient-Psychiatric-Care-Issue-Brief-121616-
Updated-12417.pdf.  Legislative Budget Board Staff, “State Hospitals: Mental Health Facilities in Texas 





which was up from 6.4 percent that studies in 1983 had found. Based upon 16 percent, 
Texas had 35,711 seriously mentally ill individuals in its prisons and jails on June 30, 
2005. In 2004, Texas had only 4,579 patients in state and private psychiatric hospitals 
and psychiatric units in general hospitals in the state. The odds of a seriously mentally ill 
person being in prison versus a hospital were 7.8 to 1 in 2005.44 In a report released in 
2018, the number of persons incarcerated in Texas prisons and jails has declined to 
218,500, which mirrors the overall trend in the United States.45 The percentage of 
seriously mentally ill in prisons has declined to 15 percent; however, the percentage of 
that population in jails has increased to 20 percent.46  
 Clearly, in Texas and the nation, the criminalization of mental illness is a fact. We 
are far more likely to incarcerate a seriously mentally ill person in jail or prison than we 
are to place them in a state mental hospital. 
Texas Private Psychiatric Hospitals Grow until Managed Care Significantly 
Alters Care 
 
 Problems for those with an SMI in Texas are not just in the public sector. In 1983, 
Texas dropped its requirement that all health care organizations obtain a certificate of 
need before building and opening a medical facility, joining six other states that also did 
                                                             
 44 E. Fuller Torrey M.D., Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard, Sheriff Don Eslinger, Richard Lamb M.D., and 
James Pavle “More Mentally Ill Persons Are in Jails and Prisons Than Hospitals: A Survey of the States,” 
Mental Illness Policy.Org., May 2010, accessed October 10, 2019, 
https://mentalillnesspolicy.org/ngri/jails-vs-hospitals.html. 
 45 U. S. Department of Justice, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2016, Danielle 
Kaeble and Mary Cowhig, April 2018, NCJ251211: 2, accessed October 10, 2019, 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus16.pdf. 
 46 “Serious Mental Illness (SMI) Prevalence in Jails and Prisons,” Treatment Advocacy Center 





so between 1982 and 1985.47 With the declining number of public psychiatric hospital 
beds in Texas, the private market rushed in and eventually created an oversupply.48 With 
the Reagan administration’s focus on less regulation and health insurance policies 
“offering generous psychiatric benefits,” the business environment created a lucrative 
market that saw the “number of private, for-profit psychiatric hospitals [go] from 220 in 
1984 to 444 in 1988” across the country.49 Funding for these hospitals came from private 
insurance companies, families, the patients themselves, and up to 190 days over a lifetime 
from Medicare. These new psychiatric hospitals and other medical expenses led to rising 
health insurance costs for employers, causing insurance plans with mental health 
coverage to limit hospital “stays to weeks rather than months.” 50 
 As the number of private psychiatric hospitals increased, there was competition 
for patients. Some hospitals worked to retain patients for as long as the funds flowed 
from the insurance companies before discharging them. Other abuses included 
“kidnapping” or “luring” patients “with promotional claims, then providing unnecessary 
treatments or simply holding them to tap their insurance benefits.”51 Regenia Hicks, a 
Ph.D. psychologist who worked at a private psychiatric hospital in San Antonio in the 
1980s, stated that patients were “cured …based on when their insurance ran out.” Patients 
often remained longer than they needed to be in the hospital because they had insurance 
                                                             
 47 S.B. 818, 68th Regular Session, Bill Files, (1983), Texas Legislature, Archives and Information 
Services Texas State Library. James B. Simpson, "State Certificate-of-Need Programs: The Current Status," 
American Journal of Public Health 75, no. 10 (October 1985).: 1226. 
 48 Missy Turner, “Hospital Market in Texas is Displaying Strong Vital Signs,” San Antonio Business 
Journal, July 21, 1998, accessed May 9, 2018, 
https://www.bizjournals.com/sanantonio/stories/1998/06/22/story6.html. 
 49 Geoffrey Cowley, “Money Madness,” Newsweek on November 3, 1991. Accessed May 9, 2018, 
http://www.newsweek.com/money-madness-201718. 
 50 Ibid. 
 51 Ibid. 
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funding available. Dr. Hicks remembered hearing the Commissioner for TDMHMR, 
Gary Miller M.D., state that many of the patients in the private hospitals were the 
“worried well” and not the seriously mentally ill treated by the state’s mental health 
system.52 Other abuses included paying “bounties to teachers, probation officers and 
psychiatrists [to] refer people for treatment.” In 1991, ABC’s Prime Time Live program 
featured Colonial Hills Psychiatric Hospital in San Antonio and other Psychiatric 
Institutes of America (PIA) hospitals in Texas and around the country to illustrate some 
of these abuses.53 In Houston in 1997, therapists at Spring Shadows Glen, a private 
psychiatric hospital, lost a judgment awarding $5.8 million to a patient in federal district 
court for implanting false memories in his mind.54 In 1991, Alan A. Stone, M.D. 
professor of law and medicine at Harvard University and a former president of the 
American Psychiatric Association identified the potential harm to the welfare of patients 
by the various means used to find and retain patients in these hospitals. He stated, “It is 
the major issue in psychiatric care today. Psychiatric standards are on a slippery slope as 
hospitals try to survive.”55  
 To provide more cost control, health insurance companies turned to managed 
care. By 1995, over half of Americans were part of a managed health care plan. The 
treatment of mental illness underwent a rapid transition to managed care in both the 
private sector and the public sector as Behavioral Managed Care Organizations (BMCOs) 
                                                             
 52 Interview of the Director of the Harris County Mental Health Jail Diversion Program Regenia 
Hicks, a Ph.D. social and clinical psychologist by Curtis Mooney on January 27, 2016. Interview available at 
the John P. McGovern Historical Collections and Research Center (McGovern Center) at the TMC Library, 
Houston, TX. 
 53 Cowley, “Money Madness.” 
 54 Mark Smith, “5.8 Million awarded in lawsuit, claims therapists implanted false memories of 
satanic ritual abuse.” Houston Chronicle, August 16, 1997: 1. 
 55 Cowley, “Money Madness.” 
235 
 
proliferated. These organizations moved the field away from more expensive inpatient 
care by limiting the number of providers from whom patients could receive treatment, 
regularly reviewing “treatment decisions,” and “closely monitoring high-cost cases."56  
Referrals by BMCOs are usually to practitioners who are willing to accept less money for 
the promise of more patients.  In Texas, these practitioners, who accept behavioral health 
insurance, are primarily licensed professional counselors, social workers, and 
psychologists with psychiatry limited to medication management, but also under 
managed care. 
Texas Turns to a Public Mental Health Managed Care Pilot in North Texas  
 
 In 1997, the 75th Texas Legislature authorized the Texas Health and Human 
Services Commission (THHSC) to administer and operate Medicaid-managed care 
programs within the state.57 Joining with TDMHMR and the Texas Commission of 
Alcohol and Drug Abuse (TCADA), THHSC developed a request for proposals from 
BMCOs to manage the mental health and substance abuse services in Dallas and six 
neighboring counties in North Texas. In a move toward the privatization of public 
services, state funds previously available to the CMHCs in the area were part of the 
contract with the BMCO. Local CMHCs went out of business or continued as a 
subcontractor under the BMCO. Value Options, a BMCO now called Beacon Health 
Options after a merger with Beacon Health Strategies in 2014, won the bid and created a 
program named NorthSTAR.  The new program became responsible for all mental health 
                                                             
 56 Institute of Medicine Staff. Managing Managed Care: Quality Improvement in Behavioral 
Health. Washington: National Academies Press, 1997. Accessed May 9, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central: 15-
16. 
 57 HB 2913, 75th Regular Session, Bill Files, (1997), Texas Legislature, Archives and Information 
Services Texas State Library. 
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and substance abuse assessment and treatment for Medicaid and indigent clients in those 
counties, beginning in 1999. It created a network of 300 clinicians, agencies, and 
hospitals to provide services. Value Options agreed to accept the authorized payment 
from the state and to manage and pay for all services. Individuals could select a provider 
from their approved providers. Value Options committed to serve all patients or clients 
quickly, so there would be no waiting lists. This program served many more persons 
annually than their counterparts in the other CMHCs who were not involved in managed 
care, but the other CMHCs argued that Northstar’s services were far less robust than they 
provided. A study in 2012 by an outside consultant recommended that the state move the 
entire state to the managed care model citing its improved outreach, better care 
coordination, broader provider network, and the separation of service authorization from 
service provision,58  
 Initially, this program was a pilot project intended to expand to the rest of the 
state if successful. Despite the outside consultant recommendation from 2012, and while 
Medicaid managed-care proliferated in Texas, the combination of TTHSC with mental 
health and substance abuse never expanded beyond the one region, and NorthSTAR 
ended on December 31, 2016, with that region returning to the traditional community 
mental health and substance abuse agencies.59 There was always strong opposition to the 
                                                             
 58 Public Consulting Group from Boston, Massachusetts, “Analysis of the Texas Public Behavioral 
Health System: Recommendations for System Redesign,” State of Texas Health and Human Services 
Commission Department of State Health Services, June 2012: 3. Accessed May 10, 2018, 
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NorthSTAR program by the CMHCs in the state. While NorthSTAR had support in the 
six counties served, because of the way it was structured, it was “ineligible for many state 
and federal funding sources” and when the Legislature increased funding for mental 
health by $330 million statewide in 2013, NorthSTAR received very little of the 
increase.60  In reality, Medicaid funding in Texas is so low that the private sector cannot 
provide mental health services without taking a loss. Neither the managed care system 
nor the traditional system had enough resources to provide for both the quality and 
quantity needed by those with an SMI in Texas. 
Political Change Brings Major Change to Health and Human Services in 
Texas 
 
 In November 2002, for the first time since Reconstruction in 1877, the 
Republicans gained control of the Texas House of Representatives, the Senate, the Lt. 
Governorship, and the Governorship.61 The 78th Legislature regular session of 2003 
passed HB 2292, which abolished ten of the eleven health and human services agencies 
in Texas. The Legislature then consolidated the ten into three new agencies. Those three 
and the single agency not abolished, the Department of Family and Protective Services 
(DFPS), moved under the control of an executive commissioner appointed by the 
governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. Mental health and intellectual 
disability, which had been together since 1965, were now a part of two different agencies. 
Mental health became part of the Department of State Health Services (DSHS), and 
intellectual disability moved to the Department of Aging and Disability Services 
                                                             
 60 Watkins, 2014. 
 61 Garnet Coleman Interview. “Overview and history of the Republican Party of Texas,” accessed 
May 11, 2018, https://www.texasgop.org/overview-and-history/.  
238 
 
(DADS). The third new agency became the Department of Assistive and Rehabilitative 
Services (DARS). The existing boards of the agencies ceased to exist, and the governor 
named new advisory councils for the four agencies. These councils could advise the 
executive commissioner, but they had no power to make decisions. The executive 
commissioner now hired the commissioners of the subordinate agencies who serve at 
his/her pleasure.  
 These changes give the governor much greater control over the agencies than any 
Texas governor had had since Reconstruction.62 This change is positive on the one hand, 
for it places the responsibility for mental health under the direct control of the governor 
and his appointed staff rather than volunteer boards with staggered appointments over six 
years by different governors.  However, in a state dominated by one party, there are 
limited voices raised for the needs of the people served and advocating for expanded 
services. 
 The Republican-led legislation also attempted to require CMHCs to diversify the 
delivery of services to other providers in the community. HB 2292 required CMHCs to 
serve as the “provider of last resort” and to demonstrate to the state department that there 
was not already a “willing provider” of relevant services in the area or county if it 
delivered the services. 63 While the CMHCs are an arm of the state, they do operate under 
boards appointed by local county commissioners or other authorities. A review of 39 
community centers reveals that each is unique, and that they provide most of the direct 
                                                             
 62 House Bill 2292, 78th Regular Session, Bill Files, (2003), Chapter 198: 612, 619. Texas 
Legislature, Archives and Information Services Texas State Library. The current executive commissioner, 
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 63 “Local Mental Health Authorities (LMHAs),” Texas Department of State Health Services, 
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services through their staff.64 Though the Legislature tried to increase the provider base, 
they provided no additional funds to do so. The CMHCs developed solicitations for more 
providers, but there were few providers interested in providing services at the rate the 
CMHCs were willing to pay. In 2019, CMHCs in Texas receive the bulk of their funding 
from the state mental health budget, but they also receive funding from Medicaid, 
Medicare, health insurance companies, local county funding, federal grants, as well as 
private funds raised locally. In addition to these several funding streams, the CMHC in 
Harris County also receives in-kind medications from pharmaceutical companies. 
 Another requirement that had a pronounced impact on the use of state resources to 
provide services to the mentally ill through CMHCs was the requirement that state funds 
were only available for “disease management practices and jail diversion measures.” The 
state required the CMHCs to treat only adults diagnosed with bipolar disorder, 
schizophrenia, or severe clinical depression.65 While this limitation did provide more 
funding for those with the specified SMIs, there were significant problems. One, these 
specified illnesses are chronic illnesses for which many do not recover as they do in 
physical medicine. Most patients will always require some level of care—at a minimum, 
medication management. Two, by limiting treatment only to specific diagnoses, others 
with equally debilitating conditions such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder or Borderline 
Personality Disorder received only crisis care through the CMHCs.66 Third, and the most 
critical, the state did not budget enough resources to provide the level of service required 
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for the number of individuals who met the qualifications for treatment.67 There were 
always waiting lists for some levels of care, and unfortunately, a growing number of 
mentally ill who did not receive treatment.  
Medicaid Section 1115 Waiver Provides Increased Funding for Mental 
Health in Texas 
 
 With the passage of the Affordable Care Act by Congress in 2009, the four largest 
states—Florida, New York, California, and Texas—were given the opportunity to begin 
the transformation to the mandatory expansion of Medicaid to 138 percent of the Federal 
Poverty Level. The funding for this action came by using a Medicaid Section 1115 
waiver,68 whereby increased funds were available under the Upper Payment Level (UPL) 
program.69 The waiver continued federal funding to hospitals for uncompensated care and 
created a second funding stream to serve as an incentive for the states to experiment with 
                                                             
 67 The FY 2004 and FY 2005 appropriations called for 60,771 adults and 11,322 children to receive 
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new health care delivery systems.70 The two funding streams provided $17.6 billion for 
the Uncompensated Care (UC) Pool and $11.4 billion for the Delivery System Reform 
Incentive Payment (DSRIP) pool from 2011 to 2016 in Texas.71 A 15-month extension 
allowed the program to continue through October 2017, and another five-year waiver 
extended the program through September 2022.72 The latest extension, however, phases 
out the DISRIP funding in 2022.73 Uncompensated Care provides funding to hospitals to 
support their provision of care to the indigent and others without insurance. The DISRP 
program is “designed to incentivize innovations to increase access, improve quality and 
better manage costs of healthcare for low income Texans.”74 Through DISRIP, local, and 
state healthcare funding that was previously not part of the state match for Medicaid 
became eligible through Intergovernmental Transfers (IGT) from the local governments 
to the state. These transfers serve as matching funds for additional federal Medicaid 
funding.75 In essence, without the state or local governments providing any additional 
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funds, increased federal funds became available for the Medicaid eligible and indigent 
population.  
 These two pools of funding allowed the creation of temporary programs to help 
the four largest states move toward the expansion of Medicaid under the Affordable Care 
Act. Texas applied for this funding in July of 2011 and received approval for the waiver 
in December of that year, six months before the Supreme Court ruling that Medicaid 
expansion was optional for the states. Since that ruling, however, the Texas Legislature 
has refused to expand Medicaid under the Federal Affordable Care Act of 2009. Even 
though Texas has not expanded Medicaid, the federal government has allowed the state to 
continue to receive this funding temporarily. In reality, if Texas had or were now to 
expand Medicaid, there would be no need for the funding under the waiver, and those 
served through this program would be receiving care through Medicaid. The waiver has 
allowed the state to expand services temporarily to provide services to the children and 
adults through innovative new programs. Texas is losing $65.6 billion in federal funding 
over ten years by not expanding Medicaid, and Texans are paying $36.2 billion in federal 
taxes so other states can expand Medicaid.76 Governor Abbott and the Republican-led 
Legislature claim expansion is wrong for Texas, claiming it would be “a massive 
expansion of an already broken and bloated Medicaid program.”77 More likely, the reason 
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for not expanding Medicaid is political, based upon conservative Republican’s opposition 
to the Affordable Care Act. 
 DISRIP works through regional healthcare partnerships (RHP) under an anchor 
institution, which can be “public hospitals, hospital districts, a hospital authority, a 
county, or a State University with a health science center or medical school.” The 
regional partnership develops program plans in partnership with other local public and 
private providers and submits them for approval to the federal Medicaid program. Once 
approved, those providers deliver the services authorized through the plan. The services 
must produce results at the levels set in the plans before payment from the DSRIP funds 
is available. While the Section 1115 Medicaid waiver is primarily a demonstration 
project to test new ideas, in Texas, it continues to provide much-needed resources for the 
indigent and particularly the mentally ill. Under its flexibility, it has allowed enhanced 
methods of delivery of services to those in need. 
 Houston Representative Garnet Coleman of the Texas State House points out that 
the funding, through its flexibility, has allowed the co-location of mental health services 
with physical health providers, and it has enabled several community mental health 
agencies to eliminate their waiting lists. Given these new resources, in 2015, the 
Legislature lifted the requirement that community mental health centers could only treat 
those with major mental illnesses. Coleman also noted that the funding is “off the 
budget,” meaning it uses matching funds that are not part of the state budget, which has 
allowed for much greater flexibility in delivering mental health services.78 There remains, 
of course, the critical question of whether the state will revert to care for only those with 
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major mental illnesses when the temporary funding ends in 2022 and whether the state 
will fund the now federal portion of the Medicaid that is matched by local funds when the 
program ends.  
 Representative Coleman also notes that Texas, under Republican control, began to 
increase funding for mental health after the Sandy Hook primary school shootings in 
Connecticut in 2012, right before the legislative session opened. There was such a focus 
on the need to do something about the shootings, and the “pro-gun lobby could not say 
that guns had nothing to do with the killings,” so the Legislature focused on mental health 
by putting more money into it. In 2015, the Legislature continued to add money for 
mental health thanks to Representatives Cindy Burkett from the Dallas area and Sarah 
Davis from Houston and Senator Jane Nelson from North Texas who are “champions for 
mental health.”79 While the Legislature in 2017 increased funding again with a significant 
commitment for capital improvements, one suggests that with the politics of a 
conservative state and its self-imposed limited taxing structure, this commitment is 
heavily dependent upon the boom-to-bust cycles of the Texas oil-based economy. 
Though it has these champions, with the history of inadequate funding for mental health 
and health care in general in the state, one has to question whether future legislatures will 
fund the new levels of care. 
The Future of Care for the Mentally Ill in Texas 
 
 Given the history of Texas, it is easy to be cynical about the future; however, 
there are recent signs of improvement. In 2018, the two highest courts in Texas, the 
Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Appeals, created the Judicial Commission on 
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Mental Health. They appointed 31 commissioners, including judges and other key public 
officials to serve on it, and they asked the governor, lieutenant governor, and speaker of 
the house to send a representative to serve as ex-officio members of the commission. Its 
purpose is to “examine best practices in the administration of civil and criminal justice 
for persons with mental illness.”80 The Legislature provides funding for the Commission 
to hire staff to support its work. The Commission and the supporting Collaborative 
Council that it has appointed seek input at their meetings that includes a wide variety of 
mental health experts and persons or families of persons experiencing mental illness. The 
Commission focuses on specific projects that fit its strategic planning model. That model 
stresses that the mission of the Commission is to “engage and empower court systems 
through collaboration, education, and leadership.”81 The membership of the Commission 
and Collaborative Council represents vital public and private experts in the field of 
mental health. Its work is long-term in nature and designed to bring about meaningful 
change in the state’s laws, services, and policies on the treatment of mental illness. With 
so many severely mentally ill persons in jail or prison, the courts already have some 
concept of the need for improvement.  
 In another positive note in 2015, the Texas Legislature directed the 18 state 
agencies receiving general revenue funds for behavioral health to work together to 
develop a “collaborative five-year behavioral health strategic plan and coordinated 
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expenditures proposal.” These agencies were spending collectively $6.7 billion from state 
general revenue, Medicaid, and local and federal resources on behavioral health services. 
That developed plan stated that  
 Texas has come to recognize the unique needs of individuals with complex 
behavioral health issues. These individuals experience a range of other risk 
factors, including unemployment, homelessness, and co-occurring health issues. 
Texas also appreciates the need for specialized services for individuals with 
intellectual disabilities, new mothers with depression, and military trauma 
affected veterans and their families. 82 
 
 That statement represents more of a hope or goal, for it certainly does not 
represent the history nor the present situation for the treatment of individuals with mental 
illness in Texas, and much will have to happen to make it the reality in the future. The 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMSHA) found that in 
2016, there were 677,000 adults age 18 and over in Texas suffering from an SMI and 
191,000 youth ages 12 to 17 who suffered from major depression during the previous 
year.83 The state Legislature appropriated resources to provide services in the state 
psychiatric hospitals to treat 12,231 persons, but less than half of that number is for 
individuals not accused of a crime. They also appropriated resources to serve 60,995 
adults and 12,561 children per month in the state-supported community mental health 
centers, but individuals receive treatment over several months, so there is a limitation to 
the number they can serve. They also appropriated resources to provide 30,915 residential 
crisis days of care and 72,200 crisis outpatient services for the year.84 The report to the 
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Legislature citing SAMSHA numbers noted that mental illness was one of the five most 
costly illnesses to treat and that it required “the highest out-of-pocket payments” from 
those receiving treatment.85 These numbers show that the state of Texas provides only a 
small portion of the care needed by those with a severe mental illness in Texas. 
Individuals not treated by the state must either have personal or family funding to pay for 
the high cost of care. Without treatment, they are likely to commit a chargeable offense 
leading to their incarceration. In jail or prison, they will perhaps receive some care, but 
not in a place designed to provide them the help and services they need to function in 
society to which they hope to return. When they leave jail, they will have lost their 
Medicaid benefits because of their placement in jail. They will have to reapply for them, 
but in the meantime, they will not have access to a physician or medications. They will 
also now have a criminal record added to their mental illness, both major stigmas in 
society. 
 In 2017, the Legislature removed the state’s mental health system of state 
hospitals and community mental health centers from DSHS and placed it directly under 
the Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC).86 Working directly under HHSC 
rather than DSHS, mental health in Texas has a much higher profile within the state. It 
sets the stage for potential changes in the system. Recognizing the woeful shape of the 
state hospitals described in a review by an outside consultant that rated all except one of 
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its facilities in poor condition,87 the Legislature included within the appropriations bill 
$66.3 million for existing mental hospitals to make repairs necessitated by neglected 
maintenance. They also added $300 million for the upcoming biennium (2017-2019) to 
begin replacing worn-out facilities and adding new ones.88 These sums are a good start on 
the repairs and new construction, but it will require future legislatures to make similar 
appropriations to accomplish the identified plan.  State funding of schools, road 
construction, and many other needs in one of the fastest-growing states in the nation will 
force mental health to compete with other critical wants in a state where the Legislature 
refuses to increase taxes to fund essential services. 
 While the initial focus on improving mental health funding in Texas came from 
the need to do something instead of talking about gun control, the state’s efforts to 
improve the treatment of serious mental illness seems to have moved beyond that 
motivation to a real desire to improve the system. The Legislature has directed HHSC to 
put together a master plan to redesign the state hospital system in Texas to meet the needs 
of the mentally ill. This plan establishes three principles to guide their planning-- 
unparalleled care, easy access, and a systems-based continuum of care. It calls for 
additions to existing campuses and new campuses beginning in FY18 and going through 
FY24. These changes include a new hospital in Houston, a new psychiatric hospital in the 
Dallas-Fort Worth area, replacement of the Austin and San Antonio State Hospitals, 
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converting an existing hospital in Waco to serve psychiatric patients, a possible new 
hospital in the Panhandle, and new maximum-security units at Rusk and Kerrville State 
Hospitals.89 In January of 2018, the Texas Health and Human Services Commission 
authorized the initial funds for the construction of a new 300-bed psychiatric hospital in 
Houston that along, with the existing 274 acute care beds in HCPC, “will create the most 
extensive academic behavioral health hospital in the country.90 In a positive move for the 
treatment of mental illness in Texas, the Legislature in 2019 appropriated the funding for 
construction of the new Houston hospital, and it appropriated initial funding to create a 
new psychiatric hospital in the Dallas Fort Worth area.  
A Skeptical Hope 
 
 The Medicaid 1115 waiver expansion of funding has created new services for 
those with an SMI in Texas as well as those with less debilitating mental illnesses. The 
state has spent more money, much of it federal funds, and some of its own spurred by the 
need to do something short of discussing gun control in response to school shootings. The 
courts are exploring their role concerning the mentally ill. The Legislature has begun to 
spend funds on replacing woefully outdated and inadequate state hospitals, and it is 
locating new ones in the major population centers of Houston and Dallas-Fort Worth. It is 
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committing itself to work with the state’s public medical schools to train more staff and 
to upgrade care in the hospitals.  
 All of these changes give hope for the future. One must ask, however, from where 
will the funds for this hope come? Texas has a history of funding the care of its mentally 
ill citizens near the bottom in a ranking of the states. It has not expanded Medicaid even 
though the federal government under the Affordable Care Act would pay for 90 percent 
of the cost of this expansion. When the 1115 waiver expires in 2022, will the state 
provide significant resources to maintain the status quo and increase funds to meet the 
rapidly expanding needs of its growing citizenship? Will future legislatures approve the 
funds necessary to meet the aggressive planning for new facilities? Will the Legislature 
provide the operating funds to pay for programming needed at both the community level 
and in the state hospitals? In a conservatively political state where the Legislature 
maintains a limited taxing structure based primarily upon sales taxes, how will mental 
health fare in competition with other expanding needs at both the state and local levels? 
One would like to hope it will fare well, but history suggests skepticism may prove to be 
the wiser view.  
Conclusion 
 
 TDMHMR’s commissioner and board lacked understanding of the challenge of 
the two lawsuits that hit them in 1974. They spent years ignoring the problem and 
refusing a settlement offer that would have required no significant changes before the 
next commissioner agreed to a settlement that he did not understand right before he 
resigned. Commissioner Miller spent years battling the federal courts on the terms of the 
agreement. He created a program to move patients out of the hospitals rather than 
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increase staffing to meet what a staff member had incautiously noted was its staffing 
plan. The first non-psychiatrist commissioner, Dennis Jones, continued to struggle until 
changes in his office and the legal counsel for the plaintiffs allowed the final settlement 
of the case nearly twenty-five years after it began. Unfortunately, for the severely 
mentally ill, the result was a dramatic loss in the number of beds available for them in the 
state hospitals that has only decreased since that time. Additionally, the state turned to 
managed care to control Medicaid costs, and new political leadership in Austin brought 
further reductions in spending and a limitation on individuals served through the 
community mental health system. New funding from a federal Medicaid waiver and the 
state legislature have brought increased services, and a skeptical hope for the future as the 




VIII. THE BEGINNINGS OF COMMUNITY MENTAL 
HEALTH CENTERS IN HOUSTON AND HARRIS 
COUNTY, TEXAS SHOW THE FATAL FLAW OF 
FEDERAL FUNDING AND THE INADEQUACY OF STATE 




 This chapter is the first of two that focuses on the treatment of the severely 
mentally ill in the local community of Harris County and Houston, the states’ largest 
county and city. While Houston and Harris County are the largest city and county in 
Texas today, that was not always the situation. The founding of the city and county in 
1836 and its service as the state capital for 1837 to 1839 held great promise for the area, 
but it was many years before it became what it is today. Thanks to the Galveston 
Hurricane in 1900 that significantly changed the fortunes of that city, the rise of the oil 
boom after the Spindle Top oil gusher in nearby Beaumont in 1901, and the opening of 
the 50 mile Houston Ship Channel from the Gulf of Mexico to downtown Houston in 
1914 the city and county’s fortunes began to change. It became the largest city and 
county in Texas in 1930 and has continued that to today. Houston had a population of 
292,352 in 1930, and Harris County had 359,928. Harris County passed one million in 
population in 1960 with 1,243,158. Houston passed a million in 1970 with 1,232,802. In 
2018, Houston was the fourth-largest city in the United States, with 2,464,124 citizens, 
and Harris County was the third-largest county in the nation in population with 
4,698,619. The Houston, Sugarland, Woodlands Metropolitan area has a population of 
just under 7 million, which makes it the fifth-largest metro area in the nation by 
population. Houston and Harris County have the most culturally diverse population in 
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America. Beyond its being the headquarters for the nation’s and the world’s energy 
business, Houston has the world’s largest medical complex, the Texas Medical Center, 
and is home to NASA and America’s space headquarters. The diversity, rapid and 
exponential growth, along with its susceptibility to hurricanes and flooding, means the 
community faces many ongoing challenges. One of those challenges is in providing for 
its most vulnerable citizens—those who suffer from severe mental illness (SMI). 
 Before the passage of federal and state laws creating funding for community 
mental health centers (CMHCs) in 1963 and 1965, Harris County and Houston’s work 
with the SMI consisted of the county’s Psychiatric Diagnostic Center that provided 
diagnoses for patients and a holding facility in the county-owned hospital for persons 
awaiting placement in the state hospital in Austin. There were also 25 emergency and 
acute inpatient psychiatric beds at the Ben Taub County Hospital, and two private 
psychiatric hospitals providing 40 inpatient beds each. Four private, general hospitals had 
approximately 125 inpatient psychiatric beds in total in 1964. The state’s Houston State 
Psychiatric Institute for Research and Training (HSPI) had 43 inpatient psychiatric beds 
along with a follow-up clinic for patients leaving the state hospitals. In partnership with 
Baylor University College of Medicine, HSPI also offered one adult and one child 
outpatient clinic.1  
 Following the passage of House Bill 3 by the Texas Legislature, which provided a 
mechanism for communities to begin CMHCs, several organizations worked with Harris 
County Commissions Court to create a local board for a Harris County CMHC. Before 
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that organization became operational, a local hospital took the opportunity to apply for 
federal funding to begin the area’s first CMHC. St. Joseph Hospital obtained both a 
federal CMHC construction grant and a federal CMHC staffing grant in 1966. It gained 
early recognition as the first community mental health center in Texas and the southwest. 
A national study identified it as one of the most successful CMHCs in the nation in 
1969.2 With federal funding diminishing over five years and no state or local funding to 
support the quality services it provided, the hospital worked with the Harris County 
Community Mental Health and Mental Retardation Authority (MHMRA), the county-and 
state-supported CMHC, to take over the program in 1972. The beginnings of MHMRA 
with the many problems it endured in getting started stands in sharp contrast to the 
success of the St. Joseph CMHC. MHMRA, a creation of the Harris County 
Commissioners Court in 1965, began with no funding from the state and little from the 
county. It struggled for the first three years to pay its bills and begin programming. It 
went through significant board and executive leadership issues for many years and 
labored to serve such a large county with the limited resources available. For many years, 
scandals and local politics provided far more headlines than the services provided by the 
agency.  
 While Harris County has the largest population in the state and has grown 
exponentially over the last 50 years, most patients needing the services of a state hospital 
still must travel three hours by car to receive treatment at a state hospital. In 1958, the 
Texas Legislature had created HSPI, as a unique research and training program that 
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served a selected population as part of its research and training. It, however, was not 
capable of serving all those with an SMI needing treatment in a state psychiatric hospital.  
It was renamed the Texas Research Institute for Mental Sciences (TRIMS) in 1967. The 
region lobbied the state Legislature from the 1950s onward for a local state psychiatric 
hospital.  
The Mid-Houston CMHC—the First in Texas and the Southwest 
 
 In the spring of 1966, Sister Mary Amelia Shannon (Sister Amelia) (1919-1987) 
and her order, the Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, were exploring ways they 
could expand their new psychiatric service at St. Joseph Hospital, the oldest general 
hospital in Houston. They had opened the new service in 1964 in space that needed 
renovation, and they were providing inpatient treatment, 24-hour emergency care, and 
limited outpatient services through the hospital to the general population of the city. 
Sister Amelia had come to the hospital with years of experience in psychiatric nursing, 
and following the completion of a master’s degree in that field from Catholic University 
in Washington, D.C. While in Washington, she had become “very much involved in 
community ‘action for mental health programs.’”3 Sister Amelia was also part of the 
Harris County Action Committee for Mental Health and had worked to establish the new 
community mental health board in Harris County.4  
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 In the search for funding, St. Joseph’s Hospital found that federal funding was 
available for new CMHC programs. The board of the hospital applied for both a 
matching construction grant under the original 1963 CMHC law and a staffing grant 
under the 1965 amendment to that law.5 The latter provided reducing funding for staffing 
costs for new CMHC programs over five years to qualifying public entities or private 
non-profit organizations. Those receiving the funding agreed to provide five essential 
services—inpatient treatment, outpatient services, 24-hour emergency care, partial 
hospitalization treatment, and education and consultation services—to a defined 
catchment area of between 75,000 and 200,000 persons with a “reasonable volume” of 
services provided below-cost or free for those who could not afford them.6 The board of 
the hospital received a federal construction grant of $342,363 to fund 56 percent of the 
cost of remodeling the building7 and a staffing grant of $719,000 for the first year. The 
latter grant provided 75 percent of the personnel costs for the new center the first year, 
but it reduced each year until it reached zero at the end of in five years. While the 
hospital’s inpatient psychiatric facility served persons from all over the metropolitan area, 
the CMHC’s catchment area (designated number 10 by the county) served a much 
smaller area. It included the hospital’s location on the east side of downtown and the 
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adjacent lower socio-economic area of the city, with a population of approximately 
170,000 and with a large Hispanic and African American population.8  
Despite Internal Opposition, Mid-Houston Expands Beyond the Hospital to 
Serve Its Catchment Area  
 
 The newly created Mid-Houston CMHC began operations in September 1966 and 
from the beginning, offered the five essential services through the hospital. However, by 
the summer of 1967, Sister Amelia and the staff of the CMHC began to question whether 
they were providing the community services needed in their “over-centralized, hospital-
bound setting.” They determined that they needed to move services out into the 
community. They began working with the Neighborhood Centers Association, a United 
Fund organization that administered “a social settlement and community recreation 
program for persons of all ages,” which served the same general area in some different 
locations. Through working with that organization, the local schools, and other 
organizations, they created a decentralized outpatient service through three district offices 
and some other outposts. This change enabled the center to broaden its outreach to the 
mentally ill and their families across the catchment area.9 However, this action led to the 
resignation of the center’s medical director, Harris M. Hauser M.D., a prominent local 
psychiatrist, who saw the move outside of the hospital as changing his role dramatically. 
He opposed Sister Amelia’s expanded role as administrative director, believing that the 
overall leadership must be under a psychiatrist, and likely from a man.10 Other staff who 
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opposed the more open community base also left, but the center hired a new clinical 
director, Harold Rockaway M.D., who was “more sympathetic” to the broader 
community approach, and he and Sister Amelia replaced the other departing staff.11  
 
 
Figure 13 Sister Mary Shannon (Sister Amelia) 12 
 
Mid-Houston Recognized Nationally for Its Leadership in Community 
Mental Health 
 
 In November 1967, fourteen months after the Mid-Houston Community Center 
began its operations and just two months after the departure of the medical director and 
other staff, the CMHC received a visit by a national survey team from the National 
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). The NIMH team was completing an interim study on 
the development of new CMHCs. Mid-Houston CMHC was one of only eight centers 
selected from the approximately 50 federally funded community mental health centers 
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with six months of operational experience at the time. The survey team intended to write 
a detailed description of each of the eight centers, but after the conclusion of the visits, 
the team determined that only two sites, the one in Denver and Mid-Houston CMHC, 
were far enough along to provide insight to others. The report regarding Mid-Houston 
described it as having “moved swiftly and well toward providing services according to 
the federal concept of the community mental health center.” It identified four significant 
accomplishments of the Center:  
1. Through a formal arrangement with the local psychiatric receiving center, the 
mental health center has intercepted a substantial number of patients who 
would otherwise have gone to the state hospital. 
2. By collaborating with a network of settlement houses in its catchment, the 
center has intricately involved and influenced the community. 
3. Even though at high cost per unit of service, the center has involved 
psychiatrists in private practice to a greater extent than any other program we 
know of. 
4. Private and public patients have been successfully integrated in a single 
treatment program.13 
 
Areas of success included no waiting list for treatment for individuals from the center’s 
catchment area, and the center never refused service to anyone from the catchment area.14 
Of the 175 persons from the catchment area who were candidates for admission to the 
state hospital from January of 1967 to November of 1967, 92 were admitted and 
successfully treated by the CMHC and did not require admission to the state hospital.  
The CMHC admitted eleven other patients, who subsequently required admission to the 
state hospital. Seventy-two patients entered the state hospital without receiving services 
from the CMHC. “Of all the persons who were already candidates for admission to the 
                                                             
 13 Glasscote et al.: 129. 
 14 Ibid: 130. 
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state hospital, 59 percent were intercepted, and of these, 89 percent were successfully 
treated in the mental health program.”15 
 Mid-Houston had an agreement with the state that provided funding of $15 per 
day for up to six months for any patients they were able to divert from the state hospital, 
up to a maximum billing of $100,000 per year. Though this would not fund the costs to 
provide the service, it served as an incentive to create programs and services locally to 
serve those previously served only by the state hospital. The CMHC also had a second 
formal agreement with Austin State Hospital, the state facility for Harris County. By that 
agreement, the two entities kept each other informed about patients from Mid-Houston’s 
catchment area, agreed to accept patients from that area upon the request of the other, and 
the CMHC worked with the families of the patients from their area to keep them 
informed about their hospitalized family member.16  
 In 1972, the last year of its operation under the Sisters of Charity, Mid-Houston 
provided 146,666 hours of service through 25 different programs to an unduplicated 
1,014 clients from the catchment area. These services included intake, diagnosis and 
evaluation, individual, group, and family therapy; medications; vocational and social 
rehabilitation and counseling; a sheltered workshop which provided a protected work 
opportunity for patients; a halfway house; case consultation; partial hospitalization; and 
home visits.17 Sister Amelia and the program gained national recognition for creating the 
                                                             
 15 Ibid: 148 
 16 Ibid: 148. 
 17 “Narrative Program Information,” “Service Data Fiscal Year 1971-1972 Mid-Houston MHMR,” 
Application for Continuation Staffing Grant to the National Institute of Mental Health Project, 
Identification Number 858-15-1572, Mental Health and Mental Retardation Authority of Harris County, 
May 17, 1973. Harris Commissioner Court Files for MHMRA December 9, 1965 to December 1973, Harris 
County Archives, Houston, TX. 
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CMHC envisioned by the law passed in 1963 and for going far beyond its requirements. 
In 1969, the NIMH issued a five-page press release highlighting Sister Amelia and the 
Mid-Houston Center’s work. The release noted that over 5,000 persons had received 
treatment since it opened and that many of those would not have received help if not for 
the center. They noted as well, “many would have been sent to the State hospital, for 
varying periods of confinement.”18 President Richard Nixon (1969-1974) wrote Sister 
Amelia a personal letter after reading a newspaper account based on the news release. He 
stated in his letter, “As a woman, as a nun, as a pioneer in the field of mental health, you 
deserve the gratitude of all Americans.”19 Sister Amelia also received recognition in 
Houston. She received the 1968 Houston Citizen of the Year Award by Goodwill 
Industries of Houston, and the YWCA of Houston named her the Woman of the Year in 
1975.20 In 1988, the year following her death, Vice President George Bush led the 
dedication of her picture in the lobby of the mental health building built under her 
leadership to honor her work with the mentally ill, alcoholics, and drug abusers.21   
                                                             
 18 News Release from the National Institute of Mental Health News Feature Service: 4.  
 19 Letter from Richard Nixon to Sister Mary Amelia, July 7, 1969. Archives of the Sisters of Charity 
of the Incarnate Word, Houston, TX. 
 20 “Wake for Sister Amelia set for St. Joseph Hospital,” The Houston Post, October 12, 1987 




Figure 14 Vice President George Bush Unveiling a Picture of Sister Amelia 22 
The Fatal Flaw of the Design for Federal Funding 
 
 While Mid-Houston and Sister Amelia received recognition, in reality, the 
program illustrated the fatal flaw of federal funding. Congress had anticipated that other 
funds would fill the gap to sustain the programs; however, programs such as Mid-
Houston, which served an impoverished area primarily, found that there were few other 
funds except their own to sustain the work. Though the Sisters of Charity set up the Mid-
Houston CMHC with a separate board, the parent organization provided supplemental 
funding from the earnings of the private psychiatric patients and its reserves as the federal 
grant decreased each year.23 After five years, with federal funds ending, the Sisters of 
Charity recognized that without other substantial funding sources, they could no longer 
maintain the program. They also recognized that only MHMRA had access to state and 
local funding that could support it. Mid-Houston’s board spent six months negotiating 
with MHMRA to take over the program. While the Sisters of Charity could have simply 
                                                             
 22 Ibid. Photo by Curtis Dowell. 
 23 Memorandum from Mother Mary Fidelis: 1-5. 
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closed the program when the federal funding ended, they worked with MHMRA to take 
over the program, seeing that course of action as the best thing they could do for “the 
long-term interests of the Mental Health patients in the geographical area of Catchment X 
[10].”24 In reality, MHMRA took over the program, but they could not provide the same 
level of care as the patients treated under the Sisters of Charity. The last year’s expenses 
under Sister Amelia for Mid-Houston was $1,345,884.25 The first full year under 
MHMRA, the expenditure for the same area was $674,704.26 After the first year under 
MHMRA, the ten catchment areas of Harris County merged into three districts, and 
MHMRA ended the relationship with Neighborhood Centers and greatly expanded the 
former coverage area, thus significantly reducing the services provided to the former 
Mid-Houston catchment area patients. Only two other catchment areas in Harris County 
had developed CMHCs, and seven areas had no CMHCs, so MHMRA was serving more 
people but providing fewer services. 
How had Mid-Houston Created a Program Seen as an Early Success on the 
National Level?   
 
 The recognition of early success was no accident. Sister Amelia was a strong 
leader who was committed to building a center based on the ideals espoused by the 
leadership of the community mental health movement. Hugh Rafferty, board chair of 
Mid-Houston CMHC, described her as “a powerful woman, a big woman, soft-spoken, 
                                                             
 24 Memorandum to Sister Mary Bernice from Hugh J. Rafferty, chair, St. Joseph Mid-Houston 
Community Mental Health Center Board, Archives of the Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 
Houston, TX. 
 25 Jim Craig, “County Mental Health Budget Plea Nearly Doubled,” The Houston Post, January 7, 
1972. Harris County Everett Squatty Lyons Scrapbook, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX. 
 26 “FY 73 Audit for MHMRA,” LaFrance, Walker, Jackley & Saville, Certified Public Accountants, 
November 26, 1973, Exhibit 1. Harris County Commissioner Court Files on MHMRA 1974-1, Harris County 
Archives, Houston, TX. 
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but when she spoke, people listened. She had an aura of authority, you did not cross 
her.”27 Louis Faillace, M.D., the founding chair of the Department of Psychiatry and 
Behavioral Sciences at the University of Texas Medical School in Houston (UT-Houston) 
noted that Sister Amelia was “a great advocate for mental health who ran a great 
operation. … She was a dominant person who, if she wanted to do something, it would 
get done.”28 At the dawn of a new movement, she expanded the program from its hospital 
base to serve the community and battled one of the leading psychiatrists in the city to 
make the change. She successfully recruited other organizations to join her in building a 
supportive community base for mental health. She worked with the state hospital to 
create a new funding stream for patients served in the community instead of the state 
hospital and negotiated trailblazing agreements with the state hospital where patients 
from her area received treatment. She persuaded the Sisters of Charity to apply for the 
federal grants and to sustain the program for the life of those grants by using its funds to 
support it. Finally, she persuaded MHMRA to take over the program when federal grants 
ended. 
 While much of the reasons for the program’s success came from its leadership, 
some fundamental principles emerge as significant. One, the program had quality staff. 
The study group from the NIMH noted that Mid-Houston paid the equivalent of twice the 
national salary for the psychiatrists who provided care; there were no salaried 
                                                             
 27 Hugh Rafferty Interview by Curtis Mooney, July 14, 2015. Interview notes available at the John 
P. McGovern Historical Collections and Research Center (McGovern Center) at the TMC Library, Houston, 
TX.  
 28 Louis Faillace, M.D., recorded interview by Curtis Mooney, January 13, 2016. Interview 
available at the McGovern Center at the TMC Library, Houston, TX. 
265 
 
psychiatrists at Mid-Houston, as each one billed individually for the patients they saw.29 
Also, when Dr. Hauser left the program, he noted the high quality of the entire team 
assembled by Sister Amelia.30 St. Joseph was an accredited hospital, whose leadership 
recognized the importance of the people serving the clients. Second, the program focused 
on one area and continually expanded the services and support for the mentally ill in that 
area. Mid-Houston was an area of great need, and throughout the grant period, the 
CMHC built relationships in the community to support the needs of those served and 
added programs to provide more care. Third, and undoubtedly most crucial, they had the 
resources, thanks to the generosity of the Sisters of Charity and other organizations 
working with them to provide the necessary programming. The Mid-Houston CMHC 
shows that if the federal, state, or local governments had provided the resources to meet 
the needs of the mentally ill in each community long-term, instead of just startup funds, 
the severely mentally ill would have fared much better.  
 In reviewing the success of this early pioneer in community mental health, one 
must question why her name and work have faded into history. She was a person who did 
not seek out glory for herself, yet the community of Houston and the mental health field 
itself could have done much more to recognize her accomplishments. Did the lack of 
recognition occur because Sister Amelia was a woman trained as a psychiatric nurse at a 
time when men trained as psychiatrists dominated the field? She was not afraid to 
disagree with a leading male psychiatrist in the community and move the program into 
uncharted territory. Sister Amelia pushed the male-dominated county MHMRA to take 
                                                             
 29 Glasscote et al.: 134. The Harris County Medical Society opposed salaried physicians, so the 
only recourse of Mid-Houston was to pay the psychiatrist per client served. 
 30 Hauser to Rafferty letter.  
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over a very successful program. Was the new male leadership at MHMRA uncomfortable 
with the success she had brought to the community? Did he downplay her role, or was he 
not aware of her accomplishments? Whatever the cause, one must salute her as a true 
innovator and developer of community mental health. 
The Inauspicious Beginnings of Public Community Mental Health in Harris 
County 
   
 Following the passage of House Bill 3 (HB 3) by the Texas Legislature in the 
spring of 1965,31 more than sixty entities in Harris County, led by the Houston-Harris 
County Mental Health Association, lobbied the Harris County Commissioners Court to 
name a board of directors to start the development of a public community mental health 
authority under HB 3.32 Commissioners Court formally appointed the Board of Trustees 
for the Harris County Mental Health and Mental Retardation Authority (MHMRA) on 
December 9, 1965, with an effective date of November 19, 1965.33 The new board had 
nine members; three were doctors, two of whom, Spencer Bayles M.D. and Moody Bettis 
M.D., had served as the psychiatric consultants for the state’s mental health planning 
                                                             
 31 HB 3, 59th Regular Session (1965), Bill Files, Texas Legislature, Archives and Information 
Services Texas State Library. 
 32 Letter to County Judge Bill Elliott from John Rathmell, Chairman of the Community Planning 
Committee of the Mental Health Association of Houston and Harris County, July 21, 1965, Harris County 
Mental Health Association 031/015 1458-31 1965, Harris County Judge William M. (Bill) Elliott Papers. 
“Mental Health Association Community Planning Committee Meeting, July 27, 1965, Terrace Room, River 
Oaks Country Club,” Houston-Harris County Committee for Mental Health Action, 031/015, 1459-01, 
1965, Harris County Judge William M. (Bill) Elliott Papers, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX. Letter from 
John Rathmell to Judge Bill Elliott, October 15, 1965, Houston-Harris County Committee for Mental Health 
Action, 031/015, 1459-01, Harris County Judge William M. (Bill) Elliott Papers, Harris County Archives, 
Houston, TX. 
 33 The Court had appointed them on the earlier date but had failed to record the action officially 
in the minutes, and the new board had already met three times by December 9. “Minutes of the 
November 23, December 2, and December 8, 1965 meetings of the Harris County Board of Trustees 
Mental Health-Mental Retardation Centers,” Mental Health Action Committee, 031/015 1453-12 1966, 
Harris County Judge William M. (Bill) Elliott Papers, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX.  
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committee in 1963-64.34 The latter two knew the state’s plan better than anyone in the 
state did, and they should have been in a position to provide clear direction for this new 
county board. Their lack of leadership and the struggles the new board encountered point 
to the difficulty these new organizations faced in becoming organized and funded. The 
other members held active roles in local or state advocacy groups for mentally ill and 
intellectual disabled persons, and hence had a commitment to the project and an 
understanding of the local resources that could assist with the work. 
 Though the advocates and agencies pushing for the new board were expecting 
results immediately, they soon began to realize that the new board was not going to be 
able to deliver what they wanted.35 Though unknown at the time, the new board had no 
money. In the first month of its creation, the board met with the Harris County Hospital 
District Board at the urging of Commissioners Court, the governing body of the county, 
to determine whether they could have space in Jefferson Davis Hospital, of which the 
                                                             
 34 The initial board members were: Dr. Samuel M. Nabrit, president of Texas Southern University; 
John Flanagan, VP (retired) of United Gas Corporation; George Alexander, M.D., physician; Mrs. William J. 
Salman, president of the Auxiliary for the Houston Council for Retarded Children; Rev. Harold Bomhoff, 
pastor, St. Paul’s Lutheran Church and President of the Baytown Mental Health Association; Mrs. I. H. 
Kempner, member of the Houston Mental Health Foundation; Mr. Robert U. Parish, senior VP, Houston 
National Bank and member of the Governor’s Council on Mental Retardation; Dr. Moody C. Bettis, former 
psychiatric consultant for the State Mental Health Planning Committee in 1964 and chief of sociological 
research at HSPI; and Spencer Bayles, M.D., Chairman of the Medical Society Committee on Mental Health 
and former psychiatric consultant for the Texas State Mental Health Planning Committee before Bettis. 
“Mental Health and Mental Retardation Board,” November 12, 1965, Mental Health Board, 031/015 
1453-09, Harris County Judge William M. (Bill) Elliott Papers, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX. Two 
members of the Board, Nabrit and Flanagan, were active for only a short time, and when the 
Commissioner’s Court reauthorized the board in 1968, Dr. Ernest C. Kershaw, a professor at TSU, was 
listed in place of Nabrit, and John Castillo replaced Flanagan. Kershaw is noted in the board minutes as 
early as August 1966. The action of the Commissioner’s Court of Harris County February 8, 1968, vol. 66, 
p. 149. Harris County Commissioner Court Files for MHMRA Dec. 9, 1965 to Dec. 1973, Harris County 
Archives, Houston, TX.  
 35 “Letter to Steering Committee of Mental Health & Mental Retardation from John Rathmell, 
Chairman,” received by Bill Elliott’s office on February 28, 1966, “Meeting Notice Mental Health-Mental 
Retardation Action Committee for Houston and Harris County, September 6, 1966,” Mental Health Action 




District had just gained control. The Hospital District was a new entity as well, having 
just won approval from the voters of Harris County that same month. There were crucial 
differences, however, between the two new organizations. The hospital district was 
following other successful districts already in existence in the state, so they had a 
blueprint to follow going forward. Most crucially, they were a taxing authority that would 
have resources to fund operations and remodel the hospital.  
 With no clear direction nor money to fund any action, the MHMRA board 
decided that it was “not ready to make any decisions.”36 In reality, it was the only 
decision it could make. Incredibly, Commissioners Court had appropriated no resources 
for MHMRA, and the board would learn over the next years that getting funds from 
Commissioners Court would be difficult.  Presumably, the commissioners assumed that 
the Legislature would appropriate funding for the board and saw their role as just 
appointing the board. Unfortunately, the state Legislature had appropriated only $600,000 
for all CMHCs for 1966 and 1967; thus, the state board had little money to fund services 
either.   
 The state used its limited funding to provide program developers for local groups 
that had created new mental health authorities under HB 3. In April 1966, the TDMHMR 
announced that it would hire and fund a program developer for Harris County for one 
year, contingent on MHMRA providing a secretary and office. MHMRA agreed to do so, 
believing it would receive funding from Commissioners Court to pay for those necessary 
expenses. The board, however, noted that for a period, it was continuing to meet weekly 
                                                             
 36 “Harris County Board of Trustees—Mental Health Mental Retardation Centers Minutes, 
November 23, 1965,” Mental Health Action Committee, 031/015, 1453-12 1966, Harris County Judge 
William M. (Bill) Elliott Papers, Houston, TX. 
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“to resolve certain legal questions about its functions.”37 The legal issue the board was 
not talking about in public was an attorney general’s opinion released on April 6, 1966, 
stating that the constitution of Texas did not permit any entity except a hospital district to 
fund mental health and intellectually disabled services in those counties with hospital 
districts.38 Since the voters of Harris County had created a hospital district to tax 
themselves to fund public health care services, no other tax-supported resources could 
legally fund public health in the area.39 Though mental health would later become a part 
of the Harris County Hospital District services, at the beginning of the District, state 
psychiatric hospitals were responsible for mental health services for the indigent and 
MHMRA, though with no money, had just received the responsibility for local mental 
health services. The courts would agree with the attorney general’s opinion, and it would 
take the passage of a constitutional amendment in November 1967 to allow other public 
entities to fund mental health and intellectually disabled services in those counties with 
hospital districts.40  
                                                             
 37 “Mental Health-Mental Retardation Board of Trustees Conduct Hearing,” Mental Notes: News 
Letter of the Mental Health Assoc. of Houston and Harris County, May 1966: 2, 031/015 1452-34 1964, 
Harris County Judge William M. (Bill) Elliott Papers, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX. 
 38 “Opinion No. C-646, Re: Authority of Wilbarger County to pay for land on which is to be 
established a facility to be operated by the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 
and related questions,” Texas Attorney General’s Office, April 6, 1966: 6. 
 39 The Harris County Hospital District today provides extensive mental health services through 
Ben Taub Hospital and its outpatient clinics. When the district formed in 1966, they could have legally 
provided such services as well, but the state hospitals were essentially the system that served the indigent 
mentally ill, and MHMRA and other CMHCs were created to provide local mental health services to the 
public and the indigent.   
 40 HJR 37, 60th Legislature, Regular Session (1967) Bill Files, Texas Legislature, Archives and 
Information Services Division, Texas State Library and Archives Commission. The Texas constitution of 
1876 reflects the small conservative government ideas held by the people of Texas in the year of its 
adoption. It has been amended 235 times since its adoption, and it is the longest constitution by far in the 
United States. To amend the constitution, both houses of the Legislature must approve the amendment 
by a two-thirds vote, and a majority of those voting in a public election set by the Legislature must 
approve it.  The courts ultimately decide if a provision of a law passed by the Legislature is constitutional, 
and if it is not, the Legislature must set in motion the amendment process, which has failed on several 
occasions. Joe E. Ericson and Ernest Wallace, “Constitution of 1876,” The Handbook of Texas Online, Texas 
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 In hindsight, keeping quiet was a mistake by the board, for the time to raise the 
issue of lack of funding was when the momentum for new community services for the 
mentally ill and the intellectually disabled was at its highest. At this point, over 60 
agencies and professional groups in the community were working to make these new 
services a reality, and St. Joseph Hospital had just received two federal grants to begin 
the first CMHC in Texas. The Harris County Hospital District had won the election over 
stiff opposition from the Harris County Medical Society after four failed elections 
between 1954 and 1965.41 Both entities were under Commissioners Court, which had 
encouraged MHMRA to work with the Hospital District. With political pressure from the 
advocates and lobbying by the board of MHMRA to the commissioners who had 
appointed them, the issue at least would have surfaced raising the possibility of MHMRA 
becoming part of the Hospital District or funded by them. The new board members of 
                                                             
State Historical Association, (2010), accessed on June 25, 2019, 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mhc07. 
 41 The medical society saw the hospital district as “unfair competition with other non-profit 
hospitals in the county …, [and believed] it was not good policy to allow district hospitals to contract with 
the federal government for patient care and treatment.” Minard Heston Gildon, “Hospital Districts in 
Texas” (master’s thesis, Texas Technological College, 1966): 42-43, accessed September 23, 2016, 
https://ttu-ir.tdl.org/ttu-ir/bitstream/handle/2346/10537/31295004051511.pdf?sequence=1. 43.  Though 
the medical society opposed the hospital district, there was a town-gown split with physicians in private 
practice opposed while those associated with Baylor University College of Medicine in favor because the 
medical school had contracts with the existing city-county hospital that with the formation of the hospital 
district would provide for their continued work and its expansion. William T. Butler, Arming for Battle 
Against Disease Through Education, Research and Patient Care at Baylor College of Medicine, Book II—
Independence (Houston: Baylor College of Medicine, 2011): 337-349.  In contrast, MHMRA had the 
support of both the medical society and the Houston Psychiatric Society.  There were three members of 
the latter group serving on the Houston-Harris County Committee for Mental Health Action, which 
petitioned the Commissioners Court to form MHMRA, and that group nominated nine psychiatrists to the 
Court for consideration for membership on MHMRA’s board.  Two, Bayles and Bettis served on the board.  
Sam Keeper, “Mental Health Association Community Planning Meeting-Previously Confirmed 
Attendance,” July 27, 1965, “Recommended Nominations for Harris County Mental Health and Mental 
Retardation Board of Trustees,” Attachment to letter from John Rathmell, Chair of Houston-Harris County 
Commission for Mental Health Action, to Judge Bill Elliott, October 15, 1965, Houston-Harris County 
Committee for Mental Health Action, 031-/015, 1459-01 1965, Harris County Judge William M. (Bill) Elliott 
Papers, Harris County Archives, Houston, Texas. 
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MHMRA did not raise the issue. Perhaps the new board members feared that mental 
illness and intellectual disability would be the poor relation in a hospital district focused 
on physical health. However, these board members were in their positions because they 
knew about mental illness and intellectual disability and presumably had political 
connections at multiple levels. Why they chose to remain silent is a mystery, but it 
certainly handicapped the early development of the new organization. 
 By not voicing the problem of lack of funding, the board of MHMRA spent the 
last six months of 1966 begging Commissioners Court to pay the expenses of Merton J. 
Trast (1907-2004), the program developer funded by the state, for whom MHMRA had 
committed to providing an office and secretary. Trast, a very experienced social worker 
and administrator, began working in the summer of 1966 to help local agencies interested 
in creating community mental health services.42 He assisted St. Joseph Hospital in 
working with Austin State Hospital and helped two other groups interested in applying 
for federal funding.43 MHMRA asked the Commissioners Court, led by Judge Bill Elliott, 
for $17,850 to pay for one year of expenses in April 1966.44 Judge Elliott, had served on 
the State Planning Committee for Mental Health and had presumably encouraged the 
Commissioners to approve the funding. However, when there was no response from 
                                                             
 42 Merton Trast received his Master’s Degree from the University of Chicago School of Social 
Service Administration in 1934 and worked for the next 30 years in social work in Kansas.  He had served 
as chief social worker at the 1,000 bed Winfield (Kansas) State Hospital and Training Center before being 
hired by TDMHMR to serve as Community Program Developer for Harris County’s MHMRA program.  
“New Community Planning Director,” Mental Notes—Mental Health Association of Houston and Harris 
County, Texas, (September 1966): 1.  031/015 Mental Health Board 1452-34 1964, Harris County Judge 
William M. (Bill) Elliott Papers, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX 
 43 Harris County Board of Trustees Mental Health-Mental Retardation Centers, minutes of the 
meeting of August 4, 1966: 2-3. 031/015 Mental Health Board 1453-08 1966, Harris County Judge William 
M. (Bill) Elliott Papers, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX. 
 44 Letter from Robert Parish to Judge Elliott and Commissioners, April 8, 1966. 031/015 Mental 




Commissioners Court and Trast was due to arrive at work in July—MHMRA secured the 
donation of furnished office space for thirty days.45 In September, the board met with the 
Commissioners Court to ask for the funding but received no action by the court.46 In 
October, the board advised the court it had “a bank over-draft, [had] not paid the office 
rent that month, and [had] several other unpaid bills,” but again received no response.47 
Robert Parish, the MHMRA board chair who was senior vice president of Houston 
National Bank, arranged an emergency loan from the bank,48 which was probably the 
only way the board, without any other means of support, could have obtained a loan.  
 
Figure 15 Merton J. Trast 49 
                                                             
 45 Letter from Robert Parish to Judge Elliott and County Commissioners, July 13, 1966, 031/015 
Mental Health Board 1453-08 1966, Harris County Judge William M. (Bill) Elliott Papers, Harris County 
Archives, Houston, TX. 
 46 Merton Trast, “Minutes of Meeting of September 15, 1966,” Harris County Board of Trustees 
Mental Health-Mental Retardation, 031/015 Mental Health Board 1453-09 1966, Harris County Judge 
William M. (Bill) Elliott Papers, Harris County Archive, Houston, TX. 
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 48 Harris County Board of Trustees Mental Health-Mental Retardation Centers, Minutes of 
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 Robert Parrish, who served on the Governor’s Counsel for Mental Retardation, 
would presumably have access to the Governor’s office to ask for assistance, but there is 
no record that he did so. Interestingly, the board members did not donate to the 
organization from their resources or seek to raise private donations from others. Perhaps 
they believed that if Commissioners Court did not provide funding in the beginning, they 
never would. More likely, they saw their role as giving their time and talent but not their 
resources to make this public entity a reality.  Since its beginning, the MHMRA board 
has had only a limited fundraising role on behalf of the agency. 
 Ultimately, the court passed a resolution transferring $5,000 from the county’s 
general fund to the MHMRA board on November 7, 1966.50 However, County Auditor S. 
B. Bruce refused to transfer the money, citing the attorney general’s opinion that 
precluded the county from funding mental health because of the presence of the hospital 
district.51 Much to the relief of everyone on the MHMRA board, Chairman Parish 
notified them that the county commissioners under the leadership of County Judge Elliott 
had appropriated $5,000 to cover the expenses of the board through the end of the year.52 
Funding would come through Harris County’s Psychiatric Diagnostic Unit at Jeff Davis 
                                                             
 50 Harris County Commissioner Court Motion by Chapman, seconded by Lyons, November 7, 
1966. 031/015 Mental Health Board 1453-08 1966, Harris County Judge William M. (Bill) Elliott Papers, 
Harris County Archives, Houston, TX. 
 51 Letter from Harris County Auditor S. B. Bruce to Judge Elliott, November 9, 1966. 031/015 
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Hospital.53 The Commissioners Court had funneled support of the program developer’s 
expenses through their County Psychiatric Diagnostic Unit as a consulting cost.54  
 The ultimate problem was the attorney general’s opinion, but why did the county 
commissioners ignore for so long the pleas of the board they created? Harris County 
Judge Executive Bill Elliot (1926-2016), the chair of the court, had served on the state 
mental health planning committee and had shared his ideas about local funding to support 
it. However, he had noted the reluctance of public entities “to support new programs that 
could lead to new taxes.”55 Texans have a strong reluctance to raising taxes, and, likely, 
the rest of the commissioners were not supportive of the program because it required 
spending the county’s money and possibly raising taxes. Until 1972, when the 
commissioners dissolved the original board and became the board themselves, the court 
mostly ignored MHMRA. They paid a limited number of bills before the state grant-in-
aid funding began in 1968, but provided little attention or support beyond that. 
MHMRA Receives State Funding and Begins to Provide Services 
 
 Following the Texas voters’ approval of the constitutional amendment allowing 
public support of mental health and intellectual disability services within hospital districts 
in November of 1967, MHMRA received its first grant-in-aid of $334,799 from 
TDMHMR in February of 1968 to fund services for six months.56 In August of that year, 
                                                             
 53 Harris County Board of Trustees Mental Health-Mental Retardation Centers, Minutes of 
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TDMHMR approved the second grant-in-aid to MHMRA of $550,000, this time for FY 
1969. MHMRA had requested $1,452,417, but the Legislature had appropriated only 
$2,769,617 for all nine existing CMHCs, and that group together had requested a total of 
$4,892,031.57 Harris County, as the largest county in the state, received the most 
substantial amount of funding, but its funding was not proportional to that received by 
smaller counties.58 This situation would remain the fate of MHMRA to this day, as the 
state funding for Harris County per person is smaller than that provided to other CMHCs.  
 To receive the state funds, MHMRA had to provide inpatient services, outpatient 
services, partial care services that could be either day care, night care or weekend care, 
24-hour emergency services through either inpatient, outpatient or partial services, and 
consultation and education services. They were required to charge those who were not 
indigent a reasonable fee to cover the cost of the service; however, MHMRA could not 
refuse services because of an individual’s “inability to pay.”59 This was a critical point 
for the middle of a mental health crisis is no time to have to look for funding. In FY 
1969, MHMRA served 3,644 patients through these five programs. By FY 1971, the 
number of patients served had increased to 7,460.60  
 In FY 1971, state support reached $845,256 and required a local match of 
$312,745.61 The local matching funds came through MHMRA, but it was not its money. 
                                                             
 57 Minutes—TDMHMR, August 10, 1968: 10. 
 58 Ibid: Appendix D: 25. 
 59 “Rules of the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation Governing State 
Grants-in-aid to Community Centers,” Minutes—TDMHMR, August 12, 1967: 58, 63. 
 60 “In Support of an Intensive Treatment Facility in Harris County,” Texas Department of Mental 
Health and Mental Retardation Program Analysis and Statistical Research Planning Support Services, April 
1972:10. McGovern Institutional Collection, No. 15, TRIMS Series 1, Box 11a, The John P. McGovern 
Historical Collections and Research Center (McGovern Center) at the TMC Library, Houston, TX. 
 61 Minutes—TDMHMR, June 15, 1970: 54.  Harris County MHMR Financial Statements and Audit, 
August 31, 1972: Note 3. 
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MHMRA was using the value of facilities and services provided by agencies with which 
they subcontracted in the community to serve as the local match.62 By FY 1972, the total 
budget of the agency was $1,856,479, of which $875,131 was grant-in-aid funding from 
the state that required local matching funds of $323,798.63 The budget included local 
funds of $121,954 and federal funds from a variety of agencies totaling $844,707. Mental 
health programs made up approximately one-half of the budget. They included a mental 
health screening service, protective mental health services for the aged, a halfway house, 
a drug abuse project, an area-wide model mental health project, four local community 
mental health clinics, and funds totaling $360,152 to pay for contract inpatient services at 
area hospitals.64  
Commissioners Court Becomes the Board of MHMRA 
 
 As MHMRA was moving forward with new funding and new programs, 
Commissioners Court’s neglect of the organization allowed the number of board 
members to decline from the original nine to six, and one of them was no longer 
attending board meetings. Spencer Bayles M.D, an MHMRA board member, surmised 
that Commissioners Court had not appointed new board members because County Judge-
Executive Bill Elliott was at odds with some of the commissioners.65 However, instead of 
appointing new board members, Commissioners Court dissolved the existing board and 
named themselves the board for MHMRA in 1972. They took this action because the 
                                                             
 62 “Harris County Mental Health and Mental Retardation Center Financial Statements as of 
August 31, 1972, together with Auditors’ Report,” Arthur Andersen & Co., October 19, 1972: Note 3. 
Harris County Court Files for MHMRA Dec 9, 1965 to Dec 1973, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX. 
 63 Ibid. 
 64 Ibid. “In Support of an Intensive Treatment Facility in Harris County,”11. 
 65 Jim Craig, “Mental Health Board Quorum Lacking,” The Houston Post, December 11, 1971: 3A. 
Harris County Squatty Lyons Scrapbook June 1970 to February 1972, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX. 
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state was increasing funding to the county for MHMRA to $1.7 million for FY 1973, and 
this would require a match from the county of $641,000. MHMRA would not have 
enough value from subcontracting entities to provide that amount of match, and 
Commissioners Court did not want to put money directly into MHMRA. By becoming 
the board, the Court could use the county’s Psychiatric Diagnostic Clinic to provide the 
requisite match.66 Commissioners Court could have transferred the clinic to the board of 
MHMRA and accomplished the same purpose without becoming the board itself.  
However, R. J. Greer (1925-2007), the administrator of the Diagnostic Clinic, had 
enough political power with Commissioners Court to keep his organization under its 
direct control. Greer “did not want anybody put between himself and the county judge.”67 
The program would eventually come under MHMRA, but in the meantime, 
Commissioners Court added direct oversight of MHMRA to an already full agenda, 
meaning they continued to pay little attention to it.  
 Before the takeover by Commissioners Court on September 1, 1972, and upon the 
retirement of Merton Trast, the original board hired John Carver, a Ph.D. psychologist, 
who at the time of his hiring served as president of the National Council of Community 
Mental Health Centers.68 Carver’s focus was on prevention and not “treatment because it 
                                                             
 66 Letter from County Judge Bill Elliott to Commissioners W. Kyle Chapman, Jamie H. Bray, Wm. F. 
Elliot, and E. A. Lyons, Jr., August 21, 1972, and the accompanying resolution adopted that same day by 
Commissioner’s Court, 857-03-2170. Harris Commissioner’s Court Files for MHMRA Dec 9, 1965 to Dec. 
1973, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX. 
 67 Unrecorded interview with notes taken by Curtis Mooney with Bill Schapp, Mental Health 
Policy Advisor to Harris County Judge Ed Emmett, January 27, 2016. 
 68 Spencer Bayles, M.D., Video Interview by Dan Creson on August 20, 1988, AVV.MS108.005,  
Daniel L. Creson, M.D., Ph.D. Papers MS 108, The John P. McGovern Historical Collections and Research 
Center (McGovern Center) at the TMC Library, Houston, TX.  John Carver would go on to create the 
“Carver Model” of Policy Governance Model that trains boards in  organizational government whereby 
the board focuses on major strategic issues and establishes the goals of the organization then delegates 
to management the operations with no “meddling” by the board.  The CEO is exclusively responsible for 
achieving the goals of the organization as determined by the board. “The Policy Governance® Model,” The 
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was too expensive, and he wanted to serve more people,” according to MHMRA board 
member Spencer Bayles. The three existing private CMHCs in Harris County that 
received funding from federal grants (Mid-Houston, Baytown, and Hedgecroft Hospital) 
all became part of MHMRA. However, their programs became more prevention-
oriented.69 Total revenue for MHMRA more than quadrupled from $1.8 in FY 1972 
(September 1, 1971 to August 31, 1972) to $7.4 million in FY 1974. The increase in 
funding from 1972 to 1974 came from the county government appropriation, which grew 
by over $1.8 million thanks primarily to the county’s funding for Harris County 
Psychiatric Diagnostic Clinic now flowing through MHMRA. State grants-in-aid funds 
increased by more than $1.8 million, and federal funding increased by over $1.7 million 
over the same time. These large increases did not bring significant new funding for the 
treatment of mental illness, however, which only increased by $218,174 from FY 1972 to 
FY 1974. During that same time, the fund balance (assets over liabilities) grew by almost 
$930,000, and the expenses for administration grew by $625,583.70 MHMRA’s program 
expenses increased significantly in services to prevent and treat drug abuse and 
alcoholism. The state grant-in-aid money did not require expansion of treatment of 
mental illness, and new monies were available from the federal government that focused 
on drug abuse and alcoholism. In reality, the program’s funding increased with the 
                                                             
Authoritative Website for the Carver Policy Governance® Model, Updated April 4, 2016.  Accessed 
November 19, 2018, https://www.carvergovernance.com/model.htm. 
 69 Spencer Bayles Video Interview.  
 70 Harris County MHMR Financial Statements and Audit, August 31, 1972: Exhibit I. Arthur 
Anderson, October 19, 1972, Harris County Commissioners Court Files for MHMRA December 9, 1965 to 
December 1973, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX.  “FY 73 Audit for MHMRA,” LaFrance, Walker, 
Jackley & Saville, Certified Public Accountants, November 26, 1973: Exhibit I, Harris Commissioner’s Court 
Files on MHMRA 1974-1, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX. “Audit Report—FY 74, August 31, 1974,” 
LaFrance, Walker, Jackley & Saville, Certified Public Accountants, January 6, 1975: Exhibit I, Harris 
Commissioner’s Court Files as MHMRA 1975, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX. 
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addition of new categories of programs; however, for the mentally ill, there was little 
improvement from the new funds. A scandal would reveal that not all was well with the 
leadership of the agency. The Executive Director of the agency essentially led the agency 
with little input from Commissioners Court then serving as the board of MHMRA. 
 
Figure 16 Spencer Bayles M.D.71 
Scandal and a New Board at MHMRA 
 
 Shortly after County Judge Jon Lindsay (b. 1935) assumed the office vacated by 
Bill Elliot at the end of 1974, staff discovered that state checks were missing and possibly 
stolen from MHMRA.72 Staff in the accounting office of the agency discovered the 
missing checks in February of 1975, five months after the thefts started.73 Alan Caliva, 
who was serving as the personnel officer for MHMRA, resigned from the agency shortly 
after admitting to stealing the checks and depositing them into his account.74 Carolyn 
                                                             
 71 Picture from the Spencer Bayles Video Interview. 
 72 Letter from Jon Lindsay, chair of the board of MHMRA, to the members of MHMRA Board of 
Trustees, February 27, 1975, Harris Commissioner’s Court Files as MHMRA 1975, Harris County Archives, 
Houston TX.  
 73 “Harris Employee Diverts Funds,” Houston Chronicle (February 14, 1975): 1.  
 74 “Agency Office Resigns, Admits Misuse of Funds,” Houston Chronicle (February 15, 1975): 
Section 5, p.5. 
280 
 
Taylor, who worked at MHMRA at the time, remembers hearing that the human 
resources director of MHMRA had deposited the state checks in his account to buy 
horses.75 According to Texas Monthly, Caliva was from a prominent Houston family 
whose uncle had worked for the county. He stole $65,000 worth of checks and repaid 
$11,000.  This was not the first time MHMRA had experienced a theft, for the previous 
summer the grand jury had charged John Lester, a developer and the property owner for 
the MHMRA’s main offices of transferring $100,000 to his account from MHMRA’s 
account to serve as a “compensating balance for a loan to himself from another bank.” 
Presumably, Lester repaid the money, for there were no indictments returned against 
him.76 Caliva was indicted in March of 1975. In July, the court ordered him to repay 
$59,671, for the 18 checks that he had stolen.77  
 County Judge Lindsay took the opportunity to ask the commissioners sitting as 
the MHMRA board to appoint a special advisory committee to study four key areas:  
1. Determine whether the agency was performing its mission,  
2. Determine the effectiveness of the current leadership,  
3. Determine what should be done to “ensure the smoothest possible 
relations” between MHMRA, TDMHMR, TRIMS, and other government 
entities related to mental health and [intellectual disability], and  
4. Determine whether the commissioners should continue to be the board of 
MHMRA.78  
 
The board appointed a committee from the community with no direct connection to 
MHMRA to do the study. With one exception, those appointed were representatives of 
                                                             
 75 Carolyn Taylor Interview by Curtis Mooney, December 17, 2015. Interview available at the 
McGovern Center at the TMC Library, Houston, TX. 
 76 Richard West, “The Monthly Reporter--Mental Health Agencies in Trouble,” Texas Monthly 
(May 1975): 20. 
 77 Richard West, “The Monthly Reporter—Low Talk,” Texas Monthly (July 1975): 14.  I could find 
no record noting that the funds were repaid. 
 78 Letter from Jon Lindsay, February 27, 1975.  
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the advocacy groups for those served by MHMRA.79 This advisory committee divided 
into four subcommittees and met more than 14 times. It received testimony from more 
than 60 witnesses, visited facilities, and studied documents. In the end, it determined that 
the current leadership was honest but “not effective and was seriously impairing the 
organization achieving its goals of service.” It also noted, “Emergency services for the 
mentally ill … are practically nonexistent.” The committee also found that while there 
was competent staff in adult mental health, “they [had] not actually solicited referrals, 
[had] concentrated on a selected clientale (sic), and [were] completely unprepared to 
accept the caseload of chronic psychotic patients from TRIMS” without more staff and 
training. Though the committee’s report did not identify the selected clientele, from the 
context, one assumes they had focused on the less seriously disturbed. The report 
questioned why the Harris County Psychiatric Hospital (HCPH) (formerly Harris County 
Psychiatric Diagnostic Clinic) existed apart from MHMRA. It also noted that the 
commissioners had not effectively served as a board since executive director Carver had 
related only to the county judge-executive as board chair, and the latter had not kept the 
other commissioners apprised properly of circumstances at MHMRA. The committee 
                                                             
 79  Commissioners Court named Mrs. Joe Kegans, an attorney in private practice and member of 
the Governor’s Advisory Committee on Mental Health and Mental Retardation chair of the special 
committee.  The Court named the following as members:  Steve Braswell, vice president of Prudential 
Insurance and chair-elect of the Mental Health Association, Cy Hancock, executive director of Region 4 
Education Services, Dr. Forrest Harris, a psychiatrist in private practice and former deputy director of 
TDMHMR for mental health, Dr. Francine Jensen, director of the Harris County Health Department, Letitia 
Plummer, director of guidance for Houston ISD, Gay Rutherford, president of the Houston Association for 
Retarded Citizens, Teresa Quijano Yeasley, staff psychologist with the Texas Rehabilitation Commission’s 
area office in Houston, and Bob Seale, a pharmacist and owner of Woodforest Rexall Drug Store. The 
latter was Judge Lindsay’s appointee and differed from the rest since he had no direct link to the 
population served by MHMRA. Memo from John Lindsay as Chair of the MHMRA Board of Trustees to the 
Members of the Board, March 26, 1975, as approved by Commissioners Court on April 10, 1975. Harris 
County Jon Lindsay MHMRA Inactive File 983.22, Harris County Archives, Houston TX. 
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recommended a new board that had sufficient time to devote to a growing agency with a 
critical mission to fulfill.80  
 Commissioners Court accepted the recommendation of the advisory committee of 
the need for a new board and appointed that board to lead the agency effective September 
10, 1975.81 The new board accepted the recommendation of the committee and moved 
John Carver to a non-managerial position to serve in an advisory capacity. It moved 
Director of Support Services for MHMRA, Eugene Williams, to the position of acting 
executive director.82 Early in 1976, the board removed the acting title and named 
Williams, the executive director. Williams, who came from the business side of MHMRA 
with no clinical training, would serve in this role until 1988 when more scandals would 
lead to another leadership change and the appointment of more new board members by 
Commissioners Court. 
The New Harris County Mental Health Needs Council Called for More 
Resources 
 
 In addition to a new board, Commissioners Court also created the Mental Health 
Needs Council (MHNC), an advisory group made up of representatives of critical mental 
health providers in the county, to advise the MHMRA board and Commissioners Court. 
This new body completed a survey of available resources for those with severe mental 
                                                             
 80 “Overview of the Report of the Special Committee to Study the Mental Health and Mental 
Retardation Authority of Harris County,” “Report of the Sub-Committee on Administration,” “Report of 
the Governance Subcommittee,” July 27, 1965, Harris County Jon Lindsay MHMRA Inactive 031/015, 983-
22,1979-1981, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX. 
 81 Commissioners’ Court Resolutions passed August 21, 1975, recorded in Volume 89, page 218. 
Harris County Commissioners’ Court Files as MHMRA 1975, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX. 
 82 “Overview of the Report of the Special Committee July 22, 1975.” 
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illness in Harris County in 1977.83 MHNC noted that 3,770 additional indigent persons 
needed short-term inpatient treatment in 1977 than had received it. They determined that 
to serve the indigent mentally ill population of Harris County adequately required 313 
public beds instead of the 93 available in 1977. In 1980, with no new public beds added 
in the interim, MHNC stated that the need had reached an additional 407 new “tax-
supported” psychiatric inpatient beds, bringing the whole community need to 500 public 
beds.84 The failure of the Legislature to fund the recommendation for a public psychiatric 
hospital in Houston in 1957 was still a critical issue for the community. 
Conclusion 
 Houston and Harris County provide an excellent study of the beginning of 
community mental health in Texas and the nation. Federal funding was available to both 
state-funded and privately funded organizations. There was an assumption on the part of 
the federal government that the states, local governments, and private entities would 
                                                             
 83 MHNC found that 771 psychiatric treatment beds provided care for 9,132 patients with an 
average length of stay of 18.2 days in 1977. Of the total number of beds, 678 were private and located in 
eleven facilities that were either psychiatric sections of general hospitals or private psychiatric hospitals. 
The public or indigent patients received treatment in the 60 beds at TRIMS and the 33 beds at Ben Taub, 
the Harris County Hospital District general hospital in the Texas Medical Center. The latter had six 
emergency psychiatric beds and 27 longer-term beds. There were 7,306 admissions to the private 
hospitals and 1,826 admissions to the available public beds. In addition, the Harris County Psychiatric 
Hospital (HCPH) provided diagnostic and holding services for patients committed by the courts. This 
program held patients until their admission to Austin State Hospital (ASH) or TRIMS. In 1977, there were 
1,497 admissions from HCPH to ASH and 184 to TRIMS. Also, 389 beds at the United States Veteran’s 
Hospital in Houston provided general psychiatry treatment for veterans. By estimation, residents of Harris 
County occupied 73% of those beds. There were also 53 beds providing 24-hour residential care to the 
mentally ill with 88 admissions in 1977. Halfway houses with 74 beds received 341 admissions in 1977. “A 
Report of the Mental Health Needs Council, Inc. 3208 Austin Street, Houston, TX, April 4, 1979: 7-8, 20-21, 
Harris County Jon Lindsay MHMRA Inactive 031/015, 983-22,1979-1981, Harris County Archives, Houston, 
TX. 
 84 “News Release Monday, August 25, 1980, excerpted from: Needs for Mental Health Services in 
Harris County, 1980,” Mental Health Needs Council, Inc., McGovern Institutional Collection, No. 15, TRIMS 
Series 1, Box 24, The John P. McGovern Historical Collections and Research Center (McGovern Center) at 
the TMC Library, Houston, TX. 
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provide funding to sustain the work created by federal funding. State funding in Texas 
was quite limited, and the Legislature chose to fund only CMHCs created under HB 3 by 
local governmental entities. The financial commitment made by St. Joseph Hospital and 
its community partners was not sustainable as the federal funding ended, and they were 
not eligible for state funding. MHMRA struggled to get started first because of 
constitutional issues, but later because of a lack of support from Commissioners Court 
and its governance issues. Despite significant grant funding increases in the 1970s, 
MHMRA failed to create programs to address the critical needs of the seriously mentally 
ill.  
 This chapter points to two funding decisions critical to the failure of the CMHCs 
to develop as hoped. First, the assumption by the federal government that the states, local 
governments, and other entities would provide the financial resources to sustain the 
programs started with federal funding was an error. The federal government needed to 
provide longer-term funding and more direction on how to develop sustainable funding.  
Second, the failure of the state of Texas to work through private organizations that could 
use their resources to create quality programs meant that local community mental health 
centers in Texas would struggle just getting started. They would also not have access to 
core funding beyond what the state Legislature approves biennially. 
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IX. THE IMPACT OF DECISIONS MADE AT THE LOCAL 
AND STATE LEVELS, AND POOR FUNDING BY THE 
LEGISLATURE SEVERELY LIMITS HARRIS COUNTY 
AND HOUSTON IN CREATING THE PROGRAMS 
NEEDED BY THOSE SUFFERING FROM SEVERE 




 The desire for a state-supported psychiatric hospital for Houston finally came to 
fruition in the 1980s. However, the new 250-bed hospital created in the Texas Medical 
Center was a short-term treatment facility that differed from what the community wanted 
and left the city and county with ongoing needs. Also in the 1980s, Austin State 
Hospital’s discharge of patients by transporting and leaving them at the bus station in 
Houston1 as part of the state’s response to the R.A.J lawsuit led to many of those 
discharged living on the streets and challenged MHMRA to serve the needs of this 
growing population. Another scandal at MHMRA significantly damaged the agency itself 
and its work with other agencies in the community. MHMRA finally accomplished its 
long-term dream of creating an expanded emergency room and crisis care center for the 
SMI in the county, but a significant portion of the program ended quickly due to financial 
difficulties. State politics in the first decade of the twenty-first century led to even more 
cutbacks in services from MHMRA.2 While Harris County provided a higher level of 
funding for MHMRA than any other CMHC in the state received from their local 
                                                             
 1 John Whitmire, “Mental Patients Released to the Streets,” The Houston Post, December 1, 
1984. 
 2 Garnet Coleman Interview by Curtis Mooney, February 25, 2016, Interview available at the 
McGovern Center at the TMC Library, Houston, TX. 
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supporting body, the Texas Legislature provided less funding per person to Harris County 
than all other CMHCs because of the community’s growing size and the Legislature’s 
unwillingness to change the funding formula.3   
 Recent increases in funding from the state in response to school shootings, and the 
federal Medicaid waiver to prepare Texas for Medicaid expansion under the Affordable 
Care Act brought improvements in the treatment of those with an SMI in Houston and 
Harris County. However, the failure of the state to expand Medicaid, as many other states 
have done, means the Legislature is forgoing millions in federal funding needed 
desperately by those suffering from severe mental illness. The temporary nature of the 
Medicaid waiver and the failure to allocate state resources to support the new 
programming created by this funding source clearly shows that the Texas Legislature has 
not accepted the challenge of serving the needs of those with an SMI in the largest county 
in the state and the third-largest county in the nation. Also, a study authorized and funded 
by Harris County Commissioners Court determined that public services for the county’s 
impoverished severely mentally ill are woefully inadequate to meet the need.  
The County and State Work Together to Build a Public Psychiatric Hospital 
in Houston 
  
 The call for more resources and a 500 “tax-supported” psychiatric bed hospital for 
Harris County matched the 1957 plan approved by the Legislature for a state mental 
hospital in Houston. Though the Legislature had approved the plan, they had never 
                                                             
 3 Unsigned Resolution of the Harris County Commissioner’s Court, December 1984, “Exhibit A: 
Grant-in-Aid for Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987 Based upon Per Capita – Using 1985 TDH Population 
Projections,” “County Donations/Appropriations to MHMRA Centers,” Harris County Judge Jon Lindsay 
Papers, MHMRA 84 989 18 984, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX. 
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funded it.4 TRIMS had expanded its primary role of research and training by adding 
outpatient services and by leasing space for 60 beds at the Center Pavilion Hospital near 
the Texas Medical Center in 1968 to provide inpatient psychiatric treatment.5 In 1973, 
Houston legislators added $250,000 to the construction budget for TDMHMR to plan for 
a “proposed Intensive Treatment Center” in the Houston area.6 The study, performed by 
Bernard Johnson, Inc., a Houston based architectural firm, found that before it could plan 
for a treatment center, it needed to understand the role of TRIMS.7 Was it a research 
facility only, or was it to be the primary public psychiatric hospital for Harris County? At 
that time, the state wanted it to focus on research, and the county wanted it to be the long-
sought-after hospital. The answer would come only when they joined forces.  
 The possibility of building a new facility in the Texas Medical Center (TMC) that 
would serve both the state and Harris County’s needs emerged in 1980 when leadership 
of TRIMS and TMC contacted Lt. Governor Bill Hobby (b. 1932) about a TRIMS-
                                                             
 4 HB 169, 55st Regular Session (1957), Bill Files, Texas Legislature, Archives and Information 
Services Texas State Library. The bill also authorized the construction of a 500-bed community mental 
hospital; however, the legislature failed to appropriate funds for the facility at that time. That bill 
eventually became the authorization used to construct the 250-bed Harris County Psychiatric Center 
(HCPC) in the 1980s. Spencer Bayles, M.D., interview by Dan Creason August 20, 1988. AVV.MS108.006-
005, Daniel L. Creson, M.D., Ph.D. Papers MS 108, The John P. McGovern Historical Collections and 
Research Center (McGovern Center) at the TMC Library, Houston, TX. 
 5 “Preliminary Summary Report: Role and Program Study for Texas Research Institute for Mental 
Sciences,” (1974): 1, 4-5. McGovern Institutional Collection, No. 15, TRIMS Series 1, Box 11-B, The John P. 
McGovern Historical Collections and Research Center (McGovern Center) at the TMC Library, Houston, TX.  
 6 HB 139, 63rd Regular Session (1973), Bill Files, Texas Legislature, Archives and Information 
Services Texas State Library. Appropriation Bill Article II: II-23. 
 7 In 1973, TDMHMR Commissioner David Wade saw its role as research, training, and treatment 
services for the Houston area and envisioned a new 500-bed hospital. However, Commissioner Kenneth 
D. Gaver, who took over in 1974, saw the original legislative intent of TRIMS to be only research and 
training. Commissioner David Wade letter to Richard T.D. Eastwood, executive vice presiden, and director 
of the Texas Medical Center, March 1, 1973. Memo from Lynn Darden, chairman of the Business 
Committee to Edwin R. Van Zandt, chair, and members of the Texas Board of Mental Health and Mental 
Retardation, October 24, 1975. McGovern Institutional Collection, No. 15, TRIMS Series 1, Box 11-B, The 




TDMHMR-TMC psychiatric facility.8 TDMHMR wanted to expand the TRIMS facility, 
and Harris County needed to replace the inadequate HCPH located at Jeff Davis Hospital. 
Hobby, who had a keen interest in education, a commitment to Houston, and long-term 
service to the state as Lt. Governor, expressed his support for the new project to 
TDMHMR,9 but he did not want that agency to run the new hospital. He asked Louis A. 
Faillace M.D., the founding chair of Psychiatry and Behavioral Science at the University 
of Texas Medical School in Houston (UT-Houston), to meet with him near the end of the 
Legislative session of 1981. At that meeting, he offered the hospital to Faillace, who told 
him it would cost 20 percent more to build and 20 percent more to operate to provide the 
training for residents, and Hobby agreed.10 The Texas Legislature added a rider to 
TDMHMR’s construction budget to build the Houston Psychiatric Hospital in or near 
TMC. The Legislature appropriated $12 million for construction and required that the 
Board of Regents of the University of Texas approve the plans for the hospital. The rider 
required the facility to operate through an agreement between TDMHMR and the 
University of Texas and for it to serve as a teaching hospital for UT-Houston’s 
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Science. It authorized TDMHMR and UT to 
enter agreements with Harris County or other groups.11 This collaboration would produce 
a smaller than needed hospital, but one that provided excellent short-term treatment for 
                                                             
 8 Memo from Joseph Schoolar and Jack K. Williams to Lt.  Gov. William Hobby, December 30, 
1980. McGovern Institutional Collection, No. 15, TRIMS Series 1, Box 11-B, The John P. McGovern 
Historical Collections and Research Center (McGovern Center) at the TMC Library, Houston, TX. 
 9 Letter from Lt. Gov. Bill Hobby to Mr. L. Gray Beck, chair of the TDMHMR Board in Austin, 
February 16, 1981, Harris County Jon Lindsay Files, Medical Center, TEMHMR Correspondence 982 22, 
1981, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX. 
 10 Louis Faillace interview by Curtis Mooney.  Interview available at the McGovern Center at the 
TMC Library, Houston, TX. 
 11 HB 656, Article 11, Rider 9, 11-26 to 27, May 29, 1981, 67th Legislature, Regular Session (1981) 




those suffering from an SMI in Harris County, increase the research on mental illness, 
and improve the training of psychiatrists and allied professionals in Houston and Texas. 
 
Figure 17 Lt. Governor Bill Hobby 12 
 Harris County Commissioners Court agreed to provide another $12 million for 
construction. Initially, it also agreed to provide funding for half of the staffing and to pay 
for half of the operating costs of the hospital. The county, however, became concerned 
about the ongoing costs. Judge Lindsay worked with Lt. Governor Hobby to change the 
agreement so that UT-Houston would operate the hospital, and Harris County would 
contribute only 15 percent of the operating costs.13 That percentage was equal to the 
amount the county was then spending to operate HCPH. The agreement called for 
MHMRA and others to refer patients to the hospital, but UT-Houston’s Department of 
                                                             
 12 William P. Hobby Jr., [1995-1997], University of Houston People, Special Collections, University 
of Houston Libraries, accessed November 26, 2019, 
https://digital.lib.uh.edu/collection/p15195coll6/item/45. 
 13 Louis Faillace Interview by Curtis Mooney. In this interview, Faillace states that the county 
agreed to provide 20 percent; however, in a previous interview in 1987, he stated 15 percent, and that is 
the number that has been paid by the county. Louis Faillace interview by Dan Creson in 1987. Daniel L. 
Creson, M.D., Ph.D. Papers MS 108,  The John P. McGovern Historical Collections and Research Center 
(McGovern Center) at The TMC Library, Houston, TX.  
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Psychiatry and Behavioral Science would provide the treatment and refer the patients 
back to MHMRA for aftercare. Instead of a 500-bed hospital, however, the combined 
resources of the state and county funded only 250 beds, and it would be a community 
hospital, serving patients only short-term with no provision for expansion of facilities for 
the care of those needing longer-term help. Those needing longer-term treatment still had 
to travel three hours to a regular state hospital. In 1982, there were 129 beds for short-
term care of the indigent mentally ill in the county, but 90 of those at HCPH and TRIMS 
would become part of the new facility.  
 
Figure 18 Louis Faillace M.D.14 
 Originally, TRIMS was to continue as a separate facility after the new hospital 
opened. However, a significant research scandal over research methods and questionable 
collection of data by research scientist Robert C. Smith M.D., and the failure of TRIMS 
Director, Joseph Schoolar M.D. to respond to the scandal in a timely manner led to its 
defunding by the National Institute of Health (NIH) and closure by the Texas 
                                                             




Legislature.15 With the new hospital opening soon and the need for funds to operate it, 
this was the wrong time for TRIMS to have such problems. The Legislature moved 
TRIMS inpatient resources to HCPC, and another portion of the TRIMS funding went to 
UT-Houston for research and outpatient services and was renamed the University of 
Texas Mental Sciences Institute (UTMSI) within TMC.16 When HCPC opened in 1986, 
instead of adding public beds that studies had identified as needed, there were only 160 
new beds, and 25 of those were flexible, with HCPC leadership able to admit anyone it 
chose.17 HCPC fell far short of the growing needs of those with an SMI in Harris County 
                                                             
 15 Dr. Robert C. Smith, a TRIMS scientist, who was a psychiatrist and held a Ph.D. in Sociology, 
was researching the drug haloperidol for the treatment of schizophrenia under a grant from NIH and two 
private pharmaceutical companies. NIH required that the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at TRIMS 
approve and monitor all research involving human subjects. A staff member working for Smith, Dr. 
Chandra Misra, raised concerns about discrepancies within the data in 1983. When Dr. Smith ignored 
Misra’s concerns, Misra took them to Dr. Neil Burch, who chaired the IRB, and Smith subsequently fired 
Misra for bad work performance. Burch then took Misra’s concerns to Dr. Joseph Schoolar, the director of 
TRIMS, and the IRB told Schoolar of the need for an investigation. Schoolar granted Misra a grievance 
hearing, but there is no information as to the results of that hearing. Schoolar arranged for both an 
external and internal investigation of Smith’s research, and those investigations found that Smith was 
withholding data from the IRB and refusing to cooperate with the board.  They also noted the lack of 
policies and procedures for research problem issues.  The IRB suspended Dr. Smith’s research in August of 
1984, and two days afterward, Schoolar, reassigned Burch from his role on the IRB and began to work 
toward reinstating Smith’s research.  Three different teams reviewed Smith’s work, and all found 
concerns.  NIMH formally suspended the grant to Smith in February of 1985, and the Texas Legislature 
received a report critical of Schoolar’s leadership stating that his actions “cannot be characterized as 
‘timely’ and that there was very little follow-up or control to ensure that his decisions were fully 
implemented.”  The report noted that TRIMS leadership had “acted in good faith, but Schoolar’s ‘desire to 
be fair to everyone, especially Dr. Smith, has caused him to delay taking definite action to resolve the 
allegations.  Ruth SoRelle and Mark Carreau, “Probe Threatens $700,000 in Grants,” Houston Chronicle, 
March 17, 1985: 1, 18, clipping located in McGovern HCPC Collection 1C67 Unprocessed Box 9 of 10 HCPC 
Scrapbooks ClipBook 1950 to 1985. Ruth SoRelle, “State Report Faults Handling of Investigation by 
TRIMS,” Houston Chronicle, date unknown, clipping located in McGovern HCPC Collection 1C67 
Unprocessed Box 9 of 10 HCPC Scrapbooks ClipBook 1950 to 1985.  
 16 Dan L. Creson, "University of Texas Mental Sciences Institute," Handbook of Texas Online, 
accessed August 8, 2018, https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/sbumk. Rosalind Jackler and 
Mark Sanders, “Cutbacks Sought for State Mental Health Agency,” The Houston Post, February 28, 1985: 
15A, clipping located in McGovern HCPC Collection 1C67 Unprocessed Box 9 of 10 HCPC Scrapbooks 
ClipBook 1950 to 1985. 
 17 Faillace interview by Curtis Mooney. Ruth SoRelle, “New Psychiatric Hospital Called Band-Aid,” 
Houston Chronicle, April 18, 1982. 
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in 1986. With the county’s population growing by 66 percent to 4.617 million from 1986 
to 2018, it meets even less of the need today.  
State Hospital Discharges to the Houston Bus Station Point to Low State 
Funding  
 
 The need in Harris County for more services for those with an SMI became more 
evident as the state hospitals, following a federal court order in R.A.J. v. Miller to 
increase the patient-staffing ratio in the state hospitals,18 began to discharge patients back 
into the community by leaving them at the downtown Houston bus station. In December 
1984, Houston newspaper articles stated that Austin State Hospital had transported 
discharged people with a mental health condition from Houston back to the city twice a 
week by van for the past year, and left them at the bus station without any money and no 
place for shelter. Among those discharged patients were some “who require[d] 
medication and supervision.” The police called the situation a “time bomb,” noting that 
families met some of the former patients, but many without families “just wander off 
down the street.”19 This dumping of patients from the public psychiatric hospitals had 
occurred in many other states in the 1970s as federal court orders required specific 
actions within the hospitals.20 Commissioner Gary Miller M.D. of TDMHMR stated that 
it was the responsibility of Harris County MHMRA to provide for patients after they left 
                                                             
 18 R.A.J. v. Miller, Order from Hearing on Stipulated Recommendations of Remedies, June 1984, 
cited in David Pharis, “The Excursion into the Community,” in David B. Pharis, State Hospital Reform: Why 
Was It So Hard to Accomplish?  (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1998):160.   
 19 Whitmire, The Houston Post, December 1, 1984.  
 20 Murray Levine, The History and Politics of Community Mental Health (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1981), 134.  Alan A. Stone, “Recent Mental Health Litigation: A Critical Perspective,” 
American Journal of Psychiatry 134, no. 3 (March 1977): 276. 
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the hospital, and he had developed the “3550 program” to provide funds for their care.21 
MHMRA officials said, “They did not have the money to provide care for all of the 
patients being discharged by the state.”22 TDMHMR declined MHMRA’s request for up 
to $5 million in emergency aid to provide 218 additional residential beds “for the 
homeless mentally ill,” noting that they did not have $5 million to send to MHMRA.23 
After discussions, TDMHMR and MHMRA agreed to open a new “Specialty Clinic” at 
410 Pierce Street in Houston just a few blocks from the downtown bus station to focus on 
crisis intervention for patients returning to the city from the state hospital. TDMHMR 
also agreed to send plans for aftercare services with each patient. The funding for the new 
clinic would come through MHMRA from funds TDMHMR provided to MHMRA to 
keep patients from going to the state hospital.24 The new clinic did not end the growing 
homeless population and the increasing number of mentally ill in the Harris County Jail, 
for MHMRA did not have the resources to meet all of their needs.  
 While opening the new Specialty Clinic took the crisis out of the public view, the 
event brought to the forefront the fact that MHMRA’s state funding per capita was much 
lower than other CMHCs in the state. For FY 1985, MHMRA of Harris County had 
                                                             
 21 David Pharis, “The History of the R.A.J. Lawsuit in Texas,” in State Hospital Reform: Why Was It 
So Hard to Accomplish? ed. David B. Pharis (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1998): 70-71. TDMHMR 
was under court order to reduce the staff to client ratio in the state hospitals. Instead of increasing 
funding to the state hospitals to reduce the staff to client ratio, Commissioner Gary Miller had developed 
the 3550 plan, which would provide the CMHCs $35.50 for each day less of hospital usage over the 
previous quarter.  This plan required the CMHCs to provide the services needed to keep the patients out 
of the hospital, however, the funding lagged by at least one quarter, and that amount did not necessarily 
provide for the level of care the patients needed in the community.   
 22 Anne Marie Kilday and Jill Dawson, “Mental Patients Set Adrift: State Hospital Discharges onto 
Houston Streets,” Houston Chronicle, December 4, 1984: 1, 8. 
 23 Michael Haederle, “State Says Special Aid Not Likely for County Mental Health Agency,” The 
Houston Post, December 6, 1984.   
 23Whitmire, The Houston Post, December 1, 1984.  
 24 Mark Sanders, “Houston to get Mental Health Clinic: It Will Probably Help Quite a Bit,” The 
Houston Post, December 19, 1984. 
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received $4.3786 per person in the county in grant-in-aid funding from the state, which 
was the lowest amount received by all but one center that had received just startup 
funding. MHMRA received only 15 percent of the appropriated resources to serve 20 
percent of the state’s population. Other CMHCs grant-in-aid funding per capita for the 
same year ranged from $4.8060 for the El Paso Center for MHMR to $11.9323 for 
Central Texas MHMR in Coleman, Texas, a very rural area.25 The number of admissions 
and funding by Texas of state hospital patients from Harris County was also lower than in 
three other metropolitan areas. The admission rate to the state hospitals for Harris was 
72.9 per 100,000 population compared to 202.5 for Bexar County (San Antonio), 122.1 
for Dallas County, and 391.6 for Travis County (Austin). Institutional cost per capita for 
Harris County was $6.40 compared to $17.79 for Bexar County, $13.72 for Dallas 
County, and $34.35 for Travis County.26  
 State funding for Harris County for mental health was not proportional to less 
populated areas of the state. That proportion would change somewhat with the opening of 
HCPC, but it had remained an issue for the county. How did such a discrepancy develop, 
and why has it continued for so long?  Harris County was one of the first counties to 
receive state grant-in-aid funding. While it received the most substantial amount of 
funding from the beginning, the funding was not proportional to the number of people in 
the county compared to other counties. The Texas Legislature provided only limited 
funding to TDMHMR for CMHCs, but TDMHMR sought to provide some funding to all 
                                                             
 25 “Exhibit A: Grant-in-Aid for Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987 Based upon Per Capita – Using 1985 
TDH Population Projections,” Harris County Judge Lindsay MHMRA 84 989 18 984, Harris County Archives, 
Houston, TX. 
 26 Ibid. “Exhibit C: State Hospital Admissions and Funding,” Harris County Judge Lindsay MHMRA 
84 989 18 984, Harris County Archives, Houston, TX. 
295 
 
who qualified under their established requirements. Many counties and regions cover 
large areas but have fewer people to serve. CMHCs in those areas received more funding 
per person. Harris County’s growth, however, has far exceeded such areas, but the 
Legislature has never provided the funding needed to fund all of the CMHCs at the level 
needed. With no additional funding from the Legislature to rectify the inequity in 
funding, TDMHMR and the subsequent leadership for mental health in Texas would have 
had to take money from other CMHCs to raise Harris County to the equivalent level of 
other areas, something they have not done.  Dallas, San Antonio, and Austin all have 
state psychiatric hospitals within their county or a short distance away.  Those areas, 
closer to the state hospitals, have more patients from the area in residence, whereas 
Houston is three hours away from the nearest state hospital, so they have historically had 
fewer patients served. The lack of appropriate state funding for Harris County MHMRA 
means that many people do not receive the services and support they need. 
Fraud, Poor Judgment, and Scandal at MHMRA and Baylor College of 
Medicine Lead to More Struggles for Resources for the Mentally Ill 
 
 MHMRA cannot blame the lack of funding by the state for all of its problems. In 
the summer of 1988, Houston newspapers broke the story of MHMRA buying a building 
to serve as an outpatient facility for $3.3 million that earlier the same day had sold for 
$2.1 million.27 Commissioners Court called for changes in the board, and the police and 
the district attorney began investigating the situation. For the next three years, 
Houstonians read news stories about significant problems at MHMRA. They told of lies, 
                                                             
 27 John Macklin, DA’s Probe: Did Building Cost Too Much,” The Houston Post, July 29, 1988: 1A, 
21A. Pete Slover, “Prosecutors Probe MHMRA Land Deal – Fraud Suspected in Sale of Building,” Houston 
Chronicle, July 30, 1988: 25. 
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negligence in oversight, the appointment of new board members, and the firing of the 
executive director. They also told of the arrests of the top two officials at MHMRA and 
the subsequent conviction of a developer, John P. Chambers, and his “silent partner,” 
who had put together what turned out to be three fraudulent sales to MHMRA.28  
 The issue began in the late 1970s when MHMRA’s Executive Director, Eugene 
Williams, developed a contract with Baylor College of Medicine to provide psychiatrists 
and psychologists to serve at each of MHMRA’s clinics.29 In Texas, non-medical 
corporations cannot employ a doctor to treat patients directly, so corporations such as 
MHMRA, without medical leadership, contract with medical schools or other physician-
led entities to provide the medical personnel to treat patients.30 The faculty member from 
Baylor who oversaw the contract was George Leslie Adams, M.D., professor of 
community and social psychiatry at Baylor College of Medicine, who would become 
Chambers’ silent partner. In addition to the principal contract to supply psychiatrists and 
psychologists, Adams also had an individual contract with MHMRA that paid him 
$35,000 a year to serve as a management consultant.31 Baylor, in turn, employed 
Williams to teach a course in mental health administration, for which he was paid 
$17,500 a year.32 Adams and Williams were the two individuals who negotiated and 
oversaw the contract between the two entities. The personal contracts and the corporate 
                                                             
 28 Stephen Johnson, “2 are Convicted in Health Agency Land Deals – MHMRA Sweetheart 
Transactions Cited,” Houston Chronicle, March 21, 1991: 25. Stephen Johnson, “Ex-Mental Health Chief 
Cleared of Theft Charges,” Houston Chronicle, November 19, 1991: 1. 
 29 Pete Slover and Stephen Johnson, “DA Seeks Baylor-MHMRA Records,” Houston Chronicle, 
August 24, 1988: 1A, 8A. 
 30 “The ‘Corporate Practice of Medicine’ is Prohibited in Texas,” Bertolino LLP A Law Firm of 
Attorneys and Counselors, October 23, 2017. Accessed August 13, 2018, 
https://www.belolaw.com/posts/corporate-practice-of-medicine-prohibited-in-texas/. 
 31 Slover and Johnson. 
 32 Ibid. Stephen Johnson, March 21, 1991. 
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one created a close, unquestioning relationship between the two and put Adams in a 
strong position within MHMRA. All of the assigned staff from Baylor were within the 
community and social psychiatry program and worked as clinicians in various roles at 
MHMRA under Adams’ leadership. When the contract ultimately ended in 1990, 25 
clinicians from Baylor lost employment there.  
 Scott Hickey, a Ph.D. psychologist, assigned by Baylor to work at MHMRA, 
pointed to a practice not questioned by Williams nor covered in the newspapers. The 
psychiatrists from Baylor would transfer patients, who had outside funding for 
evaluations or received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and qualified for Medicaid, 
to their private practice. In doing this, the psychiatrists received payment under the 
Baylor-MHMRA contract for seeing patients with no outside funding source and received 
additional payments for those who did have funding directly from the funder.33 This 
arrangement provided more income for the psychiatrist and deprived MHMRA of 
revenue.   
                                                             
 33 Scott Hickey, Ph.D. psychologist who worked under the Baylor contract with MHMRA and later 
served in administration at MHMRA said that this was the practice for the psychiatrists assigned to 
MHMRA by Baylor, however he was not sure if this was something that involved all of the psychiatrists, 
Scott Hickey interview by Curtis Mooney on December 17, 2015. Interview available at the John P. 
McGovern Historical Collections and Research Center (McGovern Center) at the TMC Library, Houston, TX. 





Figure 19 Eugene Williams, Executive Director of MHMRA 34 
 Other information emerged, however, that raised even more questions about 
MHMRA and its leadership. Further reporting by The Houston Post noted that Eugene 
Williams’ salary was $105,000 and not the $49,000 he had reported to County Judge Jon 
Lindsay, making him higher paid than any county official other than the medical 
examiner.35 Judge Lindsay, with the backing of Commissioners Court, pushed the 
MHMRA board to fire Williams, and when it did not quickly agree to do so, the Court 
replaced three of the board members, including the chair, whose terms had expired. The 
newly reshaped board fired Williams.36 News then broke that Williams and the business 
director at MHMRA had purchased annuities with funds from the agency for which there 
was no apparent formal board approval. Their arrests were major news stories before the 
                                                             
 34 Houston Post, May 31, 1985. 
 35 John Mecklin, ”MHMRA Chief under Fire in Salary Dispute,” The Houston Post, August 19, 1988: 
1A, 23A. 
 36 John Mecklin, “MHMRA Board Votes to fire Director Eugene Williams,” The Houston Post, 
September 14, 1988: 1A, 12A. 
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case against them fell apart when records showed that the board had approved the 
purchases in order to provide them higher compensation than TDMHMR allowed 
CMHCs to pay their employees.37   
 The major scandal, however, was the land sales that defrauded MHMRA of 
millions of dollars. District attorney John Holmes brought charges against Williams as a 
co-conspirator with Chambers and Adams on the land sales.38 Following conviction, both 
Chambers and Adams received probation, and the court ordered them to make 
restitution.39 When there was no trail of money from the sales leading to Williams, the 
judge dismissed the case against him.40 In defending its actions, the MHMRA board 
stated that it had paid more money for facilities than appraisals indicated was the actual 
value, in the belief that they could not obtain financing otherwise because their funding 
required ongoing approval by the state and county.41 The board never sought other advice 
or funding but went on the word of Williams and Adams. The judge’s ruling assumed 
that Williams was the victim of his friend and trusted colleague’s advice.   
 The lack of appropriate fiduciary oversight, fiscal controls, and regular reporting 
to both TDMHMR and Commissioners Court created an atmosphere where the board of 
MHMRA failed to exercise its fundamental responsibility to make informed decisions 
and to guard the integrity of the agency. Commissioners Court changed its policies on 
                                                             
 37 TDMHMR forbade CMHCs paying more in salary than the state agency paid to similar 
employees. Stephen Johnson, “MHMRA Charges Dismissed – Judge Says Evidence Shows Agency Duo Did 
Nothing Wrong,” Houston Chronicle, July 15, 1989: 1. 
 38 Stephen Johnson, March 21, 1991. 
 39 Stephen Johnson, “Developer, Psychiatrist Dodge Prison in Land Deal Fraud Case – Probation 
Given by District Judge,” Houston Chronicle, May 17, 1991: 30. 
 40 Stephen Johnson, November 19, 1991.   
 41 Pete Slover, “MHMRA Land Probe Widened,” Houston Chronicle, August 2, 1988: 1, 5.  John 
Mecklin, “Chairman: MHMRA ‘Scam’ Victim:  Officials defend agency’s real estate policies,” Houston Post, 
August 9, 1988: 1A, 8A. 
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real estate purchases by subordinate organizations to require approval by the Court.42 It 
also removed those board members who would not vote to relieve Williams of his job.  
However, none of the board members of MHMRA received any other sanctions. 
Williams, who had no previous criminal record, had lost his job, and he moved away 
from Houston. His failure to question the advice of a contractor, his failure to search for 
appropriate funding, and his lying to Commissioners Court to deceive the state all cost 
MHMRA. It significantly destroyed the trust of the community in the agency.  
Impact of the Scandals on MHMRA 
 
 The negative publicity and the concern raised in the community would be a stain 
on the agency for years. TDMHMR approved funding for MHMRA for only the first 
quarter of FY 1988, noting concerns about the lack of development of crisis care and the 
lack of timely appointments for those discharged from the state hospital. The department 
specifically called for “a thorough examination of the management and organization of 
the outpatient clinics, particularly in relation to the Baylor College of Medicine 
contract.”43 TDMHMR restored the full funding after the first quarter, and in December 
1988, the board of MHMRA hired Jan Duker (1926-2013), a Ph.D. psychologist who had 
headed the Mississippi Department of Mental Health from 1980 to 1986, to begin work 
as executive director in January 1989. She stated that one of her priorities was “re-
establishing credibility” for MHMRA.44 She stated that she would begin by making sure 
                                                             
 42 Pete Brewton and Brenda Sapino, “Higher Cost ‘Puzzled’ Appraiser,” Houston Post, August 2, 
1988: 1A, 11A. 
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there were “no conflicts of interest among agency employees.”45 To deal with a “budget 
shortfall,” she ended the existing contract with Baylor College of Medicine that paid the 
medical school $1.76 million a year and negotiated a new one with Baylor that would 
“pay for services on an hourly basis” instead of the “flat fee” they were paying before. 
She expected to save $500,000 annually by changing the contract.46  
 Duker expressed her concern to the board of TDMHMR in September 1989 that 
the operating budget it had just adopted provided far less than what Harris County 
needed. She restated the discrepancies in funding for Harris County MHMRA versus the 
other centers across the state. She was able to receive an additional $500,000 for her 
efforts, which was far from the amount needed.47 Without additional funding, MHMRA 
had a $5.6 million deficit as 1989 ended. Duker made extensive cost-cutting measures in 
1990 that included “reducing travel,” “delaying capital improvements,” and “moving its 
offices from the posh Wesleyan Tower at 24 Greenway Plaza” with its $9,000 per month 
rent to a building already owned by MHMRA.48 The cutbacks were not without 
problems. A Houston Psychiatric Society committee report stated that services at 
MHMRA had “sunk to an ‘all-time low.’”49 For MHMRA staff, Duker’s leadership 
created a turbulent atmosphere in which to work. When she arrived, she told the 
administrative staff that they “were all thieves, liars and crooks,” and they were paid too 
                                                             
 45 Mike Yuen, “County’s MHMRA Names Mississippian as New Director, The Houston Post, 
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 46 Stephen Johnson, “MHMRA Fights Budget Problem: Agency to Renegotiate Controversial 
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much. Duker was critical of everyone, including those who did not know about the 
scandals.50  
 A critical problem under Duker’s leadership was damaged agency relationships 
with other organizations. One of the most significant involved a dispute over the county’s 
funding of HCPC. The county was to provide 15 percent of the annual cost, but Duker 
demanded more accountability about costs from HCPC. In July 1991, MHMRA agreed to 
pay half of the money HCPC needed to keep from closing beds if the hospital “provide[d] 
adequate financial records and show[ed] that the money [would] be spent exclusively on 
patient care.”51 In February 1992, HCPC was again facing cutting services. They claimed 
they were facing a budget crunch brought on, in part, because MHMRA was not paying 
the money it was required to pay.52  
New Executive Director Brings Much-needed Stability to MHMRA, But 
Funding Woes Continue 
 
 Duker resigned in the summer of 1992 to work for a New Mexico state facility.53 
The board of MHMRA hired Steven Schnee, a Ph.D. psychologist who had worked in 
Texas mental health since the 1970s in both community mental health—as executive 
director of a CMHC in Central Texas—and more recently as Superintendent of the San 
Antonio State Hospital.54 Schnee would serve in his new position from 1992 until his 
retirement in 2017. When he arrived in September 1992, he found instability and a lack 
                                                             
 50 Carolyn Taylor interview. 
 51 Stephen Johnson, “Pact with MHMRA May Save Cutbacks at Psychiatric Hospital,” Houston 
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of confidence within the agency. There was “significant tension between the agency and 
its relationships everywhere.” Schnee stated that his immediate predecessor “had come in 
with a hatchet.” “Many of the agencies’ facilities were in horrible condition, and the 
psychiatric staff was minimal and part-time.” He noted that there were no quality 
controls, and every place seemed overcrowded. There was no contract with HCPC, and 
the leadership there had refused to work with his predecessor. He worked out a new 
agreement with the leadership at HCPC and began the slow process of rebuilding the 
morale both within and outside the agency.55 Though the agency was free from scandals 
under Schnee’s leadership, funding was a constant problem. Schnee noted in 1995 that 
his agency had “only enough money to treat less than 30 percent of patients considered to 
be [the] priority.”56  
MHMRA Struggles in an Attempt to Fulfill the Long-term Need for a Crisis 
Care Center 
 
 One goal of the community that had existed for years was to improve emergency 
and crisis care. The building of HCPC near one of the city’s affluent African American 
communities had raised such opposition from the residents that the contending parties 
came to a verbal agreement that the hospital would not have an emergency room.57 The 
only public emergency beds available to treat patients with an SMI were at Ben Taub 
Hospital, which had 12 beds for all of Harris County. Thus, MHMRA’s opening of a new 
emergency facility on October 4, 1999, represented a significant improvement for those 
in the county with an SMI. The new emergency center, the Neuropsychiatric Center 
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(NPC) of MHMRA at Ben Taub Hospital, was to serve 50 outpatient or walk-in patients 
with 16 beds in the first-floor emergency center, and another 34 beds that would provide 
3 to 5 days of short-term crisis stabilization on the second floor.58 TDMHMR provided 
$3 million for the reconstruction of the space, and MHMRA borrowed the remainder of 
the $2 million-plus costs to prepare the building for occupancy.59 When the first floor 
opened, utilization was much higher than anticipated, serving 1,000 to 1,200 a month in 
emergency care instead of the staffed and planned for 600 to 800 per month.60  
 The second-floor Crisis Stabilization Unit (CSU) did not open for several months. 
When it did open, it helped to reduce admissions to HCPC, and the combined emergency 
and CSU programs kept 80 percent of those seen from entering the state psychiatric 
inpatient system. However, the funding from TDMHMR had not grown as anticipated, 
and the earned income for the program proved much lower than planned. In early 2001, 
MHMRA closed the CSU because of the financial drain on the entire system. Harris 
County Commissioners Court had provided $2,673,404 per year of the $10,000,000 
budget for NPC, but the “state general revenue” available to MHMRA “ha[d] not 
increased in flexible ways to permit the level of tax support commensurate with the 
indigent care need and utilization of these emergency services.” MHMRA had anticipated 
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$3M in earned income from NPC, but the number of indigent patients was “much greater 
than anticipated,” and the resources from insured patients were far lower than expected. 61   
 MHMRA requested help from TDMHMR with funds committed to Harris County 
but not used by them. Utilizing NPC and working with HCPC, Rusk State Hospital, and 
Probate Court, MHMRA had underutilized the state funds for inpatient treatment at Rusk 
State Hospital for Harris County patients. Rusk State Hospital had funds appropriated for 
Harris County patients within its budget, but by keeping the patients out of the state 
hospital, approximately $1 million annually in the Rusk State Hospital budget went for 
patients from other CMHCs in the Rusk catchment area.  MHMRA appealed to 
TDMHMR to send those funds to them so that the CSU could remain open.62 
Unfortunately, for MHMRA, the state budget appropriated specific sums to Rusk for its 
operations, so TDMHMR did not have the authority to transfer those funds that, in 
reality, the state hospital had already spent or were committed to spending.  This situation 
left MHMRA struggling to provide for the increasing number of indigent, severely 
mentally ill patients whom police routinely brought to NPC.   
 With the decrease in capacity, NPC went on drive-by status frequently when it 
was full. Patients waiting for a bed to open at HCPC took up the space needed for new 
patients. The ones not seen at NPC remained at home or on the streets with no treatment. 
Steve Schnee, Executive Director of MHMRA, stated, “I’m deeply concerned about what 
is happening to public and private mental health care in Harris County. …It’s a sad 
reflection at a time when we can do so much for people with psychiatric disturbances.” 
                                                             
 61 Letter from Steven Schnee to Ms. Heather Havofsky, January 19, 2001: 1-2. Attachment to the 
MHMRA Board of Trustees Minutes of January 23, 2001. The Harris Center for Mental Health and IDD 
Executive Offices, Houston, TX  
 62 Ibid: 2. 
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These patients were a danger to themselves or others, and frequently, their behavior led to 
their arrest and placement in jail when they did not receive the treatment they desperately 
needed. 63 
 
Figure 20 Steven Schnee, Ph.D. Executive Director of MHMRA 64 
 A study in 2000 found that if Harris County had received the average per capita 
funding allocation for community MHMR centers in Texas of $14.61 instead of its 
$11.65, it would have received an additional $9,820,189,65 which would have funded the 
entire $10 million operating costs for both programs of the NPC.66 Instead, today, without 
the CSU beds, there are only 28 beds of emergency care (12 at Ben Taub and 16 at NPC) 
                                                             
 63 Todd Ackerman, “Psychiatric Center goes on Drive-By: Agency turns away even sickest indigent 
patients,” Houston Chronicle, July 16, 2002: 13A. 
 64 Todd Ackerman, “Fort Worth Administrator named next Harris County Mental Health Leader: 
Wayne Young to succeed Steven Schnee at Harris Center for Mental Health and IDD,” San Antonio 
Express-News, September 28, 2017, accessed September 20, 2019, 
https://www.expressnews.com/local/prognosis/article/Fort-Worth-administrator. Article originally 
published in the Houston Chronicle. https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/health/article/County-
mental-health-agency-hires-new-CEO-12239289.php. 
 65 “Exhibit 3: Estimated Cost of Funding Mental Health Authorities at The FY 2000 Texas Average 
Per Capita Community Services Allocation ($14.61),” Final Report: Recommendations of the Task Force on 
Equity of Resource Allocation Submitted to the Texas Board of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 
June 29, 2000. Attachment to the minutes of August 30, 2000: 16, The Harris Center for Mental Health 
and IDD Executive Offices, Houston, TX. 
 66 Letter from Schnee to Havofsky: 2. 
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for the indigent in a county of over 4 million people and almost 7 million people in the 
metro area.67   
MHMRA Forced to Cut Services Because of Funding Shortfalls 
 
 By the summer of 2002, MHMRA’s resources were so “strained” that the agency 
was turning away new nonemergency patients. That June, the agency had received over 
9,000 calls for help, but they had “little ability to respond to so many calls.” Schnee 
stated, “It’s a tragedy. … It says poor people will have to get sicker before they get 
treatment, and then a lot of them will end up in jail.” Schnee pointed directly to 
“underfunding” by TDMHMR as the cause of the problem. “The state spends about $12 
per resident to treat mental illness in Harris County compared with the national average 
of $27.” He noted that the dramatic growth in the population of the county and “the 500-
bed reduction in private psychiatric care in recent years” had also contributed to the lack 
of resources to serve the mentally ill. State Representative Garnet Coleman, who was 
vice-chair of the Texas House Committee on Public Health and who suffers from 
depression himself, stated, “This shows where Texas is … [w]e’re one of the largest 
states in the richest country in the world, and this is how we treat people. We’re talking 
about closing down intake for folks who will end up on the street and in harm’s way. It’s 
unconscionable.”68  
 
                                                             
 67 The new state psychiatric hospital expected to open in early 2022 will be located next to HCPC 
in the Texas Medical Center. The article announcing its groundbreaking makes no mention of it providing 
emergency care, so presumably, the previous understanding with the community around HCPC not to 
provide emergency care in that location is still in place.  Natalie Weber, “Ground Broken at Mental Health 
Facility,” Houston Chronicle, June 27, 2019: A003. 
 68 Todd Ackerman, “County Mental Health Agency Turning Away Some Patients,” Houston 




Figure 21 State Representative Garnett Coleman 69 
 With the state’s financial problems of 2003 as an excuse, and the Republican’s 
gaining control of both houses of the Legislature, the Lt. Governorship, and the 
Governorship for the first time since Reconstruction, the Republicans forced significant 
changes and reductions in the health and human service agencies of the state. 
Representative Coleman stated that while there was a shortfall in the budget for 2003, it 
was a desire by the Republicans “to cut all health and human service programs” that led 
to the passage of HB 2292 in 2003. This piece of legislation brought a significant 
consolidation of agencies under one overarching executive commissioner responsible to 
the governor. In mental health, it dramatically limited services and eligibility for services 
to a smaller portion of the mentally ill. It changed budgeting from the practice of the 
Legislature, adding funds based for population growth and needs to zero-based budgeting 
each bi-annual session. Above all, it cut needed services to mentally ill Texans.70   
 Coleman noted that Texas, like all states in 2003, received federal fiscal relief 
because of the financial situation in the nation that year. Texas received over $500 
million from the federal government, but instead of adding that to the state’s 
                                                             
 69 “Texas House Member, Texas House of Representatives, accessed September 20, 2019, 
https://house.texas.gov/members/member-page/?district=147. 
 70 Garnet Coleman Interview by Curtis Mooney. 
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appropriation in the budget, the Legislature decreased its appropriation by that amount. 
The state also had more federal funds with a change in Medicaid to a more favorable 
matching rate, which meant that Texas had to spend less to get the same coverage under 
Medicaid. While the Republican leadership claimed that through extensive administrative 
changes, they could reduce cost, “it was really an exercise in cutting services more than 
anything else.” Within the state hospitals, the Legislature also made an additional change 
by placing more funding in the state budget for restoring competency for prisoners to 
stand trial and less for treating the mental illness of those who had not committed a 
crime.71 Since 2003, competency-restoration beds have grown so that they outnumber the 
beds available for the non-criminal population of the state.  
 TDMHMR called for 10 percent reductions in budgets in 2003.72 MHMRA closed 
two of its eight clinics that were serving 1,640 clients. The agency had already reduced 
expenses by over $4 million in 2002, and it had laid off 90 full-time staff. In 2003, 
MHMRA created a mobile unit to serve some of those affected by the closings and staff 
reductions, but the agency expected it and the NPC to be overwhelmed with patients. The 
program director of the mobile unit said, “My worst nightmare is we’re going to do all 
this to connect people to services and there won’t be any services to connect them to.”73 
Because of the actions of the Republican-controlled state Legislature in 2003, MHMRA 
could only provide services with state-appropriated funding to priority population, those 
                                                             
 71 Ibid. 
 72 MHMRA Board of Director Minutes, January 28, 2003: 4, The Harris Center for Mental Health 
and IDD Executive Offices, Houston, TX. 
 73 Leigh Hopper, “Two Clinics for Indigent Being Shut—Mental Health Agency Reacts to Budget 
Crisis,” Houston Chronicle, February 27, 2003: 21. 
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with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and severe depression.74 They could provide only 
crisis care for those suffering from other diseases that can be as debilitating at any given 
time, if not over the life of the individual.  
 The funding of services for the mentally ill in Texas began to change following 
the passage of the Affordable Care Act. As part of that act, the federal government sought 
to help the largest states prepare for moving toward expanded Medicaid, by providing a 
waiver that allowed local, previously unmatched portions of mental health expenditures, 
including such funds in the MHMRA budget, to serve as a match to draw down more 
Medicaid funds. In Houston, the Harris County Hospital District took the lead in 
gathering the required new proposals to provide a new medical system and program 
innovations, including those for mental health.75 This was to be a short-term program to 
prepare Texas for expanded Medicaid, but when the Supreme Court ruled that such 
expansion was voluntary, the Republican-led Legislature refused to expand Medicaid 
even though the federal government would have funded most of the cost. The federal 
government has continued to allow Texas to use this funding mechanism, but it is set to 
end in 2022.  The failure of Texas, the state with the largest number of uninsured in the 
nation, to expand Medicaid to provide medical care for millions, makes one skeptical that 
it will provide the resources to maintain these new programs for treating those with an 
SMI in a growing state that has so long ignored the needs of so many.  
 Even with the new level of funding, Rep. Coleman noted in 2016, “Texas has a 
long way to go. The state had moved from forty-eighth in the nation to forty-third …   
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before 2003, and then it went backward in 2003. We are not at the level of funding we 
had in the 1990s.”76 Steve Schnee noted that HCPC opened with 250 beds and not the 
500 planned. He further stated  that in Harris County, 
The number of acute care beds for the public sector is down two-thirds of what it 
was 28 years ago [when HCPC opened]. Why are we surprised there are so many 
people in jail, homeless, or on the streets. There are causes and effects. These are 
not folks who choose to have a serious mental illness and then wake up someday 
and say I do not want to have this anymore. There are huge numbers of people 
that we can never get to who need help.77 
 
The Criminalization of Mental Illness Today  
 
 When severe mental illness goes untreated, it does not go away. Persons with an 
untreated SMI tax their families both financially and emotionally, to the point that those 
families often cannot provide the help needed. Society has little tolerance for individuals 
whose illness causes them to act erratically and break community norms and laws. Their 
actions lead to arrests and incarceration at the Harris County Jail, where they do receive 
treatment from MHMRA. That jail is the largest mental health facility in the state of 
Texas, serving approximately 2,400 mentally ill patients per day out of a total population 
of 9,000 inmates. The mentally ill are “arrested six times more often than those without a 
mental illness,” and they remain in jail, on average, “40 percent longer than those without 
mental illness.” The average cost to house and treat a mentally ill inmate in Harris 
County is $232 per day, while the cost for a day of incarceration of the general 
population is $57.78 The $232 per day includes the regular cost of incarceration plus the 
                                                             
 76 Garnet Coleman interview. 
 77 Steve Schnee 2nd interview. 
 78 The increased costs for the mentally ill reflect payments for increased security,  psychotropic 
medications, treatment, and oversight by medical staff. “Report on the Harris County Mental Health Jail 
Diversion Pilot Program for Fiscal Year 2016,” Health and Human Services Commission, February 2017: 3. 
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costs of providing additional staffing, security, and treatment for mental illness for those 
incarcerated with a diagnosed illness. That cost compares favorably, however, to the 
budgeted average daily cost in a state psychiatric hospital in Texas that was $499 per day 
FY 2018 and $514 per day for FY 2019.79 One assumes, however, while all of those in 
the state hospital would have an SMI, not all of the mentally ill patients in the jail would. 
 The state and county have taken some small steps to help the mentally ill avoid 
jail. In 2013, the Texas Legislature provided funding, contingent upon the Harris County 
Commissioners Court matching it, to create “a criminal justice mental health service” 
pilot program, in conjunction with the courts, local law enforcement organizations, and 
local providers of services to the mentally ill. This program focuses on “reducing the 
recidivism and frequency of arrests and incarceration of persons with mental illness in the 
Harris County Jail.”80 It uses several “evidence-based intervention models and best 
practices,” including “integrated primary and behavioral health care,” “permanent 
supportive housing,” and various forms of therapy. A study of the project published by 
the Texas Health and Human Services Commission in 2017 showed that of the 4,155 
persons referred to the program in 2015 and 2016, only 554 qualified to enter it. The 
study also showed that for participants, there was a small decrease in jail bookings and 
charges and a similar small decrease in felonies and misdemeanors. Most significant was 
an average decrease of 18.9 jail days for each person in the first year of the study. This 
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reduction yielded savings to the county of $571,564.81 In addition to reducing the number 
of jail days, the program also led to shorter hospital stays.82  
 Harris County also added a mental health court in 2012 that works with a small 
number of volunteers, severely mentally ill patients who have committed a felony and are 
on probation. The court supervises their activities closely as the probationers work with 
community mental health providers. These providers provide comprehensive evaluations, 
intensive treatment by mental health professionals, and substance abuse treatment for 
persons with both mental illness and addiction disorders. The goal of the program is to 
“ensure public safety and minimize recidivism while diverting defendants with a mental 
illness from incarceration.”83 While these actions have helped, they can by no means 
reduce the number of those with an SMI in jail without a tremendous expansion of the 
programs. 
At Present, Harris County Fails to Meet the Intensive Needs of the Indigent 
with an SMI  
 
 Harris County Commissioners Court engaged the Meadows Mental Health Policy 
Institute for Texas (Meadows) to complete a study of Harris County’s public mental 
health systems in 2014. The study found that 87,283 adults were suffering from an SMI 
and 56,044 children with a severe emotional disturbance in Harris County who were at or 
below 200 percent of the Federal Poverty Level. Meadows determined that with 
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MHMRA and Harris Health, the county’s public hospital system, along with 12 federally 
qualified health centers (FQHCs), and three Medicaid managed care networks, 75 percent 
of the adults and 56 percent of the children received some level of services. While these 
individuals received some care, the remaining 21,820 adults in poverty and suffering an 
SMI, and 24,659 emotionally disturbed children in poverty had no access to treatment. 
Meadows determined that the system had “dramatically too little intensive service 
capacity.” The study concluded:  
Relying primarily on MHMRA, Harris County has an estimated one-ninth of 
needed intensive service capacity, and one-tenth of supported housing capacity, 
compared to the level of severe need in the community and best practice 
benchmarks. As a result, high need cases cycle repeatedly through jails, hospitals, 
and inadequate care, costing $50 million in jail costs and $150 million in 
emergency room costs because the system is designed with too little core 
capacity.84 
 
In reality, treatment is so underfunded in Harris County by the Texas Legislature that it 
offers a partial level of care to those it is required to serve by law while ignoring a large 
proportion altogether. The design of the system is not wrong; it is not funded at anywhere 
near the level required to treat people who have no other means of receiving such care. It 
is prudent to recognize the added burden of cost to the county for the lack of service 
capacity, which this study does.  It was a study focused on systems, and the researchers 
interviewed key leaders within the county and sought data from a variety of sources to 
show the lack of capacity. However, Meadows did not interview those who have mental 
illness in the county, nor did they seek input regarding the tremendous burden those 
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persons suffering from an SMI in Harris County face every day. Their illnesses mean 
they will continue to go in and out of jail, emergency rooms, and HCPC with chaotic 
lives outside of those places of care and treatment. They will live on the streets or with 
their families if their families will take them in after years of suffering from their family 
member’s illness.  
  Texas is a wealthy state; Harris County is the largest county in the state and the 
third-largest in the nation. It has a vast petroleum-based industry and the world’s largest 
medical center. Nevertheless, with the state and county refusing to provide the intensive 
services needed, they condemn thousands of individuals to live with illnesses that go 
untreated in conditions that most of us cannot imagine. Without treatment, they live 
confused lives listening to voices that are not real, experiencing bouts of mania where 
they believe they can do anything, then fall to the depths of depression where they can 
hardly move. With extreme depression, they cannot take care of their basic needs. 
Navigating the medical system with a Medicaid card is not easy, for reimbursement rates 
are so low in Texas that few of the doctors they need to see will take it. Because of their 
mental illness, their physical health will suffer to the point that they will die much earlier 
than those without mental illness will. They will experience the problem of where do you 
go to the bathroom in a major city when you have no place to live, or where do you go 
when the heat index is over 100 and you are wearing or carrying everything you own. 
The police will arrest them for going to the bathroom on someone’s yard, stealing food 
because they are so hungry, or frightening the sane by their words or actions. They will 
live utterly lonely lives with an illness they do not understand, and often with no one to 
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turn to for help. They face the risk of abuse by others on the street or of deciding that they 
can no longer face life and committing suicide.  
Conclusion 
 
 Houston and Harris County, Texas, is one of the largest communities in the 
nation. It is a fast-growing metropolitan area of incredible wealth, with 21 Fortune 500 
companies located there. Its port, located 50 miles from the coast, is the second-largest 
port by tonnage in the United States. It has the world’s most extensive collection of 
health care facilities within the Texas Medical Center. This collection of resources, 
however, has not been the source of improved care and treatment for those living in 
poverty with a severe mental illness within the community. The largest mental health 
facility in the city, county, and state is the Harris County Jail, as the criminalization of 
mental illness has occurred here and across the nation. Structural and political changes at 
the state level have further reduced funding. However, recent temporary federal funding 
intended to prepare Texas for expanded Medicaid brought significant new monies to 
Harris County for mental health services. That funding has enabled an expansion of 
services using formerly unmatched county funding that has not required new state 
monies. This new federal funding has enabled the development of new programs to serve 
those with an SMI and allowed MHMRA to eliminate its waiting list. Unfortunately, this 
expanded resource will end in 2022, and a significant question remains--will Texas 
provide the funding needed to keep the new programs going? 
 The mentally ill in the county still have high needs, but this new funding has 
shown that improvements in their lives come with more funding. In the end, the treatment 
of the severely mentally ill is dependent on funding by Harris County, by the state of 
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Texas, and by the nation. At no governmental level are enough resources available to 
provide for the intensive needs of those who suffer from a group of devastating illnesses 
that destroy lives. These illnesses include schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major clinical 
depression, severe personality disorders, and any mental illness that limits an individual 
from performing critical life activities. These illnesses require more than the prescription 
of medicine and occasional visits. They require on-going care and treatment appropriate 
for their needs in a world for which they are poorly prepared to exist, much less thrive.
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X. CONCLUSION  
 
 Mental illness is a disease that defies most understanding. Though research is 
improving the understanding of its origin and its nature, we still do not have a complete 
understanding of its cause. Though medications and therapy can bring a reduction in the 
symptoms of the illness, there is yet no cure. While we refer to it as mental illness, in 
reality, it is a spectrum of diseases with varying acuity and debilitation. The individuals 
with a mental illness usually do not look any different from people without the illness. 
Nevertheless, mental illness, whether one of those considered a serious mental illness 
(SMI) or one that does not meet that threshold, can profoundly alter the lives of those 
who suffer from it, as well as the lives of their families.   
 In 1861, Texas joined the other states in opening its first public asylum for 60 
residents because members of the Legislature believed the asylum offered a cure for 
mental illness. Here, under the care of a physician and staff, many individuals regained 
their sanity, though others did not. The latter remained in the asylum, and they gradually 
filled it, along with new admissions because of population growth. Over the next 90 
years, the one small asylum grew to a small system of hospitals serving over 15,000 
people at a time in what were overused facilities and substandard programs. Though the 
first asylums failed to provide a complete cure, they did provide basic care for those with 
an illness that destroyed lives. The only other choice was jail, where those with an SMI 
often found themselves awaiting an opening in a state hospital. Through the 1940s, 
Texans brought pressure on the legislature to add more beds to their state hospitals to 
move the mentally ill from the jails. However, few in Texas questioned what happened 
inside the state hospitals, assuming that all was well. For most people, the building of 
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facilities for the mentally ill took care of society’s obligation to them. They were out of 
sight and out of the mind of the public. 
 World War II and the years following it brought the beginning of a significant 
change in the treatment and care of the mentally ill in Texas and the nation. The exposure 
of the overcrowding, inadequate facilities, poorly paid staff, and intolerable conditions 
within the state hospitals led to changes in the controlling authority over the state 
hospitals in Texas, and a tax on cigarettes allowed the refurbishment of the hospitals and 
the construction of some new buildings in the early 1950s. New medications, 
psychodynamic therapies, the growing belief that mental illness was far more prevalent 
than hereto believed, and the growing number of referrals to the mental hospitals led for 
the first time to the national government’s focus on the treatment of mental illness. This 
focus, new laws, and new federal court decisions brought significant change to the 
treatment of mental illness in the United States and Texas. 
 This change led to a national movement away from institutional care towards the 
development of community mental health centers. Nationally, most psychiatrists and the 
medical community sanctioned this change. In Texas, those two groups led a yearlong 
planning effort funded by the federal government to create a community based mental 
health system within the state. At the same time, the two groups sought a stronger role for 
themselves in the leadership of the state’s mental health programs. Texas’ politicians in 
1965 were content with the institutions then serving the state, and only created a new 
department and added community mental health at the insistence of this mental health 
planning effort. The national push for deinstitutionalization began with this movement to 
community mental health centers, but Medicaid and federal laws subsidizing nursing 
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homes and funding boarding homes fueled its growth. Federal court decisions also 
supported the deinstitutionalization movement through decisions that critically 
challenged institutional care. These rulings led to higher costs per individual served 
within the institutions. The changes within the hospitals improved the care of the 
inpatients; however, it dramatically reduced the number of beds for patients suffering 
from severe mental illness in Texas and other states, when the state legislatures would not 
fund the much more expensive care and community mental health centers at the level 
needed.   
 In Chapter I, I looked at the views from Grob, Andreasen, and Torrey concerning 
why we, as a nation, allow the treatment of mental illness to be so different from physical 
illness. Another aspect of why we treat mental illness so differently comes from the 
views of Thomas Szasz, who was prominent in the antipsychiatry movement, as noted in 
Chapter III. Szasz was a psychoanalyst who argued that mental illness does not exist. His 
views continue in the work of the Citizens Commission on Human Rights, which lobbies 
states not to fund the treatment of mental illness. This study of the treatment of severe 
mental illness in Texas and Harris County offers some additional support as to why we 
allow such different treatment of the mentally ill. Two prominent messages of the 
community mental health movement and the antipsychiatry movement were that 
institutions were terrible, and the mentally ill were not sick. The antipsychiatry 
movement of the era presented the mentally ill as persons who were just different, and 
therefore should not lose their freedom. While they argued that many of those previously 
hospitalized did not need extensive long-term treatment, they failed to recognize that 
some of those with a chronic illness needed care beyond that of a nursing home, boarding 
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homes, or the streets. Texans and frankly, most Americans heard the message that 
hospitals were a part of the past, as did the state legislators. If the mentally ill were not 
sick, then their actions were criminal, they were accountable for their activities, and jail 
or prison was now the appropriate place for them.  
 In Texas, the citizens heard or read too much about the problems with state and 
local agencies that treated the mentally ill. They read about the conflict between the 
board of the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation (TDMHMR) 
and its executive directors over who would lead the department in its early days. After 
almost a quarter-century of conflict over the R.A.J. lawsuit, Texans and their Legislature 
longed for an end to bad news from Austin and the state hospitals. In Harris County and 
other locations, they learned of scandal after scandal associated with the county’s Mental 
Health and Mental Retardation Authority (MHMRA) or other local CMHCs and the lack 
of funding for the treatment of mental illness. The public lost confidence in their agencies 
and paid little attention as local leaders called for even more money to care for people 
whom many assumed were better off in jail than on the streets.  
 However, the mentally ill did not go away just because there were no hospital 
beds for them, and the underfunded community mental health system did not keep 
hundreds of thousands of mentally ill people sane and able to function in society.  
Instead, with no treatment, the mentally ill became sicker and committed acts that 
brought the attention of the authorities to them. Instead of having a system to provide 
treatment for them, we arrested them and placed them in jail. 
 As long as the mentally ill did not disturb “normal” people, there was very little 
pressure from the citizens to the Legislature to change the situation. However, that did 
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change as the shootings in schools, churches, and other easy targets took place. The 
killing of the young schoolchildren at the Sandy Hook Primary School in Connecticut in 
2012 within days of the Texas Legislature opening caught the attention of everyone.  
Texans found it too hard to consider that guns could be the problem, but obviously, 
something was wrong, and the Legislature settled on mental illness as the problem even 
though the vast number of mentally ill are not dangerous. Starting in 2013, the 
Legislature funded a significant increase in mental health resources, and it has continued 
to do so since that time.  Those new funds, along with a temporary federal Medicaid 
waiver, dramatically increased resources for the mentally ill. One hopes this level of 
funding will continue to grow as the state grows. However, there is no state or national 
call to empty the jails and prisons of the mentally ill. There is also no call for the creation 
of programs that truly meet the needs of the SMI. There is a fear of the mentally ill with 
weapons, but no real compassion for them.  The criminalization of mental illness has not 
led to a state or national movement to recognize that mental illness is indeed an illness 
that, like any other illness, deserves the appropriate treatment and care. 
How do we Fix this System? 
 
 As noted in Chapter I, mental illnesses are some of the most common illnesses in 
our nation. I have family members who have a mental illness, as many other families do, 
but most of us keep it a secret. Through our silence, we are continuing to ignore one of 
the most critical factors in fixing the system. By not telling others, we perpetuate the 
stigma, shame, and irrational beliefs that surround mental illness. The individuals and 
families who deal with mental illness feel they are alone in their suffering, and our 
silence fails to raise a collective voice for the nation to deal with this dire situation. Not 
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more than a half-century ago, a diagnosis of cancer carried almost the same stigma as 
mental illness still does today. Today, thanks to research, improvements in treatment, and 
just the knowledge of how widespread the illness is, it is no longer something about 
which we do not talk. The National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) is an organization 
started by family members of individuals with mental illness. They bring a loud voice for 
their ill family members. That voice, however, must become stronger, and it must speak 
out at every opportunity against the stigma surrounding mental illness and advocate for 
changes in our failed system of care. 
 Another critical need lacking in the current environment is leadership for change.  
Twice, with the building of asylums and hospitals, and later, the community mental 
health movement, America focused on mental illness intending to cure it or at least make 
it so that people could live “normal” lives in the community. Both times these 
movements became the nation’s answer for mental illness, and they became almost 
evangelical movements. In both situations, the states and the nations followed the advice 
of the medical community. That advice first was to build specially designed facilities, 
asylums that became hospitals, where the mentally ill away from the home environment 
that had caused the illness, and under the care of a physician, could regain their sanity. 
Second, over a hundred years later, physicians recommended the creation of community 
mental health centers to provide treatment so that the mentally ill could live in the 
community. They now saw the hospitals as the treatment of the past. 
 Some psychiatrists today are again calling for change, but the splintered field of 
mental health has many voices, and the leadership calling for change is limited. Too 
many of the rest of us have grown silent, seeing little need to worry about the mentally ill 
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since they are now mostly in jail or prison. We do see them on the streets, where they join 
the rest of the homeless, but in our capitalistic culture, there are always losers who cannot 
make it, and most of us assume that charity or the “government” will help them.   
 The severely mentally ill do not need a new movement that promises a magic cure 
that does not exist, as the asylum and community mental health movements did. The 
reality is that in the United States, we need to change the funding mechanisms for the 
treatment of mental illness, and create a system that places the responsibility for the 
treatment and care of the mentally ill with those who have the capability of leading it:  
the medical community, just as physicians deal with other illnesses.   
 As noted in Chapter IV, Medicaid is the primary funding mechanism for the 
public treatment of mental illness in the nation. It is a needs-based program with no pre-
set federal limit on funds available to each state. The state can receive unlimited 
reimbursement for federally approved programs as long as it provides the required match.  
In essence, Texas and other states determine the amount of federal funding available to 
them for all qualified applicants by the services they approve, and by the rates they pay 
providers. The legislatures also determine the funding for state hospitals, community 
mental health centers, and potentially other services.  Principally, therefore, each state 
legislature determines the treatments their state will provide based upon the choices they 
alone agree to fund. The legislatures also approve the funding from the state’s resources 
for state services at whatever level they are willing to spend. The reliance on Medicaid 
funding levels determined solely by each state legislature means that in many states, 
including Texas, there is a tremendous under-treatment in services for the mentally ill.  
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Despite this underfunding, it has become one of the most substantial expenses, so states 
have turned to managed care to control their expenses.   
 Behavioral Managed Care Organizations (BMCOs) manage the mental health 
expenses funded by Medicaid in Texas and most other states. These companies refer only 
to a select number of providers and closely monitor the care provided to keep the 
expenses down. BMCOs are paid a flat fee for each life they manage, so they have no 
incentive to provide the much more costly services needed by those suffering from an 
SMI. BMCOs also manage the treatment of mental illness for most private insurance 
companies, using the same principles. BMCOs route individuals seeking mental health 
treatment to an entirely different manager than that for physical illness, and those 
managers exercise much greater control over the choices of providers and services than 
do the managers of physical health.   
 This treatment of mental health separately from physical health is a significant 
problem for those with an SMI or any mental illness. Despite federal laws requiring 
parity between mental illness and physical illness treatment when they exist under two 
different systems, there is, in reality, no equality. As described in Chapter IV, both 
Medicare and Medicaid have rules limiting coverage for mental illness that do not apply 
to physical illness. Separate care and treatment for the mentally ill does not create better 
treatment and care; it creates a separate and unequal system for those who suffer some of 
the most debilitating illnesses our nation knows. A movement toward integrating physical 
health and mental health has begun in Texas and other states. These programs integrate 
mental health providers within the primary care setting. This team approach treats the 
whole person. The challenge in this new model, however, is similar to that of the current 
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one. How do we fund the more expensive care needed by those with an SMI that may 
include intensive case management, a place to live, and someone to make sure those ill 
are taking their medications and taking care of their essential needs? The Texas 
Legislature has refused to fund the treatment of mental illness at this level in the past. Its 
unwillingness to increase taxes in a fast-growing state, and its unwillingness to approve 
expanded Medicaid, mostly funded by federal dollars, provides ample evidence to predict 
that Texas will not fund the expensive care needed by the mentally ill in the future. To 
leave the future of the treatment of mental illness to the Texas Legislature or perhaps any 
legislature does not bode well for those afflicted with these tragic illnesses. 
 Though the United States spends more than any other nation on health care, its 
basis of healthcare is an entrepreneurial model where physicians, hospitals, 
pharmaceutical companies, and insurance companies all focus on providing services that 
make them the most money without regard to the real needs of the patients. Wealthy 
sections of cities have far more hospitals, more primary care physicians and specialists, 
and more pharmacies than income-deprived sections where there is often more illness, 
but money is less plentiful. Most persons with chronic mental illness and their families 
exhaust their resources and become dependent upon public resources, primarily 
Medicaid, for treatment and care. Medicaid funding in Texas means individuals have 
fewer physicians who will treat them and have minimal access to hospitals to serve them. 
A study requested by Harris County Commissioners Court recently documented that the 
county did not have resources to provide services to those in poverty whom by law they 
are required to serve. It also found that for those whom they served, the services were far 
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from adequate. Without proper treatment, many of those individuals are arrested, placed 
in jail, and ultimately for some, prison. 
 The best answer to proper funding for mental health is the creation of national 
universal health insurance with the full integration of mental health and physical health 
care. This change would place the responsibility for the patients in the hands of the 
physicians and ancillary service providers who oversee their direct treatment and care. 
Such a change to universal health insurance must provide adequate compensation for the 
highly skilled individuals who provide the treatment and care to both the physically and 
mentally ill. The United States is one of the few industrialized countries that does not 
have a universal health insurance program, and we spend far more than any other country 
on healthcare. In the United States, healthcare makes up 17.9 percent of the gross 
domestic product (GDP), which is six percentage points higher than any other 
industrialized nation. The nation spends more on healthcare than any other expense. 
 Nevertheless, the resulting healthcare is not as good as that of several other 
countries; however, it has made the healthcare industry quite wealthy. The profit of each 
component in our health care delivery system and the administrative costs of maintaining 
the many different elements of our medical model would go a long way toward treating 
those with an SMI in our nation. The universal health insurance debate in the United 
States began 100 years ago. Whether it will ever become a reality is a political question. 
The integration of mental health and physical health is a new trend that other nations are 
working to develop as well; it may be closer to reality than universal national health 
insurance in the United States. 
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 Another concern is reducing criminalization through changes in the legal issues 
around the treatment of mental illness. Is being able to refuse specific treatments, or only 
being required to accept treatment if you are a danger to yourself or someone else by 
clear and convincing evidence protecting the civil rights of a person whose mind is not 
capable of making appropriate decisions for themselves? Is not living on the streets, 
dying years earlier than those without mental illness, and experiencing the effects of 
increasingly debilitating illness without medications not making one a danger to one’s 
self?  It is time for Congress and the courts to revisit decisions made at the height of the 
deinstitutionalization and the civil rights movements.   
 Making any change in the funding and the laws regarding the treatment and care 
of those suffering from an SMI will not be easy. However, the reality is that the current 
system is a national disgrace, as thousands of very ill people go untreated or poorly 
treated, and they break the law and go to jail and prison. With only 3 to 5 percent of the 
violent acts in the nation committed by persons with a severe mental illness, the mentally 
ill are not necessarily violent people.1 However, with the gun laws as they are in the 
United States, the availability of such weapons makes it highly likely that mentally ill 
persons will continue to use them to tragic effect. The availability of guns is higher in the 
United States than virtually any other country, and the ease with which anyone, including 
a mentally ill person, can obtain one makes this a dangerous place to live.   
 All of the possible answers for funding the treatment of mentally ill individuals, 
placing responsibility for their care under properly trained providers and moving away 
                                                             





from the criminalization of the mentally ill, involve major decisions that only our elected 
and appointed officials can make.  All of us must recognize that elections have 
consequences, and at this point, those consequences are very bad for individuals who 
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